I may not have been clear, or may have gotten it mixed up somewhere in the discussion, but what I’m trying to argue is that BGV can be used as evidence in a cumulative case to infer a beginning.
I think before we go any further, though, I’d like to get some distinctions sorted out that I think effect the judgments (hopefully the correct term) of subjective inferences both in terms of plausibility and probability. This may be getting off topic again, but I think it is relevant to some degree since we’re talking at present about BGV in regards to its probability/plausibility. Speaking of which, I’m not sure exactly how probability and plausibility should be defined.
I would define plausibility as an inference in light of the availability of various types of evidence to something(?) that is within reason of what human experience and objectively confirmed reality generally would allow. Probability would be an inference as to how likely it is for something(?) to happen in light of the availability of various types of evidence. Does that sound right?
I think first I’d like to address the issue of built in assumptions that would affect the plausibility/probability judgments. For example, I would assume as a scientist in your probability judgments, because of MN, you are assuming naturalism is true. Now on my side, if I assume that naturalism is false, which I think I have ample good reasons to believe is the case, we start off with quite significant differences in our judgments right out of the gate.
The way I see it, particularly in conversations between scientists and nonscientists, I think the only fair position to take on both sides is a neutral position, since neither position can be proven true. That would apply to all assumptions, regardless of what underlying view of reality they are based on. That, I suggest, would provide a level playing field from which to base the initial judgment concerning the background knowledge. I think it would facilitate a much more robust discussion and avoid unnecessary misunderstandings.
Next, another issue arises with subjective inferences. Correct me if I’m wrong, but from what I can tell, virtual particles, their popping in and out of existence, violations of the law of energy conservation of energy, and quantum instability are inferences, I’m assuming probabilistic in nature, basically based on either indirect empirical evidence or mathematical proofs, i.e., uncertainty principal and observations of oscillation patterns.
Now I would say, between the two, empirical evidences carry more weight in that they are actual observances of actual reality or its effects. Whereas mathematical proofs (which I think would fall into the logically confirmed category?) are abstract in nature. So if an inference made based on a mathematical proof contradicts empirically confirmed evidence, I would say that the empirically confirmed evidence is a good indication that the inference based on the mathematical proof is wrong.
Now whether or not you agree with that could also make a difference in how I would set the probability factor of the inference, and how you would. So I guess what I’m trying to say is, to avoid misunderstandings, there’s more that needs to go into a fair representation of a subjective inference in these types of discussions in regards to its plausibility and probability than is necessary when doing such on a purely scientific, or nonscientific level. Does that sound like a valid point to you?