While we are talking about our reactions of confusion, here’s one of mine prompted by this claim in Nelson’s review:
Well—is it true, simply as a descriptive matter, that the statements of science invoke only natural things and processes? No it is not.
OK. I’m interested in reading his best examples. (But before I do, I must ask, “Is everything a scientist states a ‘statement of science’ and thereby a conclusion of MN?” Obliviously not.) Anyway, here’s a few of Nelson’s examples:
Consider: in 2010, geneticist John Avise, a member of the National Academy of Sciences and professor of biology at UC-Irvine . . . published a book with Oxford University Press entitled Inside the Human Genome: A Case for Non-Intelligent Design . The Library of Congress assigned this book a QH 325 call number, placing it squarely in the middle of the biology subject heading “1. Evolution, molecular.” But consider the fourth subject area in the book’s LC listing: “4. Religion and Science.” Why would that heading be there?
I would assume that that heading is there because Avise wanted to reflect upon how the science he described may have religious implications—at least for some people. What’s wrong with that? Scientists are just like anybody else: they may choose to reflect upon philosophical and even theological aspects of what they investigate. That doesn’t automatically indicate that their application of methodological naturalism in their scientific research is somehow “impure” or philosophically tainted.
To buttress his point, Nelson says:
Avise himself provides the answer:
Do molecular details inside the complex human genome finally provide theology’s long-sought holy grail: direct and definitive evidence for attentive craftsmanship by a loving Creator God? Or do they point in a different direction? (p. ix)
Again, how is that a problem? Avise is posing philosophical questions about the molecular details inside the human genome. I don’t see him claiming that he can conduct an experiment to determine if “a loving Creator God” crafted the genome—much less to empirically determine if God or gods exist. I don’t see how methodological naturalism has been “violated” in Avise’s work. (Can we find any god-of-the-gaps arguments in Avise’s published scientific papers? Or does Avise simply engage in philosophical tangents based on his scientific investigations?)
Philosopher and historian of science Steve Dilley has shown that biology textbooks, including those most widely used in colleges, are permeated by theological arguments.
I would be very interested in seeing the documented examples. Meanwhile, let’s assume for the moment that Steve Dilley’s claims are true. Does the next sentence logically follow?
Evolutionary biologists, in short, don’t follow the rule of MN.
Wow. That is a huge leap. (I don’t think there is anything “short” here but the sentence.)
Out of fairness, I will certainly continue the quote:
When it suits them, they ignore MN entirely, and publish their theological arguments in otherwise scientific venues: the biology primary research literature,5 technical monographs,6 and textbooks.
Is there truly a massive intrusion of “theological arguments” into mainstream peer-reviewed literature and textbooks? Once again–just for fun—let’s assume for the moment that this very significant claim is true. Does that mean that the scientists have ignored MN entirely in their scientific research? I don’t follow the logic here. I would have to see examples where the scientists in question procedurally deviated from MN in their research procedures. The fact that some scientists publicly state their philosophical and/or theological reflections concerning their research tells me nothing about whether they have compromised MN and the Scientific Method.
Nelson continues:
The practices and publications of Isaac Newton, Robert Boyle, Francis Bacon, Carl Linnaeus, and the other theistic founders of Western science do not fit with MN in its current formulation.
I’m intrigued. Let’s read on:
While Boyle, for instance, opposed Aristotelian principles that gave a form of cognition to physical objects (e.g., “natural place”), urging instead that experiments lead the way to knowledge of genuine efficient causes, he also argued strongly that living things showed unmistakable evidence of intelligent design.
Of course he did! He was a philosopher, as were so many of the revered scientists who gave us the scientific method and MN. Philosophers are prone to philosophize. I would certainly expect Boyle, Paracelsus, Descartes et al to relate their scientific conclusions to their philosophical and theological positions. For me to believe that their versions of MN were markedly different from today’s definition, I’d have to see steps or gaps in their empirical research which they “plugged” by non-naturalistic/supernatural explanations.
To put it another way, I don’t know of any “law” forbidding scientists from publishing their philosophical and theological musings. When they do so, that doesn’t logically demand that their scientific research violated MN.
Is this another confusion of Methodological Naturalism with Philosophical Naturalism? I don’t think so—but I can certainly see why some readers might make that assumption.
In short: I just don’t get it. Perhaps I’m missing something.