Blindly trust reason. We often have check it with others, and even then there are situations where mistake happens.
How does citing a single example overrule the general case that correctly reasoning about the world should be thought more likely to correlate with survival?
You need some way to show that for the majority of situations an organism is expected to face in the world (including ones where you actually have time to sit down and think about what to do next), an incorrect inference is more likely to promote survival than an correct one.
You don’t do that simply by mentioning examples of phobias people can suffer from.
I don’t think you’re really understanding the argument I am making.
Consider the problem again that you’re faced with a diminishing supply of food. Now consider the total space of all possible inferences, both correct and incorrect, a person could engage in. There are going to be many incorrect inferences, and many correct inferences. The incorrect inferences likely outnumber correct inferences. But the key question is if the majority of survival-promoting inferences are found among the incorrect, or in the correct inferences.
For your argument to succeed we need to assume that in this incredible space of possible inferences a person could come up with (blue+red), the number that promote survival(box that overlaps both) but are arrived at through fallacious reasoning(orange), outnumber the number that promote survival but are arrived at through correct reasoning(green). You are basically arguing that we should think the orange area is bigger than the green area.
Can you give any sort of argument for why we should think the space of possible behaviors should have such a distribution where the majority of the ones that promote survival are in the incorrect inferences (orange are is bigger than green area) set?
“Some people have phobias” just doesn’t show that. You’re simply pointing to one inference in the orange area, which simply shows that there are such inferences. It doesn’t tell us their relative proportions.
It just seems intuitively obvious to me that correct inferences that promote survival (green area) would outnumber incorrect inferences that promote survival (have bigger area than orange area).
I really don’t care. I don’t consider Darwin infallible.
I’m sorry but it just doesn’t follow that “the validity of reasoning is guaranteed because our ability to reason has a source that also reasons.”