J (Jensen): But the part of the sentence you omitted gives the reason [that we should think God allows few miracles generally and fewer miracles which require more intervention than those requiring less intervention into the world].
H (Harshman): No, that’s not a reason. It’s an attempt at an inference that God has some reason, but it doesn’t give the reason.
J: Let me remind you that you had phrased the question thus: “That’s just a repetition of the original claim, with the addition that ‘he has some reason’. How can you know he has some reason?” (295)
So the question was,”How do we know God has some reason?” not “What is God’s reason?” The reason I offered that we can know this was: “It is the fact that we see few strongly evidenced miracles [compared to apparently natural occurrences] that ‘suggests . . . he has some reason for keeping these numbers very low.’ ” This is reason to think that God has some reason for doing so. I never offered to give the reason God thinks this way, only that we have reason to think that God has such reasons. I do not think there have been few “easy” miracles in the world throughout history. Many poorly evidenced easy miracles (miracles not requiring a very great amount of intervention) would be compatible with an appearance of natural occurrences.
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J: “It is the fact that we see few strongly evidenced miracles that ‘suggests . . . he has some reason for keeping these numbers very low.’”
H: That, unfortunately, makes no sense. First, we don’t see “few” miracles; we see none. That isn’t a reason to suppose that God prefers small miracles; the simpler explanation of the data would be that God doesn’t perform miracles.
J: No, we do see a number of miracle claims which have never been refuted. “Craig Keener’s magisterial two-volume study” (C. Stephen Evans’ description), Miracles, amply demonstrates this. Of course, most are in the past or are otherwise inaccessible to current scientific scrutiny. But even past miracle claims can sometimes provide strong evidence still. For example, the basic historical evidence for Christianity, the evidence for the resurrection and messianic prophecy, is based on such past miracle claims. In any case, the glib atheist claim that we see no miracles, cannot stand. You simply have no good evidence that there definitely or even likely are no miracles.
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J: The miracles involving less intervention in the world, what I called “easy miracles,” would also often be less likely discernible as miracles.
H: Why should that be a consideration?
J: Because if we see far less discernible or clearly evidenced miracles overall through most of history compared to apparently natural events but if very many of those apparently natural events are the easy miracles, then we cannot say that there likely are no or few such miracles. It could even be that there are very many such easy miracles, like God deciding who should be born with what genetic makeup. I suggested earlier that these could be a kind of weak or easy miracle which applies to everyone. (I also mentioned that in God’s planning, some individuals may require no special intervention at all. If God knows what a particular mating will produce without intervention and it is what he has determined this individual should possess, no intervention is needed.)
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J: Stopping the earth from rotating for a few hours with no other noticeable affect would require quite a bit of involvement.
H: How can you quantify the involvement of an omnipotent being? Again, how can either “hard” or “easy” make any sense here?
J: Hard and easy is just a way I’m designating how much involvement in the world is needed. We do not quantify events precisely but only roughly and comparatively. Speaking into someones mind would seem to be easier than stopping the earth in its rotation. If the latter happened suddenly, I’ve been told this would tear much of the surface of the earth apart unless each particle were somehow constrained. Do we have any physicist watching this discussion? Would you know what would happen if the earth stopped rotating? (Just curious.) Whatever would happen, it should be obvious that there is a difference in these kind of miracles.
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H: Incidentally, this [bears killing the boys who mock Elisha] is another instance in the bible of God being evil.
J: No it’s not. If you think it is, give an argument.
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J:Other than these, we have very few OT miracles.
H: We have few other large clusters of miracles, perhaps, but there are plenty of one-off major miracles. The destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, Lot’s wife, Balaam’s ass, the walls of Jericho, the confusion of tongues, just off the top of my head as I type. Your excuses are lame and counterfactual (if the bible can be considered factual).
J: I did mean as clusters. Notice that two of these five occurred within the context of the Exodus. The Exodus was one of the two groups I mentioned.
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J: But for most of history, God does not have these special reasons for doing large numbers of these more obvious miracles.
H: Nonsense. The present is ripe for miracles, to convince infidels of God’s existence, to bring the people back to God. All the reasons you cite would still apply.
J: We need to be aware that if God exists he may have reasons for not making his existence obvious to absolutely everyone. Suppose you knew beyond any doubt that a good God exists whom you will stand before some day to be judged. Suppose you know this God deserves your deepest commitment and devotion. So when he judges you, you know that if you suffer punishment of some kind for rejecting or disbelieving in him, you will be getting what you deserve. Anyone in their right mind would bow to this God. But it would be a forced submission. The God who deserves our commitment wants to know if we shall willingly and freely admit our commitment to this God. That’s why the knowledge of God’s existence cannot be undeniably obvious to everyone. Those who first tell God that they would commit themselves to this him on simply the possibility that he exists are the ones he leads to find him and find evidence for his existence.
