It seems that in my long comments I failed to ever get around to making a constructive point. I’ll try to fix that now.
Somethings a bad question, a misunderstanding, or flawed claim, will lead to a good discussion; one where people might learn something new or useful.
That doesn’t happen too often, but it can happen, and it’s very rewarding when it does. I’ve learned things, helped others learn things, and on a really good day made friends with someone I previously disagreed with. That, in a nutshell, is what keeps me coming back.
The fallacy of composition is an informal fallacy that arises when one infers that something is true of the whole from the fact that it is true of some part of the whole.
The word fallacy in creationist presentations usually draw attention away from evidence, where creationism is weak, to rhetoric, where creationism is in its element. But the fallacy of composition is especially shifty.
First off, inference from part to whole is essentially experimental science, which creationists loudly embrace. A created orderly universe is held to allow natural law to be extrapolated from operational science. They accept that the boiling point of water at standard pressure and temperature can be known without flying to Andromeda to test it there. The speed of light can be experimentally determined without measuring for every single photon in the universe. That the result of experiments are generalized is the promise and limitation of science. When exceptions present themselves, such as the orbit of mercury, then the generalization has to be re-examined. So yes, subject to controls and reasonable justification, it is an working presumption that what is true of the part is true of the whole. Is there a better idea?
Secondly, what is the alternative - to presume what is true of the part is false for the whole, a fallacy of decomposition or such absurdity? That the measured speed of light is anything but for the whole? A fallacy of composition means little apart from evidence that there exists a tension or conflict between experimental results and general observation. Given that evidence is what it comes down to in the end, just dispense with rhetorical shortcuts, and be prepared to argue the actual details and merits of the science.
When I read this, the sense that I get is that you are fairly typical among doubters of evolution in that you have a primarily verbal orientation toward the subject. Why would one worry about what is a single “phenomenon”? Why, in a complex question involving not some sort of formal logic but instead the examination and weighing of a very considerable body of evidence, would anyone waste time arguing that someone has committed a “fallacy” in the formal logical sense?
Reality is messy, and linguistic conventions like names and explanations are our way of bringing order to it and rendering it possible to discuss. But those linguistic critters aren’t actually the thing itself. They have referents in the outside world, and it is those which any attempt to address evolutionary theory must deal with, or fail at the starting gate. Does anyone care whether evolution is deemed to be one phenomenon, or a thousand phenomena? Depending on how one talks about it, it could be neither or both. Does anyone care whether the application of principles learned in connection with one set of questions and then applied in connection with another is a “fallacy of composition,” or do they instead care whether the great weight of the evidence, and inferences that may reasonably be drawn therefrom, supports or does not support the hypothesis?
I would recommend setting those philosophical/verbal attempts aside entirely, recognizing them as a bad habit, and dealing with what you think the evidentiary problems actually are. Yes, you need to use words to describe what you see and how you think it is best explained, but evolution will never find confirmation or disconfirmation in a particularly clever arrangement of phrases.
I’m not really sure how the demarcation problem applies here. Could you elaborate? (No need to explain the "something else further )
The idea that “Science cannot examine the supernatural” seems unjustified to me. Moreover, I believe it is often invoked to allow leeway for the acceptance of religious and other non-physical beliefs that would otherwise be dismissed.
The specific example I cited was that of intercessory prayer. Let’s assume that a supernatural, omnipotent, omniscient God exists. Moreover, he will use his powers to cure people of diseases when people pray on the patient’s behalf. Not all the time, or even most of the time, but a significant enough amount of the time that people who are prayed for would have a greater chance of recovery. Such an effect ought to be detectable by the same scientific methodology we use to determine if, say, an antibiotic is effective against ear infections.
Unless you can explain why it could not be so detectable, I think we will have to dispense with the notion that science cannot examine the supernatural.
Some of the excerpts from your book you’ve chosen to post here clearly do claim that scientists and educators don’t know what they are doing:
You’ve been politely corrected on this point multiple times. You’ve never responded, which speaks volumes.
