I also develop this common objection to the explanatory power of theism / design in the book, and provide several replies. First, I think the objection would prove too much, if correct, and falls to a reductio ad absurdum. If theism has no explanatory power because we cannot form a probability distribution of the actions of God, then no conceivable phenomenon could ever provide evidence for a Creator, no matter how obvious. Choirs of angels coming down singing hallelujah, particles arranging to form “GOD CREATED THE UNIVERSE”, you name it, nothing could provide supporting evidence for theism.
Second, while explanations involving personal agents commonly have to trail the data, rather than make predictions, there are several ways to argue that certain phenomena are more apt to explain by reference to such agents than otherwise. For example, theists can argue that God’s moral goodness leads us to expect certain properties of the universe, such as life capable of interaction. This is also what the problem of evil is based on. But developing a more robust account of the Creator is an advantage that theism and major religions have over a minimalist ID hypothesis. The second way is to argue that certain types of properties, such as apparent teleology, are “mind correlative” in the sense that we know from experience that such properties commonly require the use of intelligence to produce, and such properties are part of the evidence base we use to determine that something was intentionally produced, rather than an accidental byproduct. There’s arguments in the literature for / against both of these ways - my own judgment is that both are valid.
Third, it can be argued that theism does not have to give the data a high probability, since naturalism is such a terrible explanation of the data - so theism giving at least some explanation means the data favors theism over naturalism. I take it you would disagree that evolution going somewhere interesting is hardly surprising or in need of explanation - defending that statement would be one way to argue against the evolutionary design argument.
Finally, however, the point of the book is not to go in depth on these philosophical objections to design arguments, but to study whether design arguments are compatible with evolution. It would be completely possible to agree with that thesis, while continuing to criticize design arguments on philosophical grounds (based on the lack of explanatory power, for example).
But that is assuming a lot! In my view that is precisely what is not given, but what is at issue in this argument.
Yes - As far as I can tell, while Behe thinks design is compatible with common descent, but random mutation + natural selection + other evolutionary mechanisms cannot be sufficient within science, and there cannot be evolutionary pathways to develop all of life’s complexity through these mechanisms, otherwise he thinks the design argument would fail. On Denton, I am sympathetic to his structuralism but I think he makes the compatibility of evolution and design depend on structuralism, whereas I do not.
Life’s apparently teleological order, basically. Even just stuff like the evolution of the eye through standard evolutionary processes - the kind of stuff that many humans have intuitively seen as designed in biology anyway. In my view having an evolutionary explanation for these things does not invalidate the design intuition or the design argument. Secondarily, evidence of fine tuning required by evolution.
Part of philosophical research is actually mapping out possible positions. I think I’ve made plenty of claims both here and in the article already. And I think both Glass and Wahlberg do indicate pretty well which claims are core to my position, and where there is more room to disagree. In my own response to their articles, I do clarify some things, though.