There are some people who run into persuasive miraculous or similar kinds of persuasive evidence without first seeking God. There were some in the Exodus (the story goes) who watched the Red Sea part, or some in the crowds who saw Jesus raise the dead. And many who did so became convinced that what the miracle worker said was true and they believed and continued in their belief because of that evidence. This evidence motivates some to make a decision, to ask what would they choose if they thought the proffered religious claims were true. That’s what God is looking for in our religious decisions.
But even in cases like this, it is possible for people who do not want to believe it to forget or distort what they had seen. Some Israelites, so the story goes, would eventually say it was a golden calf that delivered them from Egypt and led them through the Red Sea. Likewise, some who saw Jesus’ miracles could eventually repress what they remembered seeing, or even rationalize some other explanation for the phenomenon. So almost any evidence, no matter how strong, can be repressed or rejected for one reason or another.
Strongly evidenced miracles are not necessarily undeniably persuasive for everyone but they could be for some people. God would not let there be excessively strong evidence of miracles available to everyone since there are some who would consider it undeniable and would not be able to freely choose to accept or reject God and what they perceive to be God’s will. Because of this God would providentially control who is exposed to such miracles. This fits the scenario of there being periods in history when a large number of well evidenced miracles occur but other times when few occur.
I mentioned that there are times when God may want to begin a new movement (e.g., Christianity) or establish strong beliefs in a population (the Exodus) and has used miracles to do so. Using Christianity as an example, the biblical account has it that this movement first became strongly established with many new adherents following a number of miracles. Some of the new followers may have been more inclined to disbelieve were they exposed to lesser evidence. But once the new religion became strongly established in numerous areas and more people were then exposed to this belief, the newer inquirers were exposed to weaker evidence rather than strong miraculous evidence. With so many more people exposed to this religion, relatively fewer would believe than would have occurred had they been exposed to strong miraculous evidence, yet this would still be a large number since we are now beginning with such a larger number exposed to this new evidence. Those who first believed on the basis of stronger miraculous evidence who, if they had their choice, would have disbelieved, might now begin to disbelieve. As I suggested above, there are fairly easy ways to do so. Sometimes it just takes time to forget or repress what was once thought to be compelling evidence. Still, God would need to make sure that some would never be exposed to such stronger miraculous evidence, those who are so intellectually honest that they would never doubt this evidence. God wants to see them make a free choice first. God could allow them to be exposed to such very strong evidence only once they do freely choose to believe on lesser evidence or on the mere possibility that there is a good God who deserves their commitment.
If this is what happened, this would explain why there were (according to the Bible) special periods when there were many more miracles than other times. It also fits my claim that God does not give everyone evidence for belief which is so strong that it could never be doubted. I do not think that it was only in the past that God wanted these special periods of clusters of strongly evidenced miracles. When Christianity first entered Nepal a little over a half a century ago, there were accounts of it spreading with numerous powerful miracles. Once churches became established, the miracle claims diminished. This story is purely anecdotal of course, but if it is true, it illustrates this idea of God wanting to first establish a strong church and then letting it continue by good evidence but not the excessively strong evidence it began with.
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J: It takes other arguments to provide evidence for some of the claims.
H: Then why did you bring up the ones you did?
J: You misunderstand what I’m saying. You were talking about the Kalam and the argument from consciousness and said they say nothing about God caring about us. The other arguments which give reason to think God cares about us are religious experience and the specific arguments for Christianity which I had mentioned.
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J: But it [evidence for belief] may be accessible to others depending on whether God wants to give it or not.
H: Certainly a capricious God can do anything at any time.
J: After making this statement I went on to clarify that God gives evidence according to what one will accept and that our seeking after God is the most important key to having God allow us access to such evidence. If biblical theism is true, God does sometimes allow non-seekers access to this evidence, but the only way one can feel assured they will attain such evidence is if they do earnestly seek the truth from God. This is hardly capricious. Only your skill at clipping and isolating statements out of context can make anyone think that I suggested that God is capricious.
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J: Jesus claimed that anyone who wills to do God’s will shall discover that Christianity is true (John 7.17).
H: How can one will to do God’s will without first believing that he exists? All you’re saying is that anyone who already believes will be convinced.
J: No, you can do that on just the possibility that God exists. Just say, “God if you are there and you deserve my commitment, I would give it. Let me know if you are there.”
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J: If God sees that allowing the natural processes will achieve the desired goal, then God does nothing but he is still using the natural processes to attain that goal.
H: Sure. If I want to make my garden grow, I can use the rain, i.e. by not preventing rain from happening. Why, right now I’m using earth’s gravity to make the moon orbit, and I’m using fusion to make the sun shine. Anyone could plainly see I’m doing that.
