Did Douglas Axe Disprove Evolution? Spoiler: No

That doesn’t answer my question. Why not use the wt enzyme and it’s associated MIC?

Against the temp-sensitive MIC, but why would it skew results against the wt MIC?

Yes I read it and it doesn’t make sense.

This isn’t an answer to why he’s not testing the tw ENZYME against the MIC of bacteria carrying the wt enzyme. The wt enzyme being tested against the wt MIC isn’t mentioned anywhere in his entire purported response.

Yes, lowering the standard to test against, but using the same enzyme would necessarily raise P. But raising the standard while also raising the quality of the enzyme does… what, to the P value?

Why are you quoting me Axe not answering this?

No, in the second paper spontaneous deletions resulting in gene-gene fusions occurred during the course of the evolution experiment. In fact they show eight independent deletions roughly occurring across the same locus, resulting in gene-gene fusions.

So it isn’t a rare occurrence at all.

False. Transport of a gene carrying the cytosolic di-guanylate cyclase activity to the membrane resulting in an adaptive phenoty is a novel function (that’s why they’re called cytosolic di-guanylate cyclases, they’re not memebrane proteins). In the second paper I linked, that is the function that evolved by gene-gene fusion. Evolved, wasn’t created by the researchers.

… waaaait. You claim it’s a problem for inferences from the gene-gene fusion experiments when the function didn’t evolve. Wouldn’t that also be a problem for inferences from Axe’s paper, then? You’re going to have to make up your mind.

If Axe can purport to undermine evolution despite not employing the evolutionary process to try to estimate his frequency of sequence space that constitute functional proteins, then one can obviously also support evolution by experiments that also produces some frequency of functional proteins.

Another straightforward non-sequitur. The claim is that X is an event with such a low probability we should not expect to see it in the entire history of life. If we then observe that X happens numerous times in a series of experiments, it obviously follows that X is false even if we cannot from those experiments alone determine what the true rate is.

That’s deeply confused. All of the physical world is part of nature, including laboratories. Nature very much is in a lab. It’s in hospitals, in your kitchen, in your bathroom, in your mouth, in your food, under your fingernails, etc. All of it is part of the natural world.

As with many environments “out there” in the wild, laboratories are definitely their own unique environments in many respects, and often come with changes to the selective pressures organisms might see in the wild. But of course there is no such thing as just “nature” outside, as if it is just one thing. Different environments are different. You’re going to experience radically different selective pressures on the arctic compared to in the jungle. A laboratory is just another environment. They’re not magical places that defy the operations of the natural laws.

And to be sure, researchers can deliberately put mutagens in their experiments, or subject organisms to radiation-levels they normally don’t experience. It’s just they didn’t do that in this experiment. There’s no good reason to think that something radical has happened to the rate of genomic deletions resulting in gene-gene fusions in the experiments I have referenced. That’s a very silly, ad-hoc excuse to deny the results.

For reasons already explained, they don’t have to strictly outnumber point mutations to have high relevance to evolution.

Yeah could you imagine? Then we’d probably have a lot of multi-domain proteins, and something like 65% of Eukaryotic proteins would be multi-domain proteins. And different proteins could be identified by sequence-similarity searches has having segments that appear to have been copy-pasted from other proteins.

Haha, that would be so weird.

Anyway…

I gave a reference that directly tried to establish a frequency by which gene-gene fusions would result in adaptive functions when tested against 107 different functions. The number found was ~3x10-5.

Axe doesn’t give any numbers at all. The dismissal is his, not mine.

Well, in a previous post, I quoted a description where flippers are said to be “thicker, denser, and smaller”, as well as “modified for hydrodynamic properties”. It’s a judgement call, certainly, but this does seem different.

As I said to someone else, the question is more fundamental, it’s not a question of practicality. Yes, we need others to review our reasoning, but if we’re all just ultimately reflecting motions of atoms in our brains, how can we trust anyone’s reasoning? And biases towards survival instead of reliability would be an indication we can’t trust our reasoning, that would tend to uproot naturalism, or any conclusion, as a result. That’s the point Lewis and Lennox and others are making, if our reasoning is ultimately due to unreasoning causes, we can’t really trust it. Lennox does get asked sometimes where he first saw this issue raised, and he says he saw it first, in all places, in a letter written by Darwin!

So the theist view is that we are indeed flawed beings, but our reason has a source which also reasons, so reliability is not guaranteed, but validity of reasoning, is. So if reason comes from reason (this is Lewis’ point) we accept it, but if say, a madman says there is a lion in the streets, we do not even bother to go look for it. We never make any exception to this rule, he adds.

My own reasoning is fallible, and in view of this thread, I do not trust yours.

