It is true that in casual usage, when it comes to a baseline scientific-ness, I make little if any distinction between models, hypotheses, and theories, treating, in particular, the latter two as subsets of the first, different for the most part in regards like scale and success. I believe it is reasonably clear within the context of my writing, that the criteria by which I decide if a given collection of ideas qualifies for this category is whether and how well it contextualizes experimental data in such a way as to allow for the derivation of predictions of data beyond what said collection merely accomodates. I believe that this has become clear enough, because there seems to remain no inquiry for further clarification, nor an apparent misunderstanding or disagreement on this.
“Design theory”, in my opinion, may technically just about satisfy this criterion. One could, at one’s most charitable, say that it is an attempt to contextualize, say, the admittedly vast discrepancies between some lineages, or particularly complex systems present within them, as a consequence of manipulations we would recognize as a goal-oriented – a designing, if you will. And, with as much charity, one could attempt and derive logical consequences of that contextualization. One could say that knowing what we do about good design practice, we should expect natural systems, if they indeed contain what we could recognize as design, show some efficiency of implementation. We would not expect excessive wastefulness, such as junk DNA, for instance. Whether this sort of reasoning is something commonly seen among design proponents is another question, but I do recognize, and insist, that at least in principle, the ID idea could deep down just about qualify as what I call a “scientific model” - more than just any “idea” about how things might work.
Needless to say, “design theory” is not a scientific theory. To the extent to which it may just about qualify for the broader category, its predictions – again, to the extent to which one could charitably try and derive any – are to my knowledge not borne out by the data. To the extent to which it is testable at all it is failing the tests, so it cannot be promoted to “theory”, a successful model of natural phenomena.
And indeed, the quotation marks around “design theory” were supposed to indicate that I am referencing the thing by the name it was given, not describing what it is in the context of an academic discipline, and even that I am only doing because apparently this has become a point of contention. Eventhough that too has “theory” in its name, “probability theory” it is not describing any natural phenomenon characterized by empirical data, nor advanced by empirical testing of logically derived inferences. It has even less in common with scientific theories than intelligent design, somehow (or conspiracy theories, for that matter), yet something tells me I would not have to worry about how my understanding of the operations of science in general or biology in particular are perceived, all for calling that branch of mathematics just by the name its students do.
Until elsewise indicated, I am not convinced that there was any grave confusion in the first place, regarding my stance on the scientific-ness of ID, or what the central metrics I would use to analyze such are. Whether my proprietary terminology perfectly aligns with some apparently well-established glossary used in biology, I have made no claims on. My goal in choosing words, for better or for worse, is communication. And I consider that goal well met when the harshest criticism I receive amounts to – with all due respect, and gratitude – quibbling over vocabulary.