J: If you were God, whether or not anyone sees you doing that, you are still doing it. If God set up the natural processes to achieve these goals, how is he not using them?
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J: But surely you would admit that there is an enormous difference between God manipulating someone’s brain to find someone attractive and . . . stopping the rotation of the earth for a few hours.
H: Different to me, perhaps. But different to God? Why?
J: Obviously different to God since God would be aware that one would involve little intervention in the world and the other an untold number of interactions in the world. If every particle of the earth would have to be held in place to stop earth’s rotation, that’s a lot of intervention. But you are claiming that even that much difference shouldn’t make any difference to God since God is omnipotent. But how do you know that? By just assuming that this is what omnipotence means? I’m just saying that it could be that omnipotence means being able to do anything which is logically possible but with the one qualification that God acts by his omnipotence to interact with the world as little as is necessary. That just may be how God’s omnipotence works. You have no grounds to say that God’s omnipotence must be different.
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J: There can be a first chicken and a first French speaker; it all depends on what definition we accept for each.
H: Sure, we can make an arbitrary distinction. But it’s still arbitrary, which is my point.
J: But it wouldn’t be arbitrary to God if God could say, “Ah, I’ve finally reached a point at which I can communicate with this creature with their full innate awareness of what I’m saying and they can be fully aware of moral issues and obligations so that I can deal with them in a moral way.” That would distinguish those God speaks to as humans in the Bible from those whom we do not know how God deals with at all, the non-human animals.
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J: When I say, “Some of God’s actions are inscrutable in their detail but they are always to bring about a greater good than the evil involved” (J1), I am assuming that this is true if a benevolent theism is true.
H: Can you see that an unstated assumption may not be recognized? What evidence do you have that a benevolent theism is true? There can certainly be no empirical evidence, since any event at all, no matter how evil it appears, is consistent with it, given your assumptions.
J: If I’ve failed to make clear this assumption, at least it is clear now and we should go on from here simply understanding and accepting this assumption. I don’t have the initiative right now to search my old posts to see if I have failed to make this clear as you suggest. And it is not true that no event, no matter how evil it appears, is consistent with my claim that God could bring this about and still be good. If we can imagine an event from which no greater good can possibly arise, then that would show that God is not good. I think that the traditional idea of some eternally suffering in hell (ECT) would be such an event since there is no way a greater good can arise from it. But there is no suffering in this world which is such that it can be demonstrated that a greater good cannot come of it. All such suffering is ultimately bounded by death. The problem of evil (POE) cannot disprove an omnibenevolent theism (at least if it concerns suffering in this world), but that does not mean there is evidence that there is such a being. It takes other arguments, arguments such as those I’ve mentioned earlier, to arrive at a good God.
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J: This is not an untestable future [testing theism by seeing if God eventually recompenses all undeserved suffering].
H: Of course it is. The test can only confirm goodness, not refute it. If good doesn’t result, you just haven’t waited long enough. Or the good may accrue in heaven, where we can’t see it.
J: If the test can only confirm God’s existence and goodness, it is still a test of a kind. We understand that scientific hypotheses may often be falsified but not verified and that is good enough for us. Why shouldn’t it be accepted that God’s existence and goodness is verifiable but not falsifiable? If we simply cease to exist at death, then of course it won’t be verified or falsified; we’ll just never know :-). If we have some kind of conscious existence after death (not reincarnation with its unending memory erase with each new life), and the existence of this good God or good recompense for undeserved suffering never occurs, eventually we will have at least a kind of practical falsification of such claims. So we have a kind of eschatological verification as Hick called it.
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J: I’ve shown merely that no one can give a sound argument that no greater good can come of the evil in the world.
H: Right. We must use the data available to form our opinions. Given the extent of evil events, many of them in the distant past, for which we can so far see no countervailing good, it’s reasonable to take that as evidence that not everything is for the best. The bible is full of God’s evil actions for which no sufficient compensation occurs; the massacre of the Egyptian firstborn is commonly mentioned.
J: No, I’ve shown that if there is a good God, the evil we see in the world is what we would expect and the explanations I’ve given for those evils shows the greater good that will come (again, if that omnibenevolent God exists). This give no reason to think such a God does not exist or that sufficient compensation will not occur. You have given no evidence that sufficient compensation will not occur or that the testing in the context of suffering is not a good reason for allowing this suffering.
The killing of the Egyptian firstborn (most of whom would have been adults remember) was a judgment against a nation which had enslaved the Israelites for around 400 years. If you say, well most of the Egyptian people may not have acquiesced to Pharaoh’s law to enslave them, then, if there is a good God, the God described in the Bible, their undeserved suffering will be compensated.
