I presented the analogy of insanity, and then of delirium, and I still need to see why my analogy is flawed. People do reject reasoning when they see it has an unreasoning cause. And this is not actually an analogy, it’s an application of the same principle which caused Darwin and Haldane to doubt the validity of reason, that has nonreasoning causes.
What I said was this: “But no one is saying that because evolutionary processes cannot smell, they can’t result in the evolution of organisms that smell. No one, not even ID people, are making that connection.”
So this was making a claim that was simply untrue, that is a problem, and I was pointing it out.
Well, I’m not going to call what their simulation results in an eye, if they leave out important aspects! “However, there are several failings, notably that their starting point is a patch of light-sensitive cells – so they completely disregard the substantial difficulties that would be involved in evolving the molecular basis for light sensitivity in the first place.” Another omission is “It is deplorable that professional biologists at the end of 20th century, with the benefit of decades of substantial discoveries about the molecular basis of genetics and developmental mechanisms, still present exclusively morphologically-based evolutionary scenarios which are no better than those of the 19th century. All that we’ve learned about how tissues form through the concerted action of many genes, mediated by sophisticated molecular machinery, is completely set aside – perhaps because the authors know that to take the molecular aspects seriously would completely undermine such scenarios.” So no, I’m still on my chair.
Well, the same problem arises if you consider the process that results in the ability to think! That was Darwin’s concern, if an unguided, unreasoning process resulted in my ability to think, how can I trust that that ability is reliable? The same problem occurs in two places, in the development of the brain, and in its current operation producing reasoning and thoughts.
You’ve changed the question at issue, which was whether survival implies good perception. It doesn’t necessarily imply that, as shown by the snake example I gave. Walking off a cliff could be prevented by a phobia of heights, when a person is freezing to death, they may actually feel they are being warmed, I’ve heard. So selection for survival does not somehow imply we therefore get good perception.
But the argument is that delusional thoughts are guided, but by unreasoning processes. Therefore we discount them.
So if you see “John loves Mary” in the sand, you don’t consider whether crabs or wind and erosion caused that. You consider it so implausible as to be ridiculous, which is what I mean by impossible here. Examples could be multiplied, examples have been multiplied here, I’ve been arguing for this.
It means what Darwin said, it means what Haldane said, it means what C.S. Lewis and Chesterton and H.G. Wells said. It means what I have been saying, I mean, how many times does this have to be stated in various ways, to explain the meaning? And again, I point out (C.S. Lewis’ point) that we apply this principle, reason must come from reason to be valid, all the time. This is not some obscure philosophical point.
So I have to mention all the sources that support my argument, at the beginning and all at once, or I haven’t made an argument? I don’t see how that follows.
I mention again (and again!) that everyone recognizes this principle, and applies it all the time. This is not an obscure point that no one but the experts can analyze.
It actually states the concern we have been addressing, very clearly. How is Darwin’s concern unclear? Or how is it not valid?
Seriously? You can’t understand this? I’m not saying that anyone “on this forum who respects Darwin’s judgement so much that we’d accept things on his unsubstantiated say-so.” I’m not saying that.
I told you why, why are you asking me again about why I mentioned Darwin, after just quoting my reason for mentioning Darwin? “This begins to resemble absurdist theater” said someone in another forum, on a different topic.
Um, Henry Ford was not like a car! This is alas, another straw man, I don’t hold this view.
Or a delirious person! And we don’t conclude that “John loves Mary” on the sand was written by crabs. And Darwin and Haldane and others had the concern about reason coming from non-reason. And so on…
Yes, but we reject their conclusions, because they come from irrational causes. The reasoning my be quite valid! Of course, if everybody is out to get you, you don’t call the police if something bad happens, because of course, they are out to get you, too.
But I wouldn’t say worms are reasoning! Not like we are, so the main question here has been, how can we trust our reasoning?
I’m sure he doesn’t think our reasoning is perfect! And I doubt he also rejects a process because it’s imperfect, I expect it’s because it’s unreasoning. C.S. Lewis gives the clearest statement I have seen of this view, so I would go there first for a description of this.
But as I said to Joe Felsenstein, tree-rings are not reasoning! Not like we do. And do you give credence to a delirious man, when he claims there are snakes in the room? Of course not, because we see his conclusions have unreasoning causes. So unreason is indeed sufficient for unbelief, we all apply this principle, all the time.
