Sorry but I find that section rather misleading. Yes itâs dangerous research, no doubt about that. Which is why itâs carried out in a BSL-4 facility.
But first of all, theyâre using pseudoviruses. Viruses deliberately created to be incapable of replicating. Giving a pseudovirus a new spike protein to see if this facilitates infection doesnât appear to be to constitute the creation of ânovel coronaviruses with the highest possible infectivity for human cellsâ.
This appears to refer to similar work as that in the articles that @Michael_Okoko referenced earlier in this thread, where proteins were taken from a bat virus known to infect bats, replace those on a virus known to infect humans, to see if these proteins really did facilitate infection of human cells.
Can you explain to me what, if anything, was rendered more dangerous than it already was? Is the bat virus the protein came from more dangerous because someone copied itâs spike protein gene and inserted in another virus? No.
Is the virus already infecting human cells more dangerous (does it have increased âtransmissibility and virulenceâ) when given the bat spike protein in replacement of the one it already had, which it already used to infect human cells? No. As a pseudovirus, is it lethal? No. It possibly isnât even dangerous at all.
Wade quotes this from the proposal:
âWe will use S protein sequence data, infectious clone technology, in vitro and in vivo infection experiments and analysis of receptor binding to test the hypothesis that % divergence thresholds in S protein sequences predict spillover potential.â
They are testing a hypothesis that % divergence in protein sequence predicts spillover potential. Which seems completely rational to do to try to predict and prevent new pandemics, and likely sources of potentially dangerous new pandemics.
If they are successful in identifying what those thresholds are, and where specifically in the proteins to look for mutants that facilitate transmission to human hosts, then theyâre also much more likely to be able to identify potentially dangerous new viruses before they emerge naturally. It would be stupid to NOT do this kind of research.
There is a reasonable discussion to be had about safety levels (when is it safe enough?), but it seems irrational to try to ban this kind of research when nature generally isnât in the business of abiding by human political conventions.
Thou shalt not swap genes with thy neighbor might make for a nice 11th commandment, but viruses donât read books.
I find this statement misleading:
What this means, in non-technical language, is that Shi set out to create novel coronaviruses with the highest possible infectivity for human cells.
Is the virus already infecting human cells more dangerous when given the bat spike protein in replacement of the one it already had, which it already used to infect human cells? No.
Would using a pseudovirus to fin out where the threshold of % similarity lies that facilitates infection of human cells constitute creating a ânovel coronavirus with the highest possible infectivity of human cellsâ? No. Thatâs wrong. Misleading and wrong.
Is it made as infectious as possible? No.
It seems to me this research likely really does tell us that there is a good chance the wild bat virus with itâs spike protein potentially is capable of transmitting to humans, and that therefore this is eminently rational research to be doing so that one can actually prepare for that possibility. Thatâs the whole damn point of this research. With this knowledge in hand, you can continously monitor wild populations of viruses and start developing vaccines before the inevitable actually occurs.
I think you would have a case if some replication-capable virus that was not previously capable of infecting humans was deliberately made not only capable of infecting humans, but also synthetically more lethal than any natural variant. But I have seen no evidence to indicate this was being done.