This is simply false. What the coherence of LFW relies on is the coherence of that claim. (The truth of LFW, of course, relies on the truth of that claim.)
Emphasis added. Such causal factors (among them the reasons being considered themselves, and influences which affect the agent’s power of will) aren’t the whole story.
What exactly would constitute evidence for you? I suspect that nothing would - given that we have only one actual world, genuinely alternative possibilities are not empirically accessible. If I tell you that I choose to have cereal for breakfast one morning and toast for breakfast another morning, you’ll just say that there were different causal factors at play, thereby assuming that those causal factors are the whole story, and begging the question.
In the same vein, a philosophical idealist will tell us that our experience of the external world is a lousy argument that anything exists outside our minds. That doesn’t make belief in the external world unreasonable.
In fact, it isn’t an argument at all: what I am saying is that our experience serves as the ground for properly basic belief in both cases (belief in the external world, and belief in LFW).
Already articulated it:
The reasons R and S are not mere physical pingings in the agent’s brain - they are irreducibly intentional mental states with intrinsic semantic content. The agent’s consideration of them is not some balance of causal forces such that the strongest cause always wins - it is a mental apprehension of those reasons on the basis of which the agent acts. If the agent chooses option A, it is for the reasons R themselves - not for some further reason or cause T that made R win over S.
In other words, there is intrinsic teleology or (in Aristotelian terms) final causality at work here. As I’ve already said in the other thread, the agent’s choice has no prior efficient cause (or maybe more precisely, it is not wholly the product of prior efficient causes), but it is not thereby inexplicable or incoherent because of the final and formal causes in the agent.
It isn’t consistent with an underlying philosophy that rejects final or formal causality, but that’s a whole different story.