Pragmatic vs Rational Beliefs

[Michelle (Michelle Ols)]

Since 3 of us had the questions and comments related to the idea of pragmatically formed vs rationally formed beliefs from @structureoftruth’s comments on the On Euthyphro thread, I thought the topic could be worthy of a separate discussion thread.

Copying @John_Harshman’s comments here instead of moving them fully over to preserve them on the old thread, as well

@John_Harshman

@structureoftruth

Beliefs which we are justified in believing even in the absence of arguments for them. As I’ve already said. Basic refers to the fact that they aren’t arrived at by inference.

Well, now. Those are two different things. Just because a belief isn’t arrived at by inference doesn’t mean we’re justified in believing it. Intuitions are frequently wrong. Which one of those two things does “basic” mean?

@structureoftruth

We accept a belief pragmatically when we treat it as true because it is useful to do so, not because we have any justification for thinking it is true.

That would include our beliefs about the existence of a reality corresponding to our senses, wouldn’t it?

@structureoftruth

The proper basicality of a belief counts as intrinsic justification for it

Why?

@structureoftruth

Applied to moral epistemology, at least some moral intuitions are properly basic, or we have no moral knowledge at all.

Again, why? Is this still true if we reject premise 0?

@structureoftruth

you could consider that I may, in fact, have reasons for my claims that I haven’t taken the time to repeat here

I’m willing to believe that you may, but I’m certainly not going to consider those unexpressed reasons as an argument in favor of your pont.

@structureoftruth

If there is no objective standard, our moral intuitions are false.

Just not true. Our moral intuitions could exist for good empirical reasons having nothing to do with objective standards. They could, for example, make for a society that would function better, with benefit to its members, than a society without them.

@structureoftruth

Go back and read what I wrote under premise 7b.

I did. I don’t see that it satisfies the conditions I stated.

@structureoftruth

Only vacuous if you have no idea what the terms are

I’d say that it’s vacuous if you have no satisfactory, clear idea what the terms are. If your vague idea of moral perfection is merely that it satisfies our intuitions, that’s not good enough to support a point, and I believe it destroys your point, as it sets an external standard.

@structureoftruth

Does this undercut my moral argument? My solution to the Euthyphro dilemma?

Yes, absolutely.

@structureoftruth

Keep in mind that how we know something and what makes something true (what grounds it in reality) are very often not the same thing.

I’m not sure what “grounds it in reality” means, if it isn’t a reason for believing that it’s true. If God acting in a way that fits our intuition is a reason for believing he he’s perfectly good, isn’t him acting in a way the doesn’t fit a reason for believing he isn’t?

@structureoftruth

Replace all mentions of “God” in my argument with the (far wordier) “a necessary being distinct from the natural world who is essentially morally perfect”.

Why are those three things necessarily conjoined? And of course if that’s the definition of God, then God is morally perfect by definition. We still have no reason to believe that this entity, whatever name you give it, is morally perfect.

Is a 6b entity necessary? Perhaps a flow chart would explain this better.

@structureoftruth

All I see - if naturalism is true - is matter moving around. Some of it makes noises.

Some of that matter is people. Do you really think that if naturalism is true there can be no morality? Is your religion all that keeps you from casually murdering strangers? I find this view incomprehensible, but I’m very glad that such people are religious.

@structureoftruth

For some areas of truth, that is true. For others - debatable.

You appear to be able to tell the difference, but I can’t see how.