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J: There may be much more this person is intended to do or accomplish, more moral choices they are to confront, more good or evil they are to bring about according to their choice.
H: Nonsense. God is merely using you to end a life that he’s done with. If he wanted to keep them around, he wouldn’t have allowed you to do it. Following your reasoning, that is.
J: It sounds like you are assuming a scenario in which God has me take someone’s life. That is not what we were talking about. We were talking about just anyone killing someone on their own. In fact, God does not want people killing each other, that’s why it is condemned in the Bible and God ordered the death penalty for such acts in the OT. But God does give people the ability to kill each other since it is better to give us this ability, this freedom, than not.
But there are some cases in which God actually plans that some be killed, perhaps even innocent people. Someone brought up the story in the Bible of the death of Job’s servants in Job 1 which was done for Job’s testing. This might be the kind of situation you are thinking of in your reply. In a case like this, there might be several possible answers I could give. Everyone is given a certain amount of time to live. According to the Bible some die young because of some evil they had done. But we aren’t talking about them since we know that many innocent people die young as well. Our basic purpose in life is to find and know our creator. We all must face the choice of what we would do with this God whether we know he exists or not. If we don’t, God wants to know if we will choose to accept or reject God on the possibility that he is there. God also wants to know what we will choose in our moral life, whether we will do the good or not, what we will make of our lives morally. Once those choices are made, God may take our lives at any time he chooses. Whether such a person is old or young, their purpose is completed and they enter another world. I think God may give some a longer life for different reasons. For instance, some may ask God for a longer life to accomplish some good they have in mind that they want to come out of their lives. For those who have not lived long enough to have made the moral and spiritual choices, I think they are given the chance to return to life in this world.
We should also be aware that in some cases God plans that someone should die at a given time unless someone else should intervene. Sometimes God wants his people to pray for someone’s healing; he may want to know if a friend will intervene for someone who is suicidal. These are just a couple of examples I can think of at the moment. Bring up some others if you think you can find something problematic for my argument.
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J: God will be just and those who have done evil will receive back according to what they have done
H: Does that mean they’ll be deprived of a few years’ worth of heaven, equal to the years they took away from their victims? Or will they suffer eternally for a finite crime?
J: My own view is that everyone will eventually be accepted by God. I think that this is the most likely biblical view. Eternal suffering for a finite evil doesn’t make much sense. The Bible does indicate that the suffering will be equal to the evil they’ve done. Still, Jesus said it would be better to cut off one’s hand or tear out an eye rather than to end up there. If they get what they deserve, they won’t like it. If they seek the truth from God, they will discover that Christianity is true. If they repent of any evil they had committed and accept the sacrifice God endured to reconcile them to himself, God will deliver them from the punishment they deserve it.
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H: Why should a religious person hide Jews from the Nazis?
J: Because they know this pleases God and God will honor them for doing so.
H: How do they know that? The Nazis all have belt buckles that say “Gott mit uns”, after all. And how does pleasing God give one greater moral courage than an atheist has? Your bigotry shows here.
J: They knew this because most of them were Christians and they knew what the Bible said. It doesn’t matter what your belt buckles say if you know you are contradicting what your scripture says—unless of course you believe in a very different god than the God of the Bible. I’ve given my argument that the desire to please God and the knowledge that God will give honor and eternal life to those who do what is right will produce the moral courage to so act. This isn’t bigotry, it’s just the logical conclusion of my argument. Refute my argument if you think I’m wrong.
One other point, if you think I’m being bigoted in thinking atheists are more likely to do evil than theists, are you being bigoted for thinking theists are more likely to do evil than atheists?
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J: No, Christians and other theists want to keep living in this world just about as much as anyone else.
H: Why? What can any brief period count versus eternity? If you really believed in heaven you would be anxious to die and for others to die too.
J: Reread my post you clipped this statement from. This answers your claim.
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H: If what’s keeping you from evil is only fear of punishment in the afterlife, you aren’t good at all, only scared.
J: I showed you that’s not the only reason. But even if it were, the knowledge that God will be just and give us as we rightly deserve does in fact motivate us to do good. That’s more than you can say for atheism. If this is your only life, why not do anything you want so long as you think you can get away with it? You know very well that there are many people who feel exactly that way. The more serious problems arise when you have people with political power who think that way and start acting that way. This is what cost 40 million people their lives under Stalin and 60 million under Mao.
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J: Could the creator delight in the unmitigated pain of the innocent? Could he be content with any evil?
H: Why not? Do you have an argument for that?
J: The paragraph containing of the quote you clipped gives the intuitive argument; I offered nothing more than that.
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J: Without hesitation he answered, the nun or priest.
H: Didn’t work very well in Rwanda. Just saying.
J: Do you have some statistics concerning nuns or priests involved in the Rwanda holocaust?