Tim
While I think #1 is true, that is actually not the main thesis of the article.
Rather, the point I am arguing against “the problem of scale” is more philosophical. I point out that (A) the type of suffering, (B) the proportion of suffering, and (C) whether God was morally justified in creating even a small number of mortal animals capable of pain, are crucial for the problem of evil, rather (D) than the scale of how many animals have lived.
So the paper is an attempt to get people to talk more about A, B, and C, rather than D. Also, the point is that A, B, and C are not about evolutionary history, so it does not seem evolution or deep time in themselves make the problem worse.
They would only make it worse if the creation of mortal animals capable of pain is a morally wrong thing. But in that case present day animal suffering would already be problematic enough, and this might easily also lead to the conclusion that our own existence is morally wrong or at least built on systemic evil. This then ties into Nagasawa’s existential problem of evil for atheists. https://academic.oup.com/book/10587/chapter-abstract/158560839?redirectedFrom=fulltext