Fair enough, but I doubt those two will help your “fairly special providence” view. Luther, commenting on Aristotle’s claim of nature’s ability to generate mice spontaneously from decay:
I doubt that this is a satisfactory explanation. The sun warms, but it would bring nothing into being unless God said by his divine power: “Let a mouse come out of this decay.” Therefore the mouse, too, is a divine creature… But for its kind it has a beautiful form - such pretty feet and such delicate hair that it is clear that it was created by the Word of God with a definite plan in view. Therefore, here, too, we admire God’s creation and workmanship.
He doesn’t do molecules, but he does attribute mouse hair and feet, on a supposedly spontaneoulsy generated mouse, to God’s specific Word. I linked in a previous comment to how Lutheran views of providence adopt the classical view that God concurs even in evil acts, whilst remaining innocent of their evil:
In Lutheran theology, divine providence refers to God’s preservation of creation, his cooperation with everything that happens, and his guiding of the universe. While God cooperates with both good and evil deeds, with the evil deeds he does so only inasmuch as they are deeds, not with the evil in them. God concurs with an act’s effect, but he does not cooperate in the corruption of an act or the evil of its effect.
That is virtually identical to the Reformed position - and is implicit not only in providence as such, but in the basic doctrine of divine conservation - God can sustain in being only that whose being he knows.
As for Molina:
According to the traditional doctrine of divine providence, God freely and knowingly plans, orders and provides for all the effects that constitute the created universe with its entire history, and he executes his chosen plan by playing an active causal role that ensures its exact realization. Since God is the perfect craftsman, not even trivial details escape his providential decrees. Whatever occurs is specifically decreed by God; more precisely, each effect produced in the created universe is either specifically and knowingly intended by him or, in concession to creaturely defectiveness, specifically and knowingly permitted by him. Divine providence thus has both a cognitive and a volitional aspect…
This much is accepted by both Molina and the Banezians.
As I suggested before, God is even more “bothered” over detail in Molinism over other systems since he has to select from all the possible universes by middle knowledge: you can only select between “indifferent” choices once you have ascertained that they are, in fact, indifferent.
Incidentally, Molina too was a concurrentist on divine action, holding like Luther that his “cooperation” was necessary in both good and evil acts (the Banezians tried to exclude evil acts from concurrence, and Molina debated it with them).