Marcelo, thank you. Your position is now quite clear to me. And I think we are genuinely close on one starting principle: I also regard Genesis as divine Revelation, and I agree that a good reading should introduce as few additional assumptions as possible and make clear why, where, and on what grounds they are introduced.
As for Genesis 1, my position requires more context than would reasonably fit into a single comment. I have set it out separately in Seven Acts of Creation, so I will simply leave a link to the English version here:
But when the question is what kind of reality Eden describes, I can no longer separate Genesis 2 from Genesis 3. You asked what principle I apply to the text. To explain that principle, I have to treat Genesis 2–3 as a single Eden narrative ending with the expulsion.
And it is precisely the principle of minimizing additional assumptions that leads me not to the first, but to the third option from my previous comment.
After Genesis 1, as the text enters the Eden narrative, I see a single shift of register. That register remains in place through the expulsion itself. The text speaks of real events, but no longer in the mode of an ordinary earthly physical-historical report.
The reason lies in the composition of the narrative itself. Within one sequence we encounter dust and divine inbreathing; Eve coming from the rib or side of the already-created Adam; a special garden; the Tree of Life and the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil; a speaking serpent; God walking in the garden; the opening of the eyes of those who could already see; death “on that day,” without immediate biological death following; hiding; expulsion; cherubim; and the flaming sword.
It seems more economical to me to read this entire complex within one register than to decide at each successive step where physical description ends and imagery begins. Especially because I do not see explicit markers within the narrative itself telling the reader: this should be understood physically, this figuratively, and a few verses later physically again. A single register for the whole Edenic block is therefore the starting hermeneutical principle of my model.
At the same time, figurative language does not cancel the reality of Eden. I assume that behind these images stands an actual Edenic history. But human language and our conceptual apparatus are formed within earthly experience. If the subject is a mode of being for which that experience gives us no direct vocabulary, it can only be conveyed to human beings through the linguistic resources available to them — through familiar concepts and images: dust, breath, images of Adam and Eve, a garden, a tree, fruit, hiding, expulsion. The narrative points to a real but different mode of being, and the earthly physical features of its images need not correspond literally to what those images express.
What, on my hypothesis, Genesis 2–3 is describing
In Eden there arises one personal ground directly created by the Creator from dust — the Edenic Adam, or the single Edenic “I.” To use a more direct working formulation, this may be called an impersonal soul.
“Impersonal” here does not mean lacking freedom or a relation to the Creator. It means that this is not yet a distinct earthly person with an embodied biography of its own and a separate first-person perspective. It is the single created ground of the future human personal lineage. To express the relation between this original unity and the later multiplicity of distinct persons, my model uses the image of a Seal: the one original ground is not divided into pieces among human beings, but can be fully represented in each distinct personal imprint.
Within this original unity there then arises a real differentiation into Adamic and Evic principles.
Here the structure of the text itself is especially important to me. After the narrative has already presented Adam as created from dust, it does not repeat that pattern for Eve. Eve is brought forth from the already-given Adam. For me, this asymmetry matters: difference arises from an original unity rather than alongside it.
I therefore do not read the rib or side as a description of an anatomical mechanism. What matters is the structure of the image itself: unity is prior; differentiation arises within an already-given unity.
On this reading, the Adamic and Evic principles are not to be identified with a biological man and woman, with two independent souls, or with a ready-made scheme of “active” and “receptive” principles. They are real internal distinctions within the single Edenic personal ground.
As a distant analogy, ordinary human inner experience seems relevant to me here. A single person can argue with himself, negotiate inwardly, hold opposing desires at once, answer himself with an objection, or forbid himself what he himself wants. This does not, of course, prove a metaphysics of Eden, nor does it mean that the sides of our internal dialogue are literally the Adamic and Evic principles. But it does show that real internal differentiation does not automatically require two distinct persons. Ordinary human experience already shows that a single subjective unity can be internally differentiated without splitting into two separate “I”s.
I understand the Fall as a free rupture in the relation between the single Edenic ground and the Creator. The ground itself is not destroyed, but its former immediacy of relation to the Source is lost.
The expulsion marks the next boundary. I do not understand it as the spatial relocation of a bodiless entity from one geographical region to another. I am not even sure that our categories of place, distance, and movement apply to the Edenic mode of being. In my model, the meaning of the expulsion is the transition of the human personal lineage into an earthly embodied mode of existence.
And on the far side of that boundary there arise the earthly Adam and Eve — two distinct embodied persons within an already existing biological population of Homo sapiens.
At the transition into earthly history, the image of the Seal allows the main consequence of this construction to be retained: the original unity is not divided between Adam and Eve.
Adam does not receive only an “Adamic half,” nor Eve only an “Evic half.” Each bears a complete personal imprint of the original ground: the Adamic and Evic principles are not distributed between two earthly human beings as two halves of the former whole.
