Again we must come back to the distinction between what some people in “the ID movement” may do, and what ID as a theory holds.
Many people in the ID movement (though not too many of the leading lights) are concordists, as you point out, and many of them overrate the importance of science. This is true of most creationists as well, and there is some overlap between ID and creationist folks. All of this is true.
Nonetheless, ID as such has no position on concordism, the Bible, Christianity, etc. It does, however, have a position on the nature of science, and its position is opposed to that of many in the atheist and TE/EC scientific communities. It holds that the purpose of natural science is to get at the truth about nature, following the evidence wherever it leads, unhampered by arbitrary rules such as “methodological naturalism.” Thus, if reason and evidence seem to point to design as the explanation for the origin of something, most atheist and TE/EC people reflexively respond, “No, we can’t go there,” ID people say “Why can’t we go there, if that’s what reason and evidence seem to indicate?”
I don’t see any resolution to this problem any time soon. If a ruling is made that design inferences can’t, even in principle, belong to science, because of “methodological naturalism,” then ID cannot proceed as a scientific project. If a more nuanced ruling is adopted, i.e., that design inferences might in principle be acceptable in science, though the particular design arguments offered by ID proponents are weak or invalid, then ID can keep on trying to improve itself. But if the ruling from on high is that design inferences by their very nature can’t be allowed within science, then ID people and their opponents are playing two entirely different games (as if one is playing by the rules of ping pong and the other by the rules of tennis), and all discussion must end.
George’s position is clearly that design inferences are ruled out of court by science, by the very nature of science, and therefore that ID was the pursuit of a chimera from the beginning, and ought to be abandoned. He’s entitled to that belief, but it rests on a particular account of the nature of science, the nature of knowledge, the nature of nature, etc. I’m not obliged to accept that account, and I don’t. I go with a more nuanced account in which design inferences are generally not relevant in natural science, but are not absolutely forbidden. This was the attitude of Newton, Boyle, and Kepler. The ID folks are mostly with Newton etc. The TE/EC folks, on the other hand, go with Descartes, Bacon, and Kant, and of course the atheists do, too. The differences thus go back to major disagreements in early modern philosophy – though most of the proponents of the various modern schools are completely oblivious of the history of those differences, and how they play out in modern arguments.