# Why the Brain-Only Model Cannot Fully Explain Near-Death Experiences **URL:** \ **Category:** Conversation\ **Tags:** Science, Philosophy\ **Created:** [September 12, 2026, 4:06am UTC](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/t/why-the-brain-only-model-cannot-fully-explain-near-death-experiences/18052 "2026-09-12T04:06:15Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 11\ **Page:** 8

**Author:** ![Paul\_King](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/5f8ce5/32.png) [@Paul\_King](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/u/Paul_King)\ **Post date:** [September 30, 2026, 11:35am UTC](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/t/why-the-brain-only-model-cannot-fully-explain-near-death-experiences/18052/142 "2026-09-30T11:35:40Z")

> [@LRT](#): > > Examples were given to show that vision and colour experiences reported during NDEs can differ dramatically from normal perception The answer to that is in the reply you quoted. Did you not see it? Did you not already know it from past discussion? > [@Paul\_King](#): > > According to your own words the differences in colour vision occur in visions of the afterlife and there is no reason to think that it is actually seeing or that there are colours in the ordinary sense to be seen. All of the examples you list where colour vision differed were either afterlife visions or gave no context that allowed the reader to determine whether they were or not. All the examples that clearly showed perception of the physical world did not mention any difference in colour vision - let alone a dramatic one. Perhaps you should ask yourself why you are so determinedly - and poorly - arguing this point. ---

**Author:** ![LRT](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/a88e57/32.png) [@LRT](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/u/LRT)\ **Post date:** [September 30, 2026, 11:35am UTC](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/t/why-the-brain-only-model-cannot-fully-explain-near-death-experiences/18052/143 "2026-09-30T11:35:58Z")

> [@John\_Harshman](#): > > The great thing about the dream hypothesis is that it requires no new and unevidenced forces of nature. It thus avoids the multiplication of entities that Occam was on about. It still requires supporting evidence for justification, even when applying Occam’s razor. > [@John\_Harshman](#): > > Because it requires fundamental features of nature for which there is no evidence. How about this: rather than comparing to dreams, how about comparing to manufactured memories? So, I need to justify in advance which possibilities are worth considering, exclude those that challenge our current understanding of the fundamental features of nature, and only accept what already has supporting evidence? How, then, do we test the limits of nature or open new fields of investigation under such constraints? Would that not risk introducing scientific bias? The hypothesis of manufactured memories also requires supporting evidence, lest it be treated differently because it aligns with a physicalist interpretation? ---

**Author:** ![Faizal\_Ali](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/discourse.peacefulscience.org/faizal_ali/32/12416_2.png) [@Faizal\_Ali](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/u/Faizal_Ali)\ **Post date:** [September 30, 2026, 4:41pm UTC](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/t/why-the-brain-only-model-cannot-fully-explain-near-death-experiences/18052/144 "2026-09-30T16:41:45Z")

> [@LRT](#): > > Examples were given to show that vision and colour experiences reported during NDEs can differ dramatically from normal perception, and that difference itself requires an explanation. The explanation is that perception is the result of brain function and, when the brain is functioning abnormally, abnormal perception occurs. Do you have a better explanation? A tip: An explanation that entails the existence of entities, forces or processes that are not known to exist is _not_ a better one. It’s a worse one. ---

**Author:** ![John\_Harshman](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/discourse.peacefulscience.org/john_harshman/32/1121_2.png) [@John\_Harshman](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/u/John_Harshman)\ **Post date:** [September 30, 2026, 8:32pm UTC](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/t/why-the-brain-only-model-cannot-fully-explain-near-death-experiences/18052/145 "2026-09-30T20:32:57Z")

> [@Faizal\_Ali](#): > > An explanation that entails the existence of entities, forces or processes that are not known to exist is _not_ a better one. It’s a worse one. Not necessarily. Dark matter is one such entity. We have no idea what dark matter is, except that it interacts with other matter only through gravity. But what it has that the alternatives to the brain as explanation of consciousness lacks is that it’s a parsimonious explanation for some high-quality data. Non-material souls seem carefully designed to be undetectable by any means, and consciousness as a fundamental feature of reality also seems to have no predicted detectable consequences. ---

