Iâve long felt that complexity is a red herring in the search for intelligent design.
For example, I measured complexity between naturally occurring sounds from outer space (via NASA recordings) with generative sounds from manufactured synthesizers. Using lossless compression and numbers of bits to store information about the sounds (more bits = more complex), I found that on average the naturally occurring sounds from NASA recordings required about double the number of bits than synthesized sounds.
An ID proponent trying to use complexity as a means of determining which was the result of an artificial source would arrive at the incorrect conclusion in this instance.
It really doesnât. Itâs a non-sequitur before, it is a non-sequitur afterwards.
Oh, sure. And to get back to the design thing, the equivalent premise youâd need is something like âMost things that occur in nature and have bird-like flight are designedâ, so you can ultimately conclude that birds are designed. But who on earth would grant a premise like that, especially in lieu of any evidence of any naturally bird-like-flying thing actually ever having been designed by anybody? For that matter, why even bother begging for a premise like that? Might as well at that point ask your interlocutors to grant âBirds are designedâ outright.
I will also point out that, in that absurd argument, âItem 4â eliminates the functions of items 1 and 2, assuming that they had any to start with. Bill has little control over what he says.
It would be a lot easier if anybody in the room knew what on earth you mean by âstrength of the inferenceâ.
Apparently, flying is more plausibly an indicator of design than floating. Also, apparently, it isnât always, and it depends on something else. That something else has a name, âstrength of the design inference/detectionâ, but its nature is completely opaque.
Birds are designed to fly, you say, much like Boeing planes are. Wooden logs, however, are not designed to float, you say, much like inflatable pool toys are. On the contrary. Pool toys are designed to float, eventhough logs are not.
So what are the rules? Are there even any rules? Do you not see how much of a mess you are making made? You are going miles out of your way to make it look like there is no structure to your thought at all here, like itâs entirely ad-hoc, without either memory or foresight.
I still donât understand what the rules are. What am I supposed to gather in this example, and how would I go about transferring this new understanding to floating, flying, logs, pool toys, birds, and airplanes?
Partially by the function they perform. In Ronâs funny comment he assigned function to thbogisnestabrf. Thatâs a sequence of letters with unique meaning to him which is a lower level of function than the letters arranged in a way that all English speaking people can understand.
Certain phrases have appeared on this thread that, I think, deserve further scrutiny:
âunbiased human intuitionâ
Is human intuition ever unbiased? Weâre subject to a whole constellation of biases â many of them unconscious. It can be argued that one of the reasons for the existence of the Scientific Method is to correct for these biases. Relying on âunbiased human intuitionâ is therefore grossly unscientific.
âBeheâs detection methodâ
It is unclear why Behe looking at something and saying âit looks like it has a purposeful arrangement of partsâ is any more rigorous than some other ID advocate claiming âit looks designedâ.
In both cases, it is simply intuition, and subject to all the biases linked to above.
âdesign inferenceâ
This would likewise appear to be nothing more than intuition â In Dembskiâs case rationalised ex post by some unsubstantiated assumptions of low probabilities.
There appears to be nothing here but intuition, all the way down.
As @Gisteron says, this is âjust saying stuffâ â intuition is subjective feelings not evidence.