The biggest flaw with the ontological argument is that it reduces to “If God exists then God must exist”, followed by conveniently forgetting about the “if”.
This becomes obvious if it’s laid out formally, which is probably why no-one ever does.
That’s very true of some forms of ontological argument, especially Plantinga’s modal ontological argument. I don’t think it’s true of Anselm’s ontological argument, but that does rely on the claim that “God exists” (or could exist) in some sense, specifically in our minds (i.e., we can think of God), and that’s based on the controversial Meinongian ontological framework. Gödel’s ontological argument is the one that seems least question-begging to me, since it actually attempts to justify the premise that “a maximally perfect being possibly exists,” but I’m still not convinced that it succeeds.
I think that struggle might be explained by the ontological argument literally making no sense at all. Arguments for its soundness need to be obscure and badly worded in order to keep up appearances, because plain and straightforward exposition tends to make it sound like bullshit. While it is generally a bad intellectual habit to say, “I don’t understand this, therefore it’s bullshit,” there are times when close scrutiny leads to the conclusion that something is made hard to understand precisely on account of its being bullshit, and that only those forms of it can survive which cause severe verbal confusion.
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In my view Anselm’s argument does assume that God exists. If we accept that Anselm’s definition of God is merely a definition, then it only says that something matching the definition can rightly be called God. “God does not exist” means only that there is nothing that fits the definition.
If I actually said “your imagined God is really God therefore God exists” I don’t think you would accept that. But what is “existing in the mind” other than being imagined ?
I think that’s a fair characterization, if a bit reductive, of Anselm’s argument as I understand it. And I wouldn’t accept it. But only because I don’t accept the underlying ontological framework.
I don’t think that is quite accurate. There are enough philosophers, and philosophically inclined people, whose opinions I respect and who take this argument seriously that I don’t think it can be dismissed outright. The problem is that the modal form of the argument does deal with necessity and possibility as abstract concepts, which can be difficult to grasp for neophytes like myself who are used to the sort of arguments that start from observations of the world around us.
I also find it interesting that theologians, by and large, do not consider this argument one that ought to persuade atheists or agnostics that they are wrong to doubt the existence of God. Ortlund concedes this in the video that @Rumraket posted above and, in fact, Plantinga does, himself.
What I have not seen any serious philosopher suggest is that the argument can be defended in the manner WLC suggests:
The atheist has to maintain that the idea of maximal greatness is broadly logically incoherent, like the idea of a married bachelor. But the idea of maximal greatness seems perfectly coherent and therefore possible—which entails that maximal greatness is exemplified!
This, it seems to me, is just a rhetorical trick of the sort used by uneducated apologists, rather than a serious philosophical argument. What Craig is relying on is that his audience will misunderstand the first premise of the modal ontological argument as referring to “possibility” in the vernacular sense:
There is a possible world W in which there exists a being with maximal greatness.
Maximal greatness entails having maximal excellence in every possible world.
Maximal excellence entails omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in every possible world.
So in W there exists a being which is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect in every possible world.
So in W the proposition “There is no omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect being” is impossible.
But what is impossible in one possible world is impossible in every possible world.
So the proposition “There is no omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect being” is impossible in the actual world.
So there is in the actual world an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect being.
WLC is expecting that the non-theist will casually accept P1 as trivially true. “Sure, I’m open- minded. For the sake of argument, I’m willing to concede that God could exist.” But, in fact, that seems to be the only controversial part of the argument, and its one weak spot. The rest simply follows as a matter of modal logic and is non-controversial.
WLC surely knows this.,But he also knows that most of his audience (and opponents) in a debate will not understand this, and just accept his assertion without question.
I would go beyond calling 1 merely “controversial” to calling it flat-out dishonest, as it is flat-out impossible by the definitions later employed for a being to exist “with maximal greatness” in only a (single) “possible world W.” The argument only ‘works’ by obfuscation of what they’re really asking the listener to admit to.
It also strikes me as a supremely ineffectual argument – as any skeptic will (i) simply respond oh, if that’s what you meant by “possible” then no I don’t accept 1 (rather than being bamboozled into accepting God’s existence on the strength of it), and (ii) quite possibly decide that the apologist making the argument really isn’t trustworthy for trying such an obvious trick.
It seems more a ‘gotcha moment’ argument than a serious attempt to convince anyone.
True, but I don’t see that as necessarily dishonest. Rather, that is part of what the argument is trying to determine: If one can demonstrate the possible existence of God in one world, does it follow that God must exist in all worlds? And, it seems to me, the consensus is that the argument succeeds in establishing that. However, the problem remains that P1 is not established as true.
If we view that argument as something theists can use amongst themselves to help sus out exactly what they mean by “God,” then it seems to be a useful thing. It’s when apologists try to use it as a weapon to defeat atheism that problems of honesty and intellectual integrity arise.
In my admittedly lay opinion, it is P2 that actually describes what P1 is saying. It defines “maximal greatness” in a way that makes a statement about the thing’s properties in all possible worlds. Of course, it would be meaningless to say that the maximally great being “has” any property in a world where it does not exist. So P2 is defining a maximally great being as one that, among other things, exists in all possible worlds. At that point, P1 becomes irrelevant, for P2 already asserts the conclusion. For that matter, none of the rest of the argument is necessary either, but for clarifying specific properties none of the argument depends on anyway.