No one here has EVER suggested that your freedom should be curtailed.
Don’t I have the freedom to point out that science isn’t done by textual analysis?
IIRC, you have never made a substantive reply to me.
I’ve spent a career doing exactly those sorts of analyses. I’m not an evolutionary biologist. I’ve done developmental biology, virology, genetics, carcinogenesis, cell biology, neuroscience, and biochemistry applied to cardiology. All but the first two were literally, empirically connected. Every single mechanism that I’ve studied all but screams that it arose by evolution.
It’s worth noting that you have stumbled onto a hypothesis (that systems biology and evolutionary biology can be separated as disciplines) that makes testable empirical predictions, which are false:
Zero systems biologists (and I know a few) have claimed to have separated systems biology from evolutionary biology.
Zero IDcreationists have taken up systems biology AFAIK. If you are right, they should be flocking to it.
No college or university that espouses creationism has started a systems biology department.
Why? It’s all completely intertwined. People use systems-centered approaches to study evolution itself. Are they misguided?
Why would any scientist want to consider your vision? How would you enforce this if no one did? Would you stop oncologists from studying the evolution of tumors?
Sorry, but the theme of biology for decades has been the opposite: the rapid breaking down of walls between disciplines and departments. For example, my first faculty position was in the Department of Physiology at UT Southwestern, yet I had never taken a physiology course nor published in a physiology journal.
You are proposing to erect a huge new wall on the basis of a vision for which you’ve provided no empirical basis. The only separation that makes any sense is that between the spiritual and the empirical, not by proposing new walls between scientific disciplines. Have you considered that viewing science as nothing but retrospective explanations might be a problem, and that looking at science more empirically might alleviate that conflict in your thinking?
You and I have a very similar understanding of what qualifies as science, as do most people here. Don and others have a different understanding. THAT problem isn’t going away.
The idea that “Science cannot examine the supernatural” seems unjustified to me.
I’ve read that study too. Of course we can test falsifiable claims about the supernatural, IRB willing. (The closest I’ve come is testing a hypothesis about Homeopathy.)
Invoked, sure, but I doubt most would dismiss those beliefs either way. To misquote someone (Swift?), “You cannot science a man out of a position he did not science himself into.”
This is mostly about the Wistar Conference, an attempt by engineers and computer scientists to help evolutionary biologists by showing that they were wrong about everything and introducing a little mathematical rigor into the field founded in part by R. A. Fisher.
My impression, however, is that the idea that “Science cannot examine the supernatural” is not just supported by creationists, but also by those who believe accomodationism is the best strategy for dealing with creationism. For instance, the NCSE:
The “creation or evolution” dichotomy is needless and false, based upon a category mistake. For example, if I held up an grapefruit and asked, “Is this fruit yellow or is it spherical?”, the sentence would make no sense, because “yellow” and “spherical” are not contradictory, but complementary descriptions of the fruit.
The question “Do you believe in creation or evolution?” has the same problem. Like color and shape, “creation” and “evolution” do not occupy competing categories, but are complementary ways of looking at the universe. “Creation” is a philosophical concept: it is the belief that the universe depends for its existence upon something or some being outside itself. As a philosophical term, “creation” is an empirically untestable belief that makes no claims about how or when the world came to be, or even whether creation was a determinate “act” or an event in time. It is a philosophical tenet compatible with the theological doctrines of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and other monotheistic religions. (A contrary and equally untestable philosophical assertion would be that the universe is uncreated, or self-subsistent.)
I find myself, strangely, in agreement with the ID Creationists, who (at times) seem to believe that the existence of a Creator can be scientifically tested. There may be practical reasons this could not be done (For instance, if he is an omnipotent being who does not want his existence to ever be detected). But I see no reason its existence could not be tested in principle.
You assume that I want to avoid controversy.
Regardless, that is not the position I am defending here. I believe that, if the “supernatural” exists, it could in principle be scientifically verified, at least in some forms. Moreover, the fact that it never has been verified is good reason to believe it doesn’t exist.