But Gould and Eldrige were proposing substantial revision to the standard narrative! And I hope you are not implying that Gould and Eldrige were misunderstanding the fossil record, and devoted much if not most of their careers to address this erroneous view they held.
Sure, I don’t claim that the conference is the first time these concerns have been mentioned by evolutionists. Various scientists had disagreements with Darwin, for crying out loud…
Did you try reading my reply? I went right through the article, and yes, they claim nothing of importance needs changing, but they do not show, I repeat, they do not show how the concerns of the EES people are unimportant. They do discuss how the EES proposals to address their concerns so far have failed, but that was not the claim you were making.
I think it is a good illustration, as is the fact that a person may avoid walking off cliffs if they are afraid of heights. But the argument is more than just one illustration.
I agree. Though I don’t subscribe to Theistic Evolution.
Well, unless our reason has its source in a self-existent reason, and that source is arguably good, and not deceptive. But yes, I agree with the first part of your statement.
That is not quite what the EAAN asserts. It does acknowledge that our reasoning is imperfect, but that is it nonetheless generally reliable. It also accepts that our minds are the result of evolution as understood by science. However. if we presume naturalism to be true then we have no warrant to believe that any of our beliefs are true, including our belief we are the result of evolution. The belief in naturalistic evolution is, therefore, self-defeating. The only way out of this problem is to accept a form of theistic evolution.
What part of “without ever articulating what that concern was, or linking it to Lennox” did you fail to understand?
No Lee. “Everyone” does not.
The “principle” you are asserting is essentialism – which is today widely rejected.
It is an outdated point – which is why the only people you appear to be able to find to support it either died over a century ago, or are backward-looking apologists.
Seriously, have you failed to notice Lee, that people on this thread think you are really bad at communicating?
No you didn’t Lee – you babbled incoherently.
So why does a process capable of creating something capable of cognition need to be capable of cognition itself? That your essentialism is inconsistent does not mean that it isn’t blatantly apparent.
And do not repeat your bullshitunsubstantiated assertion that “reason cannot come from unreason” – particularly when you have failed to address my point that you are conflating “the results of disordered cognition (“insanity”) and non-cognitive [mechanistic] processes.” That you label both of these very different processes “unreason” does not make them the same thing – nor does it follow that they are treated the same way (non-cognitive mechanistic tree-ring formation is not regarded as unreliable).
Are you claiming that those are two different analogies? Of course many people have explained at length why your analogy is flawed. Go back and read at least one of those.
And then you go on to make your case by repeating the analogy yet again.
You really don’t know what analogies are and what they’re for. How is this possible?
It’s not a simulation. And that you can find some anonymous creationist on the internet who raises objections is not much of a reason to reject the paper. I would argue with that anonymous creationist if he were here, but he isn’t. Perhaps you can see the flaws in his critique, though I doubt you would try.
Then you should talk about that problem without digression into a different one.
What he said once in a letter isn’t necessarily his considered opinion. Note that he still spent a lifetime doing science despite any such doubts, if he really had them. The doubts must not have been all that strong. And again, why should we care what his unsupported and only once expressed opinion was?
Further, why should we trust our ability to reason if it was created by God? And which should we trust, your reasoning or mine? How can they differ, if indeed we should trust reasoning?
As I said, you only have that one argument. Insane, delirious, no significant difference. And name-dropping is not an argument; you have even denied that it is, though in that case it’s unclear why you would bring it up. If you are now declaring that name-dropping is an argument, then I will grant that you now have two arguments rather than just one. But the second is just as bad as the first.
You’re the one with an obligation to persuade the rest of us what the relative scales of the boxes is. This is just how the logic of the argument works.
So far you’ve said nothing in support of the notion that survival should anti-correlate with correct reasoning. Since my intuition is the diametrically opposite, I have no reason to agree with you that we should put no trust in an evolved reasoning ability. You have merely pointed to possibility, but said nothing about probability.
The argument there is that, under theism, God is perfectly good, and a perfectly good person would not create us with deceptive cognition.
For the record, I don’t find that convincing. A couple counterarguments:
We also wouldn’t expect a perfectly good god to allow little kids to die of leukemia, but here we are. Whatever argument a theist uses to explain that likely could also be used to explain why our minds deceive us.
Also, it is a presumption to assume that “perfectly good” entails “creating us with reliable minds.” It does not, any more than NS entails reliable minds.