One may of course question this interpretation, but I think it is a charitable one. The alternative would be to note that P5 does not actually follow from any previous point, and that whoever constructed the argument does not understand modal logic enough to see this: “There is no maximally excellent being” is not impossible in a world where said being exists, it is merely false there.
For all we know, if maximal excellence does not entail necessary existence, it is entirely conceivable that some world W' is accessible from W, and that the maximally excellent being does not exist in W'. The only way for “There exists no maximally excellent being” to be impossible in W is if maximal excellence already entails necessary existence in all possible worlds where a maximally excellent being exists.
Likewise, to conclude that therefore a maximally excellent being exists in the actual world entails that the possible world accessibility relation is symmetrical, i.e. that if a world W is accessible to the actual world, then the actual world in turn is accessible to W as well. In that case, possible necessity entails necessity, and the existence of the maximally excellent being is established by definition with P2.
The conclusion therefore either does not follow, or is assumed definitionally in P2.
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But P2, even if accepted, does not establish that the existence of such a being is possible. Ed Feser here summarizes Plantinga’s own explanation:
Plantinga famously concedes that a rational person need not accept this argument, and claims only that a rational person could accept it. The reason is that while he thinks a rational person could accept its first and key premise, another rational person could doubt it. One reason it might be doubted, Plantinga tells us, is that a rational person could believe that there is a possible world in which the property of “no-maximality” – that is, the property of being such that there is no maximally great being – is exemplified. And if this is possible, then the first and key premise of Plantinga’s argument is false. In short, Plantinga allows that while a reasonable person could accept his ontological argument, another reasonable person could accept instead the following rival argument:
No-maximality is possibly exemplified.
If no-maximality is possibly exemplified, then maximal greatness is impossible.
So maximal greatness is impossible.
True. But if maximal excellence means necessary existence (as it clearly seems to, unless the rest of the argument is supposed to be naught but further assertions with no connection to one another), then that does establish the possible existence of maximal excellence. Surely the existence in all possible worlds entails the existence in one (or more) possible world.
As to the summary you quoted, this to me sounds just like more reasons to point and laugh at Plantinga, at least regarding this subject. Clearly, the way he defines maximal excellence (under a reading charitable enough not to question his logical faculties in their totality, anyway) is in such a way as to include – implicitly or otherwise – necessary existence. In that case the statement “No-maximality is possibly exemplified” translates to “There exists a possible world W such that a thing that exists in all possible worlds does not exist in W”, or, more concisely “A thing that exists in all possible worlds does not exist in all possible worlds”. If Plantinga finds that this is a premise a reasonable person could accept, then I’m not sure there is a place for him at the grown-ups table…
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Indeed. And as I argue above it seems clear that no-maximally is the most reasonable option and therefore should be rationally preferred.
Well, hush my mouth, then…
I think that “philosophy” is sort of the problem here. There are people who have an excessive confidence in it, and most of them, happily for themselves but unhappily for those who have to make sense of them, are philosophers.
Two obvious difficulties:
(1) one can’t really construct abstractions like “possibility” and “necessity” and then rely upon reasoning about those abstractions which supposes them to be real properties that carry a variety of extra baggage with them which can, in turn, be abstractly reasoned about. When you form abstractions founded upon abstractions founded upon abstractions, it’s hardly surprising if the results are crap.
And here I think that’s just incredibly obvious. Any assertion which has to do with the existence vel non of some force, entity or whatchamacallit cannot find its foundations in mere word-shuffling and imagination-wrangling. It has to arise from evidentiary sources; even “cogito ergo sum” is only an apparent exception, in that it sort of carries its own evidence within itself. But the ontological argument is classic word-shuffling, relying upon abstractions piled on abstractions: what is possible in one world can’t be impossible in another, for example? I am from Missouri, when these kinds of assertions are on the table. Show me. And my experience is generally that whenever anyone brings up “necessity,” there’s at least a 50% chance that what follows is bullshit. Whether that’s so or not will depend more upon evidence than upon any constellation of ideas surrounding the notion of “necessity.”
(2) Where the hell does the postulate come from that supposes that this maximally-everything being, at once small enough to be conveniently carried and large enough to be immovable when required, good enough to be lovely and not so good as to be easily fooled, wise enough to know everything and kind enough not to be a dickhead about it, smelly enough to deter pests and vermin but pleasant enough for one to wish to be around it, “possibly” exists? Where is the evidentiary support for its possibility? “Possibility” isn’t even really a thing. It’s not a property of real objects, but a mere invocation of the breadth of imagination of the philosopher and an indicator of his willingness to dance past problems.
I know you’re not a proponent of the ontological argument, and so these objections are not directed at you. But the idea that one can use verbal symbols for abstractions and thus conjure a thing out of nothingness is, it seems to me, so problematic that the problem is grossly obvious. The existence of a god is not a proposition about abstract possibilities, necessities, infirmities, calamities, extremities or even fricasees. It’s a proposition about reality, which can’t really find its confirmation in abstractions alone.
