I thought it was over.
Are minds required for truth?
The answer is yes â for some meanings of âmindâ and some meanings of âtruthâ.
To say it differently, the terms âmindâ and âtruthâ are sufficiently imprecise that we cannot actually make sense of the question in the title.
My take: The notion of truth emerges from language. Itâs what people is a social group (or language community) use to express agreement or disagreement. And language could not work without that ability to express agreement or disagreement.
One can hold a skeptical view of propositions, whereby they donât actually exist at all, even in the presence of minds. Philosophers who take that position suggest that we should talk of âstatementsâ or âsentencesâ or âassertionsâ rather than propositions.
We have to use those words when defining âpropositionâ.
No. Or rather the mind is only a tool for the heart to allow the soul to think. The bible says man thinks with his heart. not with his mind. The mind, memory to me, is like a logical machine. the heart, priority conclusions, is what is the intellectual thinking part.
Yes there is truth. Who decides what is true? Thats the story of humanity.
Our hearts are more intelligent then our functioning mind. Yet its all about conclusions we have convinced ourselves about.
Thats why in origin issues the evidences we all claim prove our side are not persuasive to the other side.
this because our hearts have made conclusions and our minds are only along for the ride.
How do you know this (that formal systems of logic donât have anything to do with God)?
Thatâs a fair question! I know that no system of logic includes a âGodâ axiom. There is good reason for this, because introducing an assumption about God would introduce paradox.
Iâll add this - I donât think God can be a valid mathematical assumption, but might be valid for others reasons, like emotion, love, compassion, and empathy. Logic does not answer all questions, IMO. YMMV
I have no problem with that, but when you say âaxiomâ and âsystem of logicâ, you automatically presume a mind (unless you are platonically mindless ).
Yet, every system of logic has paradox built into it. I would refer you to Godels incompleteness theorem.
The first incompleteness theorem states that no consistent system of axioms whose theorems can be listed by an algorithm is capable of proving all truths about the arithmetic of the natural numbers
For any such consistent formal system, there will always be statements about the natural numbers that are true, but that are unprovable within the system. The second incompleteness theorem, an extension of the first, shows that the system cannot demonstrate its own consistency.
The quote is from Wikipedia. In short all systems of logic need something outside the system to affirm basic truths and are not complete in themselves.
This means, even math needs God or atleast truths that are eternal and immovable.
Interesting, why do you think so? Do you mind elaborating?
I would be careful here. First of, Godelâs incompleteness theorem does not say that âevery system of logic has a paradoxâ, but rather that there are statements about the natural numbers that are undecidable. Having undecidable statements about the natural numbers is very different from having paradoxes.
Further,
Not true. First of, Godelâs incompleteness theorem does not say that basic truths are undecidable, but rather that very specific statements about the natural numbers, called Godel sentences are undecidable by logical systems whose axioms can be generated through effective procedures. I would be surprised if basic statements about God(s) are Godel sentences.
Further, one cannot add âsomething outside the systemâ to patch this up, i.e. one cannot appeal to
to patch this system, as adding âtruths that are eternal and immovableâ is equivalent to adding new axioms. This new system is also subject to Godelâs incompleteness theorem, and thus remains incomplete.
Why are the statements undecidable? Isnât it because of a paradox within it where the statement seems both true as well as false?
As I understand it, this means that there will always be basic axioms in any logical system which we believe to be true intuitively even though there is no proof for the same.
I donât see God in Godel statement, bit in the incompleteness of logical systems. All systems of logic need to be rooted in truths that are beyond the scope of the systems proofs.
Would you agree that if these âtruthsâ were different, then, the conclusion of the logical systems would be different?
No, they are undecidable because they cannot be proven.
Your understanding is mistaken then. What you are describing is just the fact that logical systems have axioms, and has nothing to do with Godelâs incompleteness theorem.
Thatâs more or less the definition of what an axiom is; an assumption so basic that it cannot be proven. If it could be proven it wouldnât be basic. Some axioms (like Identity) are intuitively true. Others might not be so obvious, and may be excluded from alternative systems. The axiom of Choice, having to do with enumerating infinities, is an example of this.
If God can move the immovable object, or otherwise change the rules to allow the object to be moved, it introduces paradox. If God says, âLet 1=2â, breaking the axiom of Identity, then everything based on on that assumption of Identity breaks too.
As an open but related question, Can God make God not exist?. Breaking the axiom of Identity is, to my thinking, the same as God defining Himself out of existence (and everything else too). If there is an omnipotent God, it is a God that chooses not to break the universe.
@PdotdQ provided excellent responses to everything else, so I wonât respond to the other points.
This seems to be the âIf a tree falls in a forest âŚâ question again. There MAY EXIST propositions that are true but unknown or undiscovered. They remain true even if no mind wanders along to give them a name.
Whether or not I am Platonically mindless is an open question.
This type of âno-limitâ understanding of omnipotence has been rejected by philosophers since the middle ages. God cannot perform logically impossible task as such task is not well defined - e.g. âa triangle with 4 edgesâ is just word salad with no real meaning.
Yes⌠but why should that lead to paradox. Couldnât it be possible to have an entirely coherent logical system that is different from the current one in which 1=2?
How do you know this is not possible?
Which is why I think God would be constrained to follow the axiom of Identity, and perhaps a few others.
First a clarification: I made the unstated assumption that the logic of set theory applies to the physical world and also to the metaphysical (perhaps a step too far?). The former seems reasonable, but the latter can only be speculation. IF God is not bound to this logic, then this is consistent with my earlier statement that God is an axiom - assumed but not provable.
How is that even a question? A system of logic that defines â1=2â is paradoxical by definition.
You might define a system of logic that doesnât include the axiom of Identity. Such a system could be entirely consistent, but (Iâm pretty sure that) nothing would be decidable.
Trying to catch me out with a series of unanswerable questions is not âŚpolite. If that what you are trying to do, then I will start demanding your own answer to the question before I reply.
And at least 700 years of classical Catholic philosophy agrees with you. This is very different from your original claim:
Because one can axiomatically introduce an assumption about God(s) who do not have âno-limitâ omnipotence.
Interesting! I have never encountered this, and I wonder if such a statement can really be made axiomatically, but Iâm willing to accept your word on it. My previous brushes with this question were with people who would never admit to limited assumptions - and maybe not even to assumptions ITFP.
I find this interesting. I mostly read Catholic philosophy, and I am not familiar with Protestant and non-Christian conceptions of God. In Catholicism, that God does not have no-limit omnipotence is a traditional and well accepted statement.
Indeed, ideas of it (though the full statement is not until much later), seem to be present in documents as old as the Pauline Epistles, 2 Timothy 2:13: âIf we are unfaithful [God] remains faithful, for [God] cannot deny himself.â.
One might even argue that hints of it is as old as the Old Testament, Hebrews 6:18: âso that by two unchangeable things in which it is impossible for God to lieâŚâ Though I donât really know how to properly analyze the Old Testament.
My educated guess: most of my previous encounters have been with certain Evangelical Protestants, and Omphalism make frequent appearances.