**Author:** ![LRT](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/a88e57/32.png) [@LRT](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/u/LRT)\ **Post date:** [October 1, 2026, 2:33pm UTC](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/t/why-the-brain-only-model-cannot-fully-explain-near-death-experiences/18052/146 "2026-10-01T14:33:34Z")

> [@Paul\_King](#): > > The answer to that is in the reply you quoted. Did you not see it? Did you not already know it from past discussion? > > Paul\_King: > [@Paul\_King](#): > > Perhaps you should ask yourself why you are so determinedly - and poorly - arguing this point. Tell me plainly what you are trying to establish. I have reread your posts in this thread and still cannot tell what you want from me. You ask vague questions, then criticize my interpretation after the fact.I can’t help but feel that I’m being intentionally set up to fail. When you write, “The answer to that is in the reply you quoted. Did you not see it? Did you not already know it from past discussion?”, you answer with a jab and withhold the point. If you want specific information, ask for it. I can’t read your mind. You also wrote: “Perhaps you should ask yourself why you are so determinedly, and poorly, arguing this point.” That is an attack on my motives and my competence, not an argument. Maybe I am arguing poorly. But I am making a real effort to explain a position different from yours and to reason through it carefully. If you think I’m wrong, show me where and why. That would accomplish far more than questioning my intelligence. I have also noticed in other threads that when someone disagrees with you, your replies turn dismissive or derisive. Not everyone reasons in your way, and that does not make their arguments, or their effort to understand yours, worth ridiculing. State your point, and I’ll engage with it as best as I can. If not, this conversation is over. > [@Paul\_King](#): > > All of the examples you list where colour vision differed were either afterlife visions or gave no context that allowed the reader to determine whether they were or not. All the examples that clearly showed perception of the physical world did not mention any difference in colour vision - let alone a dramatic one. If I understand you correctly this time, colours can be more vivid, but not necessarily new, while the experiencer is still perceiving the earthly environment (e.g., the operating room), whereas new and more vivid colours are reported in the afterlife. ---

> [@Faizal\_Ali](#): > > Both views have in common the unanswered question of how consciousness is produced by the stuff that is presumed to produce it. That question does not exist under physicalism alone. The stuff that produces consciousness isn’t really “stuff” at all—it’s consciousness itself, at least according to my interpretation. That removes the need to explain how stuff somehow produces consciousness in the first place. > [@Faizal\_Ali](#): > > Wrong. In addition to the challenge of explaining how consciousness arises from the stuff that is presumed to produce, non-physicalism also has at least two additional challenges that do not pertain under physical: > > 1. How does the non-physical interact with the physical in the production of consciousness. > > 2. What evidence is there that the non-physical even exists in the first place? (Physicalists do not have to convince anyone that the brain exists.) Apart from the hard problem, if my research is correct, physicalism also has to contend with several other issues, including emergence, the binding problem, intentionality, mental causation, and the explanatory gap. So saying that replacing physicalism with a non-physical model necessarily creates more problems is an overstatement. Each model has its own set of unresolved issues. > [@Faizal\_Ali](#): > > You are misconstruing my point. By all means, we should study both dreams and NDE’s. I am not saying that we shouldn’t. I am, rather, asking: In studying the two phenomena (which I have never denied can be distinguished from one another) why should we more strongly consider that the physically impossible things reported in NDE’s might actually have happened, than we do with the physically impossible things reported during dreams? > > While his brain was being turned to mush by acute meningitis, [Dr. Eben Alexander](https://www.wired.com/2013/12/butterfly-riding-neurosurgeon-hits-turbulence/) actually believed he was riding on the back of a giant butterfly. IMHO, this is not good reason consider that this actually happened. At least, no more than if I had dreamed the same thing last night but had the good sense to realize it was just a dream. Apologies for misconstruing your point. I’m glad to hear that you agree both possibilities should be investigated. I also agree that, at this point, dreaming appears to be the better-supported explanation. My point, however, is that it’s still too early to really know which explanation is actually correct. Alexander also describes his NDE as beginning as a point of awareness, without language. A light then opened into a portal, through which he entered another realm that he described as extraordinarily rich and “ultra-real.” It may well have been a dream, and experiences like this are reported frequently in NDE accounts. Dreams can certainly have recurring themes as well. Still, some features of these accounts are intriguing because they seem so unlike ordinary earthly experience. Dreams can include flying, for example, but flying is essentially an exaggeration of something familiar, within a world that otherwise resembles our own. I often dream of jumping much higher than I can in waking life, but that is still an amplified version of something I actually do. Reports of 360-degree awareness, by contrast, describe a form of perception that we simply don’t experience in ordinary life. There is no obvious earthly template to exaggerate in the same way. For me, that leaves two possibilities: NDEs may be something more than ordinary dreaming, or they may be an especially vivid form of imagination. There is clearly a strong imaginative element and recurring themes in many accounts, which makes me hesitate to draw any firm conclusion. At the same time, it is the combination of apparently unearthly experiences and the recurring sense of being somewhere other than the ordinary physical environment that I find particularly intriguing. That combination is reported by many experiencers, and for me, it is what makes NDEs worth investigating rather than simply assuming we already know what they are. ---