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He also doesn’t say what he means by “maximal greatness” until after using it in his premise - by which time it’s too late to object that a being with “maximal greatness” cannot exitst in a possible world by definition. It’s like asking if there is a country which has had a worldwide famine. The premise is self-contradictory. Nor would fixing that help, alse because there is a possible world in which nothing exists, so there can never be a being of “maximal greatness”.
Talking about “maximal gteatness” as if it applied to only one posdible world then definong it to include* all* possible worlds is a deceptive bait-and-switch.
Added: There’s also a bait-and-switch between ‘possible’ and ‘existing as an alternative’.
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That’s an excellent point. Let’s try the premises with the definitions first. I’ll also add in comments by a hypothetical listener (italics) and proposer (bold):
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Maximal greatness entails having maximal excellence in every possible world. That’s just a definition, so okay.
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Maximal excellence entails omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in every possible world. Ditto.
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There is a possible world W in which there exists a being with maximal greatness. Wait a moment! Under your previous definitions, that would mean that this being has to exist, and have omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in EVERY possible world, not just a (single) possible world. Ummm, yes. Why would I agree to that? Ummm… Also, under your previous definitions, doesn’t this proposition on its own presuppose the existence of God in every possible world? Isn’t that simply Begging the Question? Ummm…
I cannot help but view this ‘argument’ as nothing more than a bit of logical legerdemain, that only works if the listener doesn’t understand what they’re agreeing to.
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Well, is that true? Can we not demonstrate that something exists thru a priori abstract concepts alone? I don’t believe we can, but how would I go about demonstrating that I am correct?
It seems to me that this is one of the problems the ontological argument(s) can be used to try illuminate. The more I try learn about philosophy, the more it seems to me that it is not so much about finding answers in the manner that the scientific method is used. Rather, it is about figuring out how best to think about difficult questions using the tools of logic, while recognizing that this will not necessarily (or even likely) result in definitive answers.
In that context, I no longer see Plantinga’s concession that not even he believes his argument establishes God’s existence as the intellectual pratfall I once thought it was. Rather, it is just an open acknowlegment of the scope of his discipline.
The more serious problems arise when the apologists try to use these arguments as proofs for their beliefs.
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I think that sometimes the only demonstration of futility is an ongoing record of contrast between empirical and non-empirical modes of inquiry. One cannot establish, as a matter of some sort of philosophical certainty, that no truth is accessible to pure reason unaided. But, you know, by their fruits shall ye know them, right? I look at the massive literature of theology, and its utter failure to produce one useful and definitive fact (outside of “shelves and shelves of books are REALLY heavy!”), and I look at the cornucopia of useful knowledge about the world which empirical methods have produced and continue to produce, and I find that I am not disappointed that I cannot PROVE the futility of pure reason unaided, when the practical demonstration seems to be everywhere I look.
Perhaps, but my sense is that in that way, it is an intellectual shortcut for people who don’t want to have to grapple with facts. That, I think, is part of why some creationists love the fact that Stephen Meyer is a barely-employable-by-charlatans “philosopher” of science, rather than a person who does useful work. They think that a barely-employable philosopher is nonetheless far above the mere fools who study the phenomena in question themselves. They think philosophy is a Gordian-knot-cutter, when in fact it is often only a method of tying knots which are not worth the trouble of untying.
The law is rather like a weird variant of applied philosophy, full of strange false notions that nonetheless hold authority (we call them “legal fictions,” when we recognize them as such). But it finds its grounding in human experience, at least sometimes – the application of a philosophy incapable of solving practical problems runs head-first into situations which require that someone with sense apply some equity to something, and the philosophy has to bend to accommodate reality, rather than the other way around. We have journals full of theoretical work – the “law reviews” published by law schools – and those are so useless to the practitioner that I can’t recall the last time I saw anyone cite one in the course of an actual dispute.
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But is it “how best to think about” the existence of God to make a proposition that appears to be plausible only because it obscures how strong an assumption it really is making?
Also, is this an issue of limitations of philosophy, or of the limitations of apologetics?
I don’t think any unwarranted assumptions are being made.
It seems quite reasonable to include necessary existence as among the attributes of God. If he is the non-contingent ground of all existence, as he is conceived to be under classical theism, then if he does not exist, then neither does anything else.
And, AFAIK, it is generally accepted that, according to modal logic, if it is possibly necessary that X, then it is simply necessary that X, period.
From that, if follows that if God (a necessary being) merely possibly exists, then he exists.
The only out, as far as I can see, is if his existence is impossible. The only other option is to reject logic.
Even as an atheist, it is not intuitively obvious that God’s non-existence is not just a contingent fact of the world as it is but is in fact an utter impossibility in all possible worlds. But it seems that is the only option, if logic is true. Of the three options (God necessarily exists, God necessarily doesn’t exist, or logic is not true) I pick the 2nd. And, sure, thru that process I have started as an atheist and ended as one still. But I have also understood a bit better what my atheism entails.