The earthly embodied person is therefore not composed of two ready-made independent parts — an organism and some added spiritual component. It is the single life of a particular Homo sapiens individual, with its entire natural bodily and psychological history, bearing a complete personal imprint of the Edenic ground. The earthly Adam and Eve therefore become two distinct “I”s.
They have different bodies, different biographies, different first-person perspectives, different decisions, and different responsibilities. They do not share one empirical consciousness or one earthly memory. Unity belongs to the ground of the personal lineage; it does not mean that later human beings merge into a single collective subject. The same principle later allows the personal lineage to continue without the original soul being divided into ever smaller pieces. That is the function of the Seal image within the model.
The Sixth Act in my model is therefore not the first appearance of consciousness, sensation, memory, or developed psyche. All of these have their own natural history and could already have existed among members of the Homo sapiens biological lineage before the first earthly embodied persons.
The novelty concerns a personal mode of being: lived history becomes my biography, an action becomes my deed, the future becomes the future of the same “I,” responsibility becomes my responsibility, and the relation to the Creator becomes a free personal response.
The individual images of Genesis 2–3 then fall into place for me within this larger architecture.
Dust speaks of the created status of the Edenic personal ground. It is not a part of God, an emanation of God, or a fragment of the divine nature, and it does not contain the source of its own being within itself.
The inbreathing of the breath of life signifies the gift of life from the Creator to this created soul and the establishment of an immediate relation with Him. I associate the immortality of the soul with this same gift: not the inherent indestructibility of something divine by nature, but the Creator-sustained existence of a created soul.
The garden expresses the immediacy of the relation with the Creator — a condition in which action, vocation, freedom, and responsibility already exist, but are not yet experienced within the earthly mode of alienation and resistance.
The Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil and the command associated with it establish a real boundary. That boundary is not made insurmountable, because otherwise freedom of choice would remain freedom in name only.
The fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil signifies the appropriation of the right to determine good and evil independently of the Source.
The serpent expresses the temptation toward self-separation.
The opening of the eyes signifies an awareness of one’s changed condition after the choice has been made.
Nakedness signifies the earlier openness which, after the rupture, comes to be experienced as vulnerability and calls for concealment.
Hiding signifies the loss of the former openness before the Creator.
This is why God’s questions — “Where are you?” and “Have you eaten?” — are especially significant. They bring what has happened back to the authorship of the act.
The Tree of Life retains the connection with the life that was given and with the possibility of living within the Edenic relation; the closing of the way to it means that the choice already made cannot simply be undone by going back, nor can the lost condition be restored independently.
And here it becomes possible to see how, in my model, the consequences of Adam’s sin relate to later generations.
I do not assume that descendants inherit personal guilt for someone else’s act, much less some “substance of sin.” The free rupture occurred in the relation between the common Edenic ground and the Creator before the appearance of multiple distinct earthly persons. Later generations therefore enter personal history after that original immediacy has already been lost. What is passed on is neither another person’s act nor another person’s guilt; each new human person arises within a personal lineage already standing in a changed relation to the Creator.
This also changes how I read death.
Biological death existed in natural history long before the earthly Adam and Eve appeared. Animals died; the biological ancestors of human beings were mortal as well. The Fall therefore does not introduce death into the physical world for the first time, nor does it turn previously biologically immortal human organisms into mortal ones.
Death enters soul-personal history.
After the transition into the earthly embodied mode of existence, the human person lives in a body that is mortal by its biological nature. From that point onward, bodily death becomes a boundary within that person’s own earthly biography.
But the original gift of the soul’s immortality is not thereby destroyed. What is mortal is the earthly embodied mode of human life; the Creator-sustained existence of the soul is not reducible to the lifespan of the biological organism.
So I see our disagreement as concerning the mode of being of the Edenic reality described by the text.
You understand Eden as a definite place within the earthly physical world and read the events of Genesis 2 primarily within that order. I read Genesis 2–3 differently: as a single narrative in which familiar human and earthly images communicate a real Edenic history, without requiring that this history itself unfold within the same physical-geographical mode that is familiar to us after the expulsion.
I do not claim that this reading is the only possible one. It is my working hypothesis. But it has one consistent hermeneutical principle: a single register for the whole Eden narrative.
And this is why your own principle of minimizing additional assumptions brings me back to my original question. You said that your reading is closest to the first option, and you understand Eden as a real, delimited place within the earthly physical world. My original question about such a reading is precisely how, within that overall physical-historical register, the status of particular images in the narrative is determined. If not everything in them is a direct description of a physical scene, what in the text itself, or in the hermeneutical principle you adopt, determines that boundary?
It seems to me that this is where our two readings can be compared most meaningfully: not by counting literal versus figurative details, but by asking what rule each reading applies to the Eden narrative as a whole, and how consistently that rule works.