**Author:** ![Faizal\_Ali](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/discourse.peacefulscience.org/faizal_ali/32/12416_2.png) [@Faizal\_Ali](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/u/Faizal_Ali)\ **Post date:** [October 1, 2026, 2:33pm UTC](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/t/why-the-brain-only-model-cannot-fully-explain-near-death-experiences/18052/148 "2026-10-01T14:33:45Z")

> [@John\_Harshman](#): > > Non-material souls seem carefully designed to be undetectable by any means, and consciousness as a fundamental feature of reality also seems to have no predicted detectable consequences. In many ways, dualism seems similar to hardsolipsism. Neither position can be logically nor empirically refuted. But, at the same time, there are no good arguments or evidence to support them. Also, they’re both kind of silly when you really think about them. ---

**Author:** ![John\_Harshman](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/discourse.peacefulscience.org/john_harshman/32/1121_2.png) [@John\_Harshman](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/u/John_Harshman)\ **Post date:** [October 1, 2026, 11:41pm UTC](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/t/why-the-brain-only-model-cannot-fully-explain-near-death-experiences/18052/149 "2026-10-01T23:41:22Z")

**Author:** ![LRT](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/a88e57/32.png) [@LRT](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/u/LRT)\ **Post date:** [October 1, 2026, 11:41pm UTC](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/t/why-the-brain-only-model-cannot-fully-explain-near-death-experiences/18052/150 "2026-10-01T23:41:27Z")

> [@Faizal\_Ali](#): > > Also, they’re both kind of silly when you really think about them. Explain why they are silly! ---

**Author:** ![Faizal\_Ali](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/discourse.peacefulscience.org/faizal_ali/32/12416_2.png) [@Faizal\_Ali](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/u/Faizal_Ali)\ **Post date:** [October 1, 2026, 11:41pm UTC](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/t/why-the-brain-only-model-cannot-fully-explain-near-death-experiences/18052/151 "2026-10-01T23:41:37Z")

