Which is besides the point, in my view. Evolution would remain true as a scientific idea. If it is “true” in any other sense, who’s to say?
I’m not doubting that. What I am questioning is whether and how he has actually calculated that this is more probable, under evolution, than organisms who succeed with reliable beliefs.
My position is that we have no way of knowing, so why worry about it? Unless you’re a theistic philosopher trying to prove your god exists, that is.
A benevolent God does not save the argument, because how are we to know what a “benevolent God” would do? With our minds? The very mind Plantinga believes was created by this benevolent God?
I can’t see how it is any more difficult to rationalize a benevolent God who gives us unreliable minds for our own good than one who creates a world in which little kids die of leukemia.
I’m not really sure what “true as a scientific idea” would mean.
I am going to stop defending Plantinga, however, as I don’t agree with him so my heart is not in it. I’m happy to accept that many other philosophers have put forth criticisms and leave the details to them as they do not interest me.
Well I think we do have a way of knowing. I think there is a mind independent world, that our scientific theories should be taken literally when they make claims about non-observable objects like Higgs bosons that are part of that world, and our scientific practices yield approximately true theories which improve in their approximations over time.
It’s not about God or theism. Many atheist philosophers are involved in this argument. I think it is an argument about the nature of science and why it works so well. That’s one motivation for caring.
There is also a separate argument about everyday reality and whether we should doubt our knowledge of that reality via eg Cartesian skepticism. That’s a separate set of arguments.
The basic positions of both these arguments have been hashed out at TSZ (and of course in introduction philosophy texts as well as IEP and SEP). I am not interested in revisiting these discussions here. Let me know if you want some links or books.
He argues for other ways of knowing about God , namely the Sensus divinitatis, that would probably apply here. But I’m not interested in defending that position, only in saying that I suspect that Plantinga has a theology which addresses your #3. He’s too intelligent and involved in these arguments not to be familiar with your points in #3.
I mean that, based on the stuff going on in our minds and the minds of the other people who seem to exist according to the stuff going on in our minds, and the rules of science that we all seem to have agreed on, evolution is true.
Maybe the worst sentence I have ever written in my life.
I will respect your wish not to talk about Plantinga further.
A different but related argument in Philosophy of Physics/Science is the Realism (physics theories describe the world) versus Anti-realism (physics theories models the world) argument. I’m ambivalent on this question - it doesn’t seem reasonable to deny the reality of atoms, but the very different constructions of Newtonian gravity versus General Relativity versus a hypothetical gauge theory of gravity give me pause with regards to Realism.
Right, I am referring to that in my posts as the issue of Scientific Realism.
I have only a vague, conceptual understanding of the mathematics of gauge theories and physics (which means I’ve eg read Susskind’s Bare Minimum book on EM and field theories without doing the exercises).
Based on that, and given your concern, I think that structural realism is a better approach to arguing for scientific realism than any form of entity realism is. The SEP article on structural realism provides more details; cited articles by eg Ladyman and French articles go further. I’m not qualified to argue about the math details, so my preference for structural realism is mostly intuitive at this stage.
I’m unhappy with how I expressed my concerns in my previous posts, mostly because I shot my mouth off about EAAN without having looked at the details for several years. So for my own intellectual satisfaction, I’m going to try again. Then I’ll stop and leave the last word to you, if you want to say more.
In the original version of his argument, Plantinga argues that we cannot have true everyday beliefs about the world if we simultaneously accept naturalism and evolution. As summarized in the Wiki article on EAAN, most of his opponents disagree with him, as do you. But unlike you, I read them as arguing evolution can indeed yield cognition which produces and entertains true everyday beliefs.
As I understand your posts, you agree with Plantinga that evolution does not justify claims that we have true everyday beliefs. You accept at least methodological naturalism in the sense that God has no role in our explanations. And of course you accept evolution is true in the sense you have described.
I have two concerns based on that understanding:
By rejecting a claim that we have true everyday beliefs, you are accepting some form of skepticism. t. I’m not sure if you have looked into the philosophical concerns and implications of such skepticism. If not, and if you are interested in such philosophy, then perhaps you might want to do so. SEP articles on Skepticism, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysical Realism address different facets of the philosophical issues. There are also TSZ discussions, where comments by KeithS, Walto, and KN are worth reading. (The SEP Kant material is mostly beyond me, but it speaks to your points about not knowing reality, I believe).
By accepting evolution as true but still making your argument, you may be committing the type of error that Plantinga describes. But that is mostly my claim, I now realize. On my reading of Wiki, it seems the EAAN discussion is more about everyday beliefs and reality, not the truth and realism of scientific theories. So pursuing that issue would involve understanding the philosophy of what makes scientific theories true (as opposed eg to merely to being instruments for successful prediction). That was my other set of potential links regarding scientific realism.
This is not by any means meant to be an exhaustive response to your points, and I don’t want to promise that one will be forthcoming. But just a few points that come to mind immediately:
I think my fundamental objection to Plantinga is the foundationalism that provides the very basis (the foundation?) of his argument. I have my misgivings about this to begin with, and need to be convinced of this in the first place before accepting his specific argument.
It also seems to be that foundationalism actually commits one to the very skepticism you’re talking about. I actually see nothing wrong with just presuming that there is an external world that exists in the form that we perceive it and that operates in pretty much the way we understand it, even if we cannot defend this as true with an air-tight metaphysical argument. I simply recognize that I am unable to defend this claim with such an argument, and don’t really think this is all that important outside of the context of a rigorous philosophical discussion.
There are anti-skeptical arguments that take a similar course, eg those based on anti-Cartesianism because of Peircean pragmatism and replies based on Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions.
I think you are right about Plantinga foundationalism, although it is also I think based on his theology.
I don’t think foundationalism in epistemology works.
