Gotta disagree, Art, and then I’ll bow out of this discussion – thanks to all who participated.
No doubt my minority position as an ID theorist makes me aware of lines of argument (in evolutionary theory / biology) stemming from theological or anti-theological premises. Disputes over what fraction of animal or plant genomes is functional, for instance, may seem far removed from theology.
But advocates of “it’s mostly junk,” such as Dan Graur, often keep their “if intelligent design were true, then X, so we should expect to see ~X” premises close to the surface. Graur’s primary literature disputes with John Mattick, for instance, about the extent of functionality, caused Mattick to call out Graur for wanting to keep junk DNA around so the latter could refute ID:
“…we suggest that resistance to these findings [of function] is further motivated in some quarters by the use of the dubious concept of junk DNA as evidence against intelligent design.”
Look, I don’t care if evolutionary biologists use theology in their arguments. Have at it.
What I DO care about is hypocrisy in the ground rules of science. As I said earlier, use theology if you want to – use whatever rhetorical or persuasive means you find necessary to make your case – but be honest about it. Don’t proclaim “methodological naturalism for everybody” at the same time you’re talking about what “a sensible God” would do.
Neither of these so-called “examples” make any mention of “God”, nor give any implication that they are talking about anything substantively divine, supernatural, religious or theological. Simply stating the opinion that something is “poorly designed from an evolutionary point of view” or “stupidly designed, because it embodies many functionally arbitrary or maladaptive features” is neither “God-talk” nor theology.
I would suggest that ID has been marinating too long in using “Designer” as their codeword for “God”, that they think any time anybody uses “design” or its cognates, they must be talking about God too.
I would also dispute that Natural Selection: Domains, Levels, and Challenges is part of the primary biological literature, as it does not appear to be “the original publication of a scientist’s new data, results, and theories”, but rather the author’s “perspective on modern evolutionary theory”.
Looks like you (and Roy) didn’t read the paper itself (Kutschera and Niklas 2007). From the paragraph in the paper just preceding the passage I cited:
“The facts that Rubisco across present-day eukaryotic photoautotrophs is far from a ‘perfect enzyme’ as well as the evidence for macroevolution in the Flaveria species complex (Fig. 4) serve as clear examples with which to counter the fallacies perpetuated by creationists and adherents of the Intelligent Design (ID)-movement.”
The (putative) imperfection of Rubisco is not expected on a design hypothesis. That’s a theological claim, or, at any rate, a claim crossing over from biology into assumptions about the character and goals of the designer. When terms like “design” are used to refer to an idea in historical biology competing with common descent via natural processes, the slide into theology is hard to avoid.
Graur’s premises aren’t all that close to the surface; in fact, they’re buried far enough that I doubt any such thing exists. If only John Mattick can spot them, it seems more like a case of wishing away an opponent’s position, and from the inventor of the dog’s-ass plot, one well versed in wishing arguments into existence.
No Paul, I did not read the rest of it. I made the, I would suggest quite reasonable assumption, that if there was a ‘smoking gun’ you would have quoted it.
As it is, your replacement quote doesn’t strengthen your case. Correcting “fallacies [about science] perpetuated by creationists and adherents of the Intelligent Design (ID)-movement” is a legitimate scientific activity. The fact that these fallacies were theologically motivated does not make their rebuttal likewise theological (irrespective of your frantic hand-waving to the contrary).
Addendum: this form of argument seems somewhat akin to the following:
Worshiper of Bob That the moon is made of green cheese is a sign of the generosity of Bob.
Scientist But the moon isn’t made of green cheese.
Worshiper of Bob In claiming that the moon isn’t made of green cheese, you’re making a theological argument.
I would also point out that a “design hypothesis” that places absolutely no ‘expectations’ on what its putative designer could do or might wish to do, is utterly vacuous. No possible outcome or observation can conflict with it. It is thus simply a dishonest rhetorical device, not a serious attempt at intellectual inquiry. It is thus unsurprising that scientists tend to try to turn it into a hypothesis that is, to some small extent, testable.
At first blush, I think parsimony is a criterion of rationality. Would a rational forensic scientist claim that fingerprints a crime scene can’t be used because a magical leprechaun could have planted them there?