Well then I clearly need help. What do I not get? What am I wrong about?
The non-equivalence of two radically and completely different ideas. I cannot even begin to imagine how you cannot see it. Itâs like watching someone say that polar bears and watermelons are the same thing.
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See, thatâs what concerns me. I cannot even begin to imagine how you cannot see it. I know youâre perfectly reasonable, rational, intelligent people. So whatâs wrong with me?
I donât see these as two radically different ideas at all.
Determinism is the philosophical view that all events are determined completely by previously existing causes.
Cause and effect. Just matter/energy behaving according to the natural laws that govern this universe. Unchanging, constant laws. There are no exceptions. The same with the mind/brain. Determinism is the cause/effect chain of events that result in a decision. There are no deviations.
Free will is the ability to choose between different possible courses of action unimpeded.
Thatâs the philosophical definition of free will.
Now, theologically, the notions of free will and predestination are heavily debated among Christians. Free will in the Christian sense is the ability to choose between good or evil.
Predestination , in Christian theology, is the doctrine that all events have been willed by God, usually with reference to the eventual fate of the individual soul.[1] Explanations of predestination often seek to address the âparadox of free willâ, whereby Godâs omniscience seems incompatible with human free will. In this usage, predestination can be regarded as a form of religious determinism; and usually predeterminism, also known as theological determinism.
How are these radically different ideas?
Well, at no point have you previously raised predestination, so while that has elements in common with determinism and elements that are different, it is a bit surprising to see you bringing it up now. Most Christians with whom I am acquainted are not strict Calvinists and so predestination doesnât come up a lot.
Look: itâs very difficult to explain to a man that polar bears and watermelons are different, when you find a man who thinks theyâre not. Iâve seen myself and others repeatedly try, for example, to explain why the two uses of the word âmotorâ as meaning (1) a mechanical contraption built by a human and (2) a thing that has parts that cause something to spin, e.g, a bacterial flagellum, are not actually the same definition and that they cannot, therefore, be stuck into the same argument and used as equivalent to one another. As patently obvious as the distinction between these things is, thereâs no convincing a man not to bring sliced polar bear to the picnic when heâs got his head in this sort of state.
I donât have much quarrel with your definition of âdeterminism,â and while, strictly speaking, as others have noted above, the absence of determinism doesnât mean the presence of free will, we may, for the purpose of discussion, consider determinism as though it is the opposite â the negation of free will.
But when you say THIS, you have diverged into a wholly different subject:
Whether Christians sometimes use that definition is not something I know, but thatâs completely and utterly unlike the conventional notion of free will and so in any attempt to philosophically reason about free will youâve got to have distinct names for, and definitions of, these completely different concepts to firewall them off from one another.
In a deterministic universe, people will look exactly as they do in this one (which may, for all we know, be deterministic). They will deliberate, and make choices. They make choose good, and they may choose evil (though I would hate to have to figure out how to rigorously define THOSE particular terms). In a non-deterministic universe, the same holds. The ability to choose good and evil exists in deterministic and non-deterministic universes, the only distinction being the purely academic and non-observable one that in the deterministic universe, the âchooserâ did deliberate and choose, but the possibility of his choosing other than he did is not real but only apparent. However, nobody can tell whether the universe he exists in is deterministic or not, nor can he tell whether such non-deterministic features as it may have actually represent some sort of non-physical cause of choice (something of an endo-geist, for example, a ghost which dwells in our bodies and makes up its own mind about things, directing the body to act accordingly) or whether they only represent such things as quantum indeterminacy or some other âtrulyâ random or other non-will-directed thing. Nor, when the endo-geist has been identified, tagged and questioned, will the endo-geist know whether ITS personality is the result of deterministic non-physical factors.
But all of that to the side: choices for good and for evil will be made in a universe without free will, where we may, if we like, deem them âapparentâ rather than real, or they may be made in a universe with free will. There simply is no relationship between free will and the ability to choose good or evil.
In this context choices for evil will not and cannot happen in a universe without free will. Sin is the equivalent of violating the laws of physics. Sinning and behaving against the will of God is one and the same as behaving against the law of gravity. God, like gravity, is absolute. No exceptions.
Thatâs why free will is such a significant thing. Itâs âunnaturalâ. Itâs âmagicâ. It shouldnât be possible.
No, thatâs not true in any âcontext.â Obviously a deterministic universe could be constructed in which awful things are âchosenâ by deliberative minds, if you have the ability to construct universes.
No. Itâs simple cause and effect. No deviation. There is no deliberative mind that can choose an evil/unnatural act. Godâs will = natural/physical law. Godâs will is what determines.
You assume that evil is unnatural.
Itâs not an assumption. According to the context of the story being told, that is the case. All of the natural world was deemed âgoodâ.
Thatâs a very thin rationalization. And it assumes that free will is not good and thus that God, in creating Adam, created something that wasnât good. Why would he do that? Is Satan good, by the way? And I note also that the creation of Eden was never described as good either. Does that mean it wasnât good?
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No, not all that is done through free will is evil. Human free will is also all the best of humanity. We put a man on the moon. That wasnât evil. Free will makes evil possible. Without it, it isnât.
You contradict yourself. You define free will as unnatural, not good, and contrary to Godâs law, which you define as evil, yet you say that free will isnât evil. You have declared yourself free of the natural law of transitivity.
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Not a contradiction. Free will is unnatural, but not all unnatural acts are evil. Itâs an individual will independent of Godâs will. It can do good or bad. It has the freedom to do both.
In a sense, God made humans creators. Human create and add to His universe things that are not âof Godâ. Hence, unnatural.
You contradict yourself again. Your whole argument in the past few posts was based on unnatural equalling evil and on creation in Genesis 2 not being described as good.
Not what I said. I said all created in Gen1 were deemed âgoodâ. The text confirms this as context. And I never said unnatural equals evil. Natural equals the natural world. All that was created and deemed good. Acting outside of that isnât all evil. Freedom includes freedom to do good as well. We can create good thatâs not ânaturalâ good. Itâs our addition. Itâs a powerful capability.
To be pedantic, this is not accurate. The state in which God created Adam was, in Godâs own words, not good:
Then the LORD God said, âIt is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a helper fit for him. (Gen. 2:18)
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This is nothing more than the myth of the noble savage, with the addition that they lack âfreedomâ. Itâs been rightly pointed out that this view is reprehensible. I also note that in your account, the various markers of âfree willâ, such as writing and weapons, are all in necessary service to evil, such as social stratification war.
But would you confirm that the creation of Adam and the Garden of Eden were not good, since the bible doesnât say so?
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You will note that in Jeremyâs story, the humans created in Genesis 1 do not include Adam. Adam is not part of the âgoodâ creation.
Well He immediately rectified that. But, continuing on the pedantic train, this does confirm, story context wise, that the intent and goal of Adamâs creation is for it to be âgoodâ as well. When something is found that is not good, itâs corrected to return it back to a state of âgoodâ. So, thereâs that.
The creation of Adam and the garden are all in service to the whole reason it was all created. The natural world was created to create Adam.
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