I do remember it, and my final conclusion that the problem with information theory is that there is no information theory of “information,” since it’s pretty absurd to be unable to distinguish between events that are not only irrational, but possibly uncaused, and organised matter such as we find in life.
To summarise my comparison of (ontological) chance and choice, the reason they are formally indistinguishable is that one of them doesn’t exist at all. Which one it is depends on your own metaphysical presumptions.
Where I’m starting to take this in blog posts is to the fundamental nature of “intentional information,” (and cognates like design) as an immaterial entity closely tied up with speeech and language, whether it occurs in human or divine situations. This accords with the grave problems we have (despite Glipsnort’s assurances) defining that kind of information scientifically. You can’t define teleology, meaning, and the ambiguities of language in terms of mathematical abstractions - and yet these are reality.
Watch that space.