It does not seem unreasonable to believe that. But, again, the very act of deeming something reasonable requires that we trust that our minds can reason in the first place. It is this trust that Plantinga believes naturalsim fatally undermines.
Yes, that is one of the objections raised against the EAAN. A specific objection that I had not considered myself: Even the “Tiger” example involves a number of unstated beliefs that must be true in order for the false beliefs to be adaptive. We have to believe that we exist; that tigers exist; that that thing over there is a tiger; that we have bodies that can be moved and that by exercising our will it will move where we want it to; that time, space and the physical universe themselves all exist, etc. etc.
Well, I am hoping that formulating a less stupid version of the argument will produce a more interesting discussion.
Likely Plantinga’s reputation helps. But I do find it a clever attempt, and not one whose flaws are obvious. It is an example of the kind of philosophy I don’t really like. It comes across to me like a magician’s trick, where it is up to you to find how the illusion of a sound argument was created. I prefer philosophical arguments that are intended to help better understand a difficult problem, rather than ones that serve as apologetics.
Revision to the history of how evolution occurred. Not to the underlying mechanisms by which it occurred.
And you are actually undermining your own argument by citing something written 40 years ago. It’ would be astonishing that you don’t realize this if I was not already familiar with your thinking.
So what, then, was the point of the conference? To say “Here are some questions that are still not completely answered. We have no idea what the answers are, either!”
You really are clueless, aren’t you? The EES’s whole point is that many things of importance do need changing. So, yet again, you have unwittingly contradicted your own position.
But the same limitations apply there, because we have to rely on our belief that the source is not deceptive. The source could be deceiving into believing that.
I actually did articulate my concern, and I mentioned Lennox too, if I mentioned Lennox later, and Darwin, I’m still not sure why this somehow invalidates my argument.
And I addressed your claim that this is essentialism, please respond to what I said in reply to this.
Ah, so only something that was said recently can be true? C.S. Lewis held a view like this for a while, until some friends asked him, was the conclusion ever refuted, and if so, by whom and how? Or did it just fall out of fashion, as fashions do? Lewis subsequently referred to the latter as “chronological snobbery”, which people do hold to today, the assumption being that people in ages past were sadly blind and mistaken, and today we are not, we have no blind spots, no errors characteristic of our age, that people some day will look at and be astonished that we believed this.
So you cede the point? I don’t believe in essentialism. And I’ve given lots of illustrations that reason must come from reason, not from nonreason. You need to address what I’ve said, not to ask me to defend my conclusion. I’ve done that.
So one or more of these corresponds to valid reason? Certainly they are not the same thing, I do claim that they both are nonreasoning, surely you agree. Insanity is an example of conclusions coming from nonreason, so is saying natural processes produced the brain, and produce my current thoughts. And again, tree-rings don’t reason! Your counterexample doesn’t apply. You can make conclusions based on tree-rings, but the reasoning is yours.
As Tim posted, the Plantinga argument is a dodge which is not remotely plausible in itself. Multiply that by the many, many, different ways being out of touch with reality can kill, each requiring some fanciful alternate explanation for why behavior is based on illusion. There’s a reason the Darwin Awards are a thing. Plantinga’s argument itself is out of touch with reality.
I suppose my general response would be that of course we make presuppositions as to why we trust our rationality. We could conceivably be brains in pods living in a matrix, we could be hologram avatars in an alien video game, or we could be subject to Plantinga’s massively pervasive set of delusions that somehow work in our favor. In these cases, our trust in our rationality would be misplaced, because what we think is reality would be an illusion. My point here is that we trust our reasoning because we choose to, life experience tells us our choices and actions have immediate and long term consequences, and the world seems real enough. Who gets up in the morning, and suddenly cannot function because it occurs to them that their reasoning faculty may not have cause in ultimate reason?
Let’s suppose that our reason actually does derive from God (apart from natural processes). Many so endowed are convinced that that their faculty for reason derives from natural causes, but they are wrong. What is then trustworthy about divinely bestowed reason when it fails on such a fundamental and self contradictory question? Well, such fallibility may be explained as a consequence of the fall, but that leaves the mess of sorting out the fallen part from the good stuff. Should Pharaoh trust his reason, when his judgement was divinely hardened? And should the saints trust their reason if their thoughts and actions work backwards from their predestinated conclusions? So basing reason in divine bestowal fails to achieve anything in terms of trust.