> [@LRT](#): > > The stuff that produces consciousness isn’t really “stuff” at all—it’s consciousness itself, at least according to my interpretation. That removes the need to explain how stuff somehow produces consciousness in the first place. So consciousness _is_ stuff? That clarifies nothing. How can our conscious experience _be_ stuff? It still demands an explanation. That is, unless you wish to concede that eliminative materialism also resolves the problem of consciousness. ![](https://us1.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/uploads/peacefulscience/original/3X/0/f/0f00d1cab974a5819679e2e788b2d80eb74696ec.jpeg "Patricia Churchland, What is eliminative materialism?") > [@LRT](#): > > Apart from the hard problem, if my research is correct, physicalism also has to contend with several other issues, including emergence, the binding problem, intentionality, mental causation, and the explanatory gap. So saying that replacing physicalism with a non-physical model necessarily creates more problems is an overstatement. Each model has its own set of unresolved issues. I don’t really see how most of those problems only pertain to physicalism. It might appear that the problems are more diverse because the brain is a specific, physical object that can be studied, and so the questions regarding how it could produce consciousness are more focussed and specific. Dualism, OTOH, only deals with vague, metaphysical entities about absolute nothing specific can be said. > [@LRT](#): > > Apologies for misconstruing your point. I’m glad to hear that you agree both possibilities should be investigated. I also agree that, at this point, dreaming appears to be the better-supported explanation. My point, however, is that it’s still too early to really know which explanation is actually correct. I have _not_ said they are dreams. They are their own thing, arising under different circumstances and having features that are not identical to dreams. What, I believe, they share in common is the existence of false perceptions, caused by brain states that differ from those of a healthy brain during awakeness. > [@LRT](#): > > Still, some features of these accounts are intriguing because they seem so unlike ordinary earthly experience. Dreams can include flying, for example, but flying is essentially an exaggeration of something familiar, within a world that otherwise resembles our own. That doesn’t apply to Alexander’s claim that he was flying on the back of a giant butterfly. How does that fit with your hypotheses? Do we live in a world where there are butterflies large enough to carry an adult neurosurgeon on their back, only we can’t see them because our brains prevent us? ---

**Author:** ![Paul\_King](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/5f8ce5/32.png) [@Paul\_King](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/u/Paul_King)\ **Post date:** [October 1, 2026, 11:41pm UTC](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/t/why-the-brain-only-model-cannot-fully-explain-near-death-experiences/18052/152 "2026-10-01T23:41:49Z")

> [@LRT](#): > > Tell me plainly what you are trying to establish. Well in the parts you quote I am asking why you somehow managed to miss my explanation of why your examples were irrelevant - and I quoted it to remind you. But you don’t engage with that at all. Indeed I am not “trying to establish” anything. It is plain that NDE reports dealing with observations of the physical world do not typically report any radical differences in colour perception - even though colour vision is deeply tied to the make-up of the human eye. Explaining why this would be so - if NDE experiences are veridical - would seem to be a real problem. And that’s the point. > [@LRT](#): > > When you write, “The answer to that is in the reply you quoted. Did you not see it? Did you not already know it from past discussion?”, you answer with a jab and withhold the point. If you want specific information, ask for it. I can’t read your mind. This is untrue since I quoted the relevant section from my previous post - the point was not withheld at all. That you have - repeatedly - ignored it - is hardly my fault. > [@LRT](#): > > You also wrote: “Perhaps you should ask yourself why you are so determinedly, and poorly, arguing this point.” That is an attack on my motives and my competence, not an argument It is an observation and an accurate one. For instance if I explain why afterlife visions are irrelevant to my point and you reply with a list of NDE experiences, many of which are clearly afterlife visions you are arguing poorly. If you get “exasperated” that your examples weren’t accepted even though the reason was right there. If the explanation is given again and again and you still ignore it then I think that “determinedly, and poorly arguing the point” is a fair - even generous - description. > [@LRT](#): > > If I understand you correctly this time, colours can be more vivid, but not necessarily new, while the experiencer is still perceiving the earthly environment (e.g., the operating room), whereas new and more vivid colours are reported in the afterlife. You do not understand correctly. I do not say anything of the sort. I am simply explaining what your ,list of observations shows with regard to observations of the physical world - not what “can” or cannot be the case, What I did say is that afterlife visions are not relevant to my point, since we cannot say that they refer to perception of anything physical at all. Once we limit ourselves to the observations in your list that can be reliably identified as referring to the physical world (there are only two) we do not even see reports of “more vivid” colours. [Previous page](https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/t/why-the-brain-only-model-cannot-fully-explain-near-death-experiences/18052.md?page=7)