I think Faizal is arguing along the lines of the Boethian view of divine time. From God’s perspective, the statement “You will eat waffles tomorrow” is meaningless, because there is no “tomorrow” for God. The statement that he believes would instead be “You eat waffles on 25 May 2024” which is not dependent on tensed language.
Likewise, God can know what your choices are without contradicting free will, because (for example) he knows the proposition “You freely choose to drink coffee rather than tea at 19:33:18 on 24 May 2024” to be true. He doesn’t know this to be true before the choice is made, because God views all events as an ever-constant present, and “before” has no significant meaning to him.
I don’t necessarily hold to a Boethian view of divine (a)temporality, nor do I think it solves the fundamental contradiction of LFW, but it does solve this ‘contradiction’.