If you think that Michael Behe’s ideas are at the same level as your hypothesis, then you haven’t really understood why his ideas sell well. Being able to come up with ideas that are appealing to religious people, with three thousand years of theological thought behind them, requires real thought and skill.
In fact, Josh has pointed out that even Ken Ham has skills in reaching out to his own audience.
I’d be more impressed if they did that without lying. There are lots of con men who manage to make money off people. This is not usually considered admirable.
I have no doubt whatsoever that he recognizes when his ideas have been successfully refuted, and then changes his story to avoid admitting this. That is deception.
I can’t speak to Behe’s state of mind, but I can say that he has not retracted obvious errors that I have difficulty believing he does not know are errors. Though maybe he really does think Allen Orr endorses his book, who knows?
Ham, I am sure, believes entirely what he is selling. I see no indication of lying from him. He is not engaged with the details enough to be lying.
Yes, so I have modified my hypothesis so that the de novo humans are created as embryos, or possibly even blastocysts, and implanted in a woman’s uterus. There is no way we would know this was happening, unless we were constantly monitoring the interior of the uterus of every female of reproductive age, which is practically (and ethically) impossible.
I think only in a scientific sense. The GAE has non-scientific, theological and philosophical, reasons for existence. I think the fundamental problem you’re having is that people may have reason and evidence for things outside of science.
I find it interesting, @Faizal_Ali, that you still fail to see the main difference between your hypothesis and the GAE, even though many people have sought to explain to you the problems with your model.
To repeat, more clearly:
Assume that theory A and B are both be non-falsifiable. That doesn’t mean that the epistemic status of A and B are equal. For example, if theory A has 10 ad hoc propositions, while theory B has two, hypothesis B has higher epistemic status.
In this case, theory A = your hypothesis, theory B = GAE.
I’m not sure if that is correct. But even if it is: If we assume that 18% of the population must have arisen with no human ancestors, then my hypothesis is the only possibly correct one.
That’s a really weird position to take. Whether or not something is true should be based purely on the evidence or arguments that support the position. The reasons one might have for taking the position should have no bearing on the issue. You disagree?
For instance, if someone asserts that the sun is smaller than the earth because he has a deep and sincere religious commitment to the geocentric model, does he have a better argument than someone who asserts the opposite, but for no particular reason?
I’m trying to be fair. There is a thing called “evidentialism” which apparently is a thing and which some of our friends here might think is bad, bad, bad.
I don’t disagree. What I’m trying to say is that you are saying your hypothesis and GAE are equal because neither de novo event is detectable by science. My point is, there is other evidence for GAE, i.e. the biblical record. You likely wouldn’t care about that evidence, why would you? But it does mean that, outside of science, there is a reason to differentiate between your hypothesis and GAE. There isn’t a strong indication from your hypothesis that it is grounded in any existing theological or philosophical framework. That’s what I was asking for.