Well, I suspect we’re still not on the same page. However, with relativity I don’t see how the theoretical concepts of a spacetime continuum and tenseless time are arrived at by abductive reasoning, i.e., following the evidence where it leads, but seem to be based on their association with the success of the mechanics of relativity theory.
Maybe you are talking about whether we can still argue for the existence of an absolute space and time (i.e. A-theory instead of B-theory) even in light of the empirical findings of SR. There are certainly philosophers who have proposed alternate philosophical interpretations of SR (see this overview article, for example). I’m not sure if any of them are convincing, but in principle it’s possible. I’m also not sure if these alternate interpretations can be extended to also cover the use of SR in other empirically verified theories such as quantum field theory.
What empirical findings? Are you talking about empirical verification of the equations?
@dga471, I continue to suspect my position is not being fully understood, understandably so considering the multifaceted nature of theory. I think the SEP article you linked to raises a related question to the point I’m trying to get at.
Should reasoning primarily be tethered to abstract ideas that can lead to conclusions that can be more easily molded to conveniently fit into a desired outcome? Or should it primarily be tethered to concrete objective observations and shared common experiences that to a greater extent require following the evidence wherever it leads even if contrary to a desired outcome? As I understand it, this debate of ideas or experience as primary goes back at least as far as Plato and Aristotle and continues on till today.
Similarly, should theoretical concepts as explanations of actual hidden reality be tethered to abstract mathematical equations that can lead to conclusions that can be more easily molded and conveniently fit into a desired outcome? Or should they be tethered to concrete objective observations and shared common experiences that to a greater extent require following the evidence wherever it leads even if contrary to a desired outcome?
Accepting the latter would not necessarily tether theoretical concepts as conceptual frameworks to the concrete, but would allow for those concepts as frameworks to be tethered to either the concrete or the abstract since in that setting they don’t serve as epistemological claims but as tools in the hand of the physicist for formulating equations.
For example, there would not be a contradiction in accepting the use of relative space as an abstract concept for a framework in relativistic mechanics, where as a framework all that matters is whether or not it works for the intended purpose, while rejecting relative space as an explanation of hidden reality and holding to absolute space as the concept that best explains space for what it is, since only when intended as an explanation are concepts necessitated that they be either true or false.
And just to clarify, I’m not claiming that the position I’m holding is without question the true position, though I’m convinced it is. I’m just saying that I’m warranted in holding to such until someone has successfully shown why I’m not.
Jumping in for the A-theory: I would contend that quantum field theory is basically no different from non-relativistic quantum mechanics, as far as its bearing on the debate about the philosophy of time goes. That is to say, there is at least a tension, if not an outright inconsistency, between quantum mechanics - actually between certain predictions of QM that are now experimentally well-confirmed facts - and relativity theory. This conflict doesn’t go away when you move to QFT, because there are still those experimental facts to explain.
I’m referring here to Bell’s Theorem, as understood by Bell himself, though apparently not as understood by the majority of physicists. If you look up papers by Travis Norsen on arxiv you’ll find several on Bell’s Theorem or Bell’s condition of local causality that reason quite convincingly that Bell’s understanding (contra the majority) is the correct one, and so there is this conflict with relativity theory. That in turn seriously weakens the usual argument from relativity against the A-theory.
If there is a scientific theory that is hard to reconcile with A-theory, it is (as PdotQ has pointed out on this forum) General Relativity. But even that isn’t conclusive.
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While general relativity is hard to reconcile with A-theory (though I would say not impossible), there are certain modifications of GR that have not been ruled out yet that allows for interpretations that naturally lends to the A-theory of time. Indeed, the way we compute spacetimes in numerical relativity through the so called BSSN formalism is very A-theory in flavor. Notably, the BSSN formalism cannot generate all solutions of the Einstein’s equations, and there are still technical challenges before one can philosophically interpret it as an A-theory “theory”. Both of these can be ameliorated by modifying GR in specific ways.
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I admit I don’t know if you are speaking coherently our pulling a prank with technobabble…
You can rest easy, I’m pretty sure it’s not a prank. 
From same SEP article:
…or (2) deny that the theory of relativity actually entails that there can be no such thing as absolute simultaneity. …Option (2) seems like a promising approach for A Theorists, but A Theorists who opt for this line are faced with the task of giving some account of just what the theory of relativity does entail with respect to absolute simultaneity. (Perhaps it can be plausibly argued that while relativity entails that it is physically impossible to observe whether two events are absolutely simultaneous, the theory nevertheless has no bearing on whether there is such a phenomenon as absolute simultaneity.)
The part in parenthesis expresses another aspect of what I’ve been saying, and shows that evidently there are professional philosophers who also recognize at least part of what I’ve been saying. Just because it’s not humanly possible to measure something, in this case simultaneity, doesn’t exclude the possibility that it is a part of reality.
Our experience would tell us that it is a part of reality in spite of being outside of what’s humanly possible to measure, which is in essence what the equations of relativity are based upon, i.e., the limits of what is humanly possible to be measured.
I would say that it’s the same idea promoted in the past that, “if it can’t be measured it doesn’t exist,” a holdover idea originally promoted by logical positivists that should be recognized for what it is. It’s also another example how following Platonic reasoning of ideas as primary can lead to a completely different conclusion than when following Aristotelian reasoning of experience as primary.
