On Euthyphro

[structureoftruth (Matthew Dickau)]

@John_Harshman

@structureoftruth

But in fact, it would be arbitrary to deny that same properly basic status to moral intuitions, since moral intuitions and rational intuitions come from the same place (namely, our cognitive faculties).

I think you need to be more explicit there is step two. Just because two things come from the same place doesn’t mean they deserve the same status.

Sure. It follows from a principle of indifference: we should treat two relevantly similar things the same unless there is a relevant difference between them, a reason to treat them differently. The relevant similarity between rational and moral intuitions is that they are both sets of intuitive beliefs that we have. I’m not aware of a relevant difference that doesn’t beg the question against according properly basic status to moral intuitions.

@John_Harshman

I resist reading your blog. Can’t this argument be made briefly here?

Very well. Here’s one way of putting it. (Actually superior in some respects to the argument on my blog, since if I have to write it out again I might as well improve on it. But I don’t have time to defend all the premises in depth, I’m afraid.)

0. There is a necessary objective standard of morality. (Supported by moral intuitions.)
1. If there is a necessary objective standard of morality, it is grounded in reality in some way. (Basically what it means for there to be something is that it is grounded in reality.)
2. Either a) God (a necessary being distinct from the natural world who is essentially morally perfect) exists, or b) he does not exist.
3. If 2b, then either a) naturalism is true (nothing supernatural exists), or b) something supernatural, but not God, exists.
4. If 3b, then either a) some non-concrete entity or entities (i.e. abstract Platonic Forms) exist, or b) some concrete supernatural non-God entity or entities exist.
5. If 4b, then either a) the concrete non-God supernatural entity or entities are distinct from the natural world (i.e. something like deism), or b) not (i.e. something like pantheism).

Premises 0-5 imply:

6. The standard of morality is grounded either in
   a) God
   b) One or more non-God supernatural entities distinct from the natural world (deism)
   c) One or more supernatural entities not distinct from the natural world (pantheism)
   d) One or more abstract objects (atheistic moral platonism)
   e) The natural world (naturalism)

7. But:
   e) 6e is false - the natural world can ground a necessary objective standard, because the natural world is contingent, contains no value facts (since value facts are not reducible to facts about physical things operating according to natural laws), gives us no reason to select one normative premise over another, or any at all, etc.
   d) 6d is false - things like Platonic Forms suffer from philosophical objections going all the way back to Aristotle; they are causally impotent and therefore there cannot be any connection between our moral intuitions and the objective standard of morality, etc.
   c) 6c is false - a supernatural entity not distinct from the natural world would contain a mix of good and evil and therefore could not serve as a standard of morality.
   b) 6b is false - a non-God supernatural entity distinct from the natural world could not serve as a standard of morality, since either it fails to be necessary or it fails to be essentially morally perfect.

Premises 6 and 7 imply:

8. The necessary objective standard of morality is grounded in God (a necessary being distinct from the natural world who is essentially morally perfect).

That’s a brief as I can go while still providing a modicum of support to every premise.

Edit: @John_Harshman, I might as well add that if you are going to reply with a premise 7a. 6a is false - because Euthyphro, I’m going to have to ask you to please state the objection more fully.