(I will also repeat something I mentioned in another discussion: I believe the terms “natural” and “supernatural”, as well as “material/immaterial” are falling out of favour in metaphysics and are being replaced with “physical” and “non-physical.” I think this makes a difference.)
How do we not accommodate beliefs? All of us have various beliefs, and at any given time many of those beliefs are wrong at least in degree. At some point we draw a line and understand that not all beliefs are relevant to a given task, and move along with what matters.
The very idea of a null hypothesis indicates some degree of belief, and is at the heart of the scientific method. Bayesian statistics formalizes this with a probability distribution for Prior Belief which gets updated (with data) to a Posterior probability distribution.
I guess I don’t see accommodation as the problem. Creationism can use the scientific method just as well as anyone else, and if they do it properly the results should be the same. Lying about results is a problem. Bias in observing and reporting results is a problem. The extent that beliefs may push people to bend results is a problem, but now the issues are rigor and honesty.
We should not accommodate dishonesty or malfeasance in science, but this is nothing new.
I see your point, I think, and my only disagreement is that my understanding of most conceptions of “supernatural” is that the word describes concepts/things that are outside of natural explanation by definition. I take this to mean that the existence of such things cannot be scientifically tested, by definition. (You also note above that an omnipotent being can evade detection or analysis without breaking a supernatural sweat.)
To whatever extent I am capturing typical definitions of “supernatural,” I think it follows that science could not study such things, but it can study the effects of such things whenever they impinge on the natural world, and of course it can “investigate claims of the supernatural” as @faded_Glory writes, though I take that to be a corollary of “whenever they impinge on the natural world.” And I think it should be universally agreed that science can (and should IMO) investigate the human phenomenon of belief in the supernatural.
“Natural explanation”, sure. But, not necessarily scientific explanation, which is not precluded from explaining that which is not natural. Even if one believes the practice of science entails the use of methodological naturalism, this does not mean it must entail metaphysical naturalism.
I don’t really find that a particularly useful or coherent approach. True, we can only examine things that “impinge upon” the world as it is accessible to our senses. That does not help distinguish between the “natural” and the “supernatural.” For instance, it is possible that the multiverse hypothesis is true and only involves natural phenomena. However, if these other universes have no measurable effect on our universe, then they will be forever inaccessible to the scientific method.
I am using “accomodationism” in the (admittedly pejorative) sense of describing an approach where certain (generally religious) beliefs are arbitrarily declared to be outside the remit of science. Not because of the nature of the ideas themselves, but as a tactic to make scientific facts more palatable to those who might otherwise find them in conflict with their faith.
In effect this creates two different standards of truth. Scientific ideas are required to meet a particular standard, but religious beliefs have a different standard, one which is rarely specified.
I see no help for that. Even within science there are different levels of evidence, and in statistics “levels of significance” at which we should interpret a p-value. Individuals may have a personal “threshold of evidence” at which they are persuaded (prior beliefs again).
I think if we got to the point of putting a p-value or Bayes factor on the existence of God, we might have made a few other mistakes along the way.
I think most would agree it is possible for religious beliefs to go too far or be too extreme. There is a sort of standard, rarely specified as you say, beyond which most would agree something just ain’t right. We could find examples, but it is a quality not a quantity.
I think that’s the whole point, the whole purpose, of defining “supernatural” to be outside of accessible existence. Maybe this sounds cynical or even conspiratorial, but my view of supernaturalism (perhaps that just means religion) is that it is designed (by smart humans or by cultural evolution or by a combination of those two) to provide comfort or other resources to those who need magic stuff, at essentially any cost. Of course it’s incoherent. Of course it hinders any honest attempt to “distinguish between the ‘natural and the supernatural.’”
I take the view that supernatural beliefs which contain their own insulation and get-out-of-evidence-free cards survive better than those that don’t. So whether by design or a sort of natural selection, they tend to render themselves inscrutable and, consequently, unworthy of attention.
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