The underlying issue would seem to be that one’s “luck” (ie Epicurean chance) has to explain not just the favourably fortuitous, but the existence of everything, including people sufficiently discerning to appreciate providence as luck, or vice versa.
Incidentally, one set of replies to the Epicurean syllogisms here. Implicit in the replies is the realisation that everything one uses to validate Epicurus - logic, definitions, moral absolutes, etc, have themselves also to be accounted for by chance:
The problems with Epicurus’ statements are as follows.
Evil is not defined. Therefore, the assessment of the statements cannot be validated.
If evil were defined, what would justify the definition as being the right one?
Epicurus presupposes a moral absolute that if God can prevent evil, then he should. But how is such a moral absolute justified as being true?
4.The problem of how much evil (all, most, some) ought to be prevented is not addressed.
5.The problem of preventing evil thoughts and intentions with its implication of denying free will is also not addressed.