Anyways, why should uncertainty be uncomfortable? So what if reason springs from millennia of pragmatic development and survival.

Well, as I said to Rumraket, the theist view, and I would add here, the Christian view is that we are flawed, as you said, and also that God is a reasoning being, and if he is good, we can trust him to give us good reasoning abilities. So Christianity has evidence for both, and you kind of have to start with reasoning being valid as a fundamental principle, and proceed from there.

Again, as I mentioned to Rumraket, we do accept reason coming from reason, but not from unreasoning causes. If you have evidence that we (with our reason) were created by a reasoning cause, we can make progress. But naturalism ends all this, empirical results, practical considerations, don’t help, if our reasoning is all ultimately the result of an unreasoning cause, both in our history, and the immediate ultimate cause being simply the movement of atoms in our brains.

I said if you need a conclusion, like “is the antibiotic effective enough to be produced?” then a threshold is needed. This is not a mere assertion.

And I also said that saying “we measured variants, and here are the numbers, and we have no conclusion” is not very useful.

But I showed how Axe explained why. So again, this is not a mere assertion. Saying “No, not true”, is, though.

Well, “taste and see” is one way, getting to know God in his creation, in his revelation, in establishing a relationship with him, is the way. How do you know a person is trustworthy? By getting to know them. “Faith is based on evidence”, says John Lennox. People do think faith is belief without any evidence. Dawkins believes this, and Lennox asked him if he has faith in his wife. “Lots of evidence!” replied Dawkins. Oops…

Lennox responds to the problem of evil by pointing to a God who died on a cross. That’s not a complete answer, but it does give reason to hope, if God is good, and he is not apart from pain, that it’s not meaningless. In naturalism, however, it is. So the problem is one for naturalism as well, and it has no reply to make, at all.

That doesn’t answer my question as to the criteria you are using to determine what is different. If it’s just a subjective judgment call, then it’s not an objective criteria we can apply across the board.

If we assume that a being exists who dislikes suffering and has the choice of making there not be any, then the presence of suffering – meaningless and meaningful – is an actual conundrum. One that there’s been millennia of attempts to address, and how effective any of them were is something best debated among theologians, but still, there is an actual question there to ponder.

On the other hand, nothing about naturalism would suggest that we should expect kids to not get leukemia. Your appeal would be a tu quoque fallacy even if it actually applied, but in this case it does not.

It is also a question of practicality. Since your point being that God is necessary to make us able to trust reason, the evident fact that we still cannot blindly do that creates an issue for your position.

And why would that be the case, if our being designed should make our reasoning trustworthy?

Exactly for the reason that we should expect that survival correlates with correct inferences.

Think about what it would mean if it was the opposite. We would have to believe that for every possible survival/reproductive challenge an organism could potentially face, it is more likely than an incorrect inference about that challenge is adaptive, than it is that a correct inference about it is adaptive.

To be more specific, when you your foodstock diminishes each day (and innumerable other possible surival situations where reasoning can contribute to survival), we’d have to posit that making incorrect inferences about whether and when that means you should go and collect some more would be more likely to increase your survival, than correct inferences about whether/when you should go and collect some more.

There just isn’t any good reason to think incorrect inferences are generally more biased towards survival than correct inferences are. It just seems to me logically obvious that the opposite should generally be the case. That incorrect inferences being adaptive should be exceptions and not the other way around.

But for reasons just explained, I think the distinction of reliability versus survivability is actually exaggerated, because in the vast majority of cases they should strongly correlate.

You haven’t given us any reason to think the two should be expected to be anti-correlated.

So, given that our reasoning appears to be mostly reliable, yet we do have some biases that can lead us astray, but that those biases are in fact adaptive in certain situations we are likely to have faced in our evolutionary past. It just seems to me this picture is actually perfectly in line with what we should expect from evolution.

I think I have given intuitively obvious reasons for why the claim is untrue, and in fact that evolution would tend to strongly bias cognitive processes towards correct inferences exactly because those are in the majority of situations, more likely to be adaptive than incorrect inferences are.

That’s just a circular argument.

Did you? When? Where? And what exactly did you do?

So you can decide this in the absence of evidence, and the whole argument for “different body plan” depends on a conclusion you draw without evidence. Do you really think that’s a good idea?

What do you mean by “such a timeframe” and how do they make the problem worse?

I have no idea what description you’re talking about here, but you don’t show much ability to determine what’s compatible and what isn’t. There will be a case in point a little later in this post.

You know nothing on this subject. Remember that there are many flying birds that use their wings to swim too. Do they lack those “hydrodynamic properties”?

