In broad principle, yes. The devil is in the detail, of course: at face value, dga471’s description sounds like occasionalism - and that, in some forms, is a viable option. More broadly, to speak of God’s “lawlike” actions allows for any kind of secondary causes - provided one regards them as instruments of divine action, not autonomous entities. That would include “laws” or even “angels.”
The point would be that ones methodology, within science, would be geared to “regularity,” or “predictability,” without begging the metaphysical question with words like “naturalism” or “materialism.” So the mode of God’s regualr action (lkaws, angels, divine finger) would be covered by philosophy and theology - but without the current conceptual disjunction that encourages metaphysical naturalism.
The other major problem to solve (vide the discussions on Bacon here and at the Hump) is how to view that which is not regular and predictable in relation to ones science. Miracles is one pole of that, but if nature is God’s instrument, then providential contingent action will be expected to exist alongside regular divine action, and needs to fall within ones account.
My solution is to recognise that the category of “random,” which at its purest just means “unknown, because not regular or predictable,” carries as much metaphysical baggage as “natural”. In fact, “theistic science” will do better by using “contingency” as a placeholder for “divine choice” and dispensing with the idea of “randomness”, just as it will do better by substituting “God’s regular actions” for “natural occurrences.”
The aim is not to change the science, but to enable the theist to engage the natural world using a language language with which they may also address spiritual matters. For the Christian, that means christological language.