So from that you draw that any beak modifications are no big deal, even though honeycreepers have much greater differences than Galapagos finches do. And “they were still finches” is the sort of thing the most ignorant creationists say. A greater irony is that Galapagos finches are actually tanagers, Thraupidae, while Hawaiian honeycreepers are actually finches, Fringillidae. And of course Indohyus and Basilosaurus are still artiodactyls.

You may have thought you did, but you were wrong. You can’t both reject and support common descent without being contradictory. Remember that thing I said above about a case in point? This is that case.

No, this is just you finding a snippet you can use by taking it out of context. These are the same phrase used with two separate meanings. But where was “elsewhere”? You don’t say. You’re just wrong about this.

I sincerely believe you didn’t have a point, and you seldom do. One problem is that you seldom manage to say what you mean. Another is that you don’t understand the science well enough to talk about it.

But your reason was just that you thought they would. That’s not a reason.

Sure, it’s an important branch if you’re interested in the basal divergences within eukaryotes. But it’s still local. And yes, that’s what they meant. They were talking specifically about the basal divergences in eukaryotes, mostly one-celled organisms. They actually did say so. Unlike some, they said what they meant.

I’m not sure you know what ghost lineages are, and I can’t tell why you brought them up. You seem to feel that they’re important and relevant, but you don’t say why. None of the other stuff you mention is relevant to universal common descent either. Why do you think Bechly was wrong about this one issue when you take his word for all the others?

But isn’t every species therefore a “kind”? Were all species separately created? And if you’re agnostic about the relations of canines to felines, then you can’t know if they’re a “kind”. Also, how can you be agnostic? Is it because you know nothing about the relevant data?

Trilobites have transitional forms connecting them to other arthropods and to other ecdysozoans. Crabs have transitional forms, and they’re also not Cambrian. This is relevant because you were making a claim about “all the new creatures that appeared suddenly, without intermediates” in the Cambrian, and I’m doubting that you have any idea what you’re talking about. That much seems clear.

Notice that the start of the Cambrian is 20 million years before we see most of the creatures that constitute the Cambrian explosion. And I asked you to name any of those creatures, but you didn’t, probably because you couldn’t. My point is that you’re wrong: there are plenty of intermediates for Cambrian taxa.

That’s an entirely different question, demanding entirely different evidence. Your thinking on this is so muddled it’s impossible to clearly understand what you’re proposing. And you are particular: you reject common descent in favor of separate creation. You’re on record as claiming that every species was separately created, though I don’t think you realized what you were saying.

Why are you bringing the bible into it? This is, I believe, your first mention. Do you consider Genesis relevant data on earth history? And let’s add “supergroups” to the list of words I doubt you understand. These supergroups may not be entirely clear, but we can be confident about the reality of Opisthokonta, which includes all animals, fungi, choanoflagellates, and several other protists.

No, you could resolve all those problems, if you thought they were problems, by involving God in the process. Thus you have a model that keeps the Jesus you want to be responsible but, unlike separate creation, actually is compatible with the data.

I really don’t care whether you want to think that humans are exceptional or whether Chesterton is your justification. I only say that you needed something other than what you said the first time.

Are you again claiming that every species was separately created, with no ancestors? And it’s silly for the reasons I mentioned, which you have not addressed.

Whether it does or not, why attack a version of theistic evolution that I didn’t mention? (Though it does seem to be Bechly’s version. Again, you accept many things just because he says so, but you reject this. Why would that be.) I, however, was talking about the idea that God intervenes to introduce particular mutations during the process of descent. Why don’t you like that?

But if you say “unguiedd” rather than “random”, that changes the meaning of what you said completely. And since some people have an irrational phobia of snakes, doesn’t that kill your claim that our minds are rational in a way that can’t be explained by evolutionary advantage?

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That was gibberish. There is no evidence that reason can only come from reason, whatever you mean by that. There is no evidence that a reasoning cause can only give rise to an entity whose attempts at reason are valid. Even if we suppose that entity is good. Maybe it’s good to give us bad reasoning abilities. And of course we can’t believe that God is good unless we can first believe that our reasoning is valid. CIrcular. And no, Christianity doesn’t have evidence for both, and if you think it does, you have to depend either on reason or on something more basic than reason to decide that. Again, you have to trust your reason prior to deciding that you can trust your reason.

True. And it doesn’t matter for that purpose where reason comes from. Unreasoning nature is just as good (or as bad) as God for that purpose.

Who is “we”?

Here you conflate two separate questions: creation by God, or not; and whether reason happens in our brains or in some magical, immaterial entity attached to them. These questions are unrelated. And you haven’t said (or apparently thought about) anything meaningful about either of them.

That assumes your judgment in such matters is reliable. But you’re trying to prove that your judgment is reliable. Still circular. You haven’t addressed any of the questions. Can you even read and understand them?

How do you know John Lennox is trustworthy?