If GAE were true, the God of the OT is worse than Dawkins and Hitchens describe

[structureoftruth (Matthew Dickau)]

@John_Harshman

You say God is necessarily good, but offer no argument for that.

In the context of this argument, that is an inference to what God must be like to be the ground of objective moral values, but it has independent justification in some of the more comprehensive forms of the ontological argument. Similarly for the obedience due to God. (The justification via the ontological argument depends on the premise that necessary goodness and worthiness of worship and obedience are forms of perfection, and I admit can only offer intuition in support of those premises. Nevertheless, I think they are more probable than not.)

@John_Harshman

How can we say that he’s good if we have no standard of good other than “what God is like”?

But we do have more than “what God is like”; we have the moral intuitions that God has given us to guide us in what is good. These are fallible (because of our fallen nature) but still a valid source of knowledge.

@John_Harshman

Further, his acts as stated in scripture are frequently quite different from good as we understand it, and his motivations, on those occasions when they are stated, are frequently not good either. Is it a case of “do as I say, not as I do?”

There’s obviously more than one such difficulty of the kind you reference here, and the response may vary depending on which one it is, specifically. I recommend Paul Copan’s Is God a Moral Monster? for its treatment of such issues. There was also a thread on the forums here a while back that had an article on the interpretation of the book of Joshua, in the form of a dialogue, which offers an alternative to Copan on the Canaanite genocide question specifically. Clay Jones’ Why Does God Allow Evil? touches on your objection here as well.

[John_Harshman]

@structureoftruth

The justification via the ontological argument depends on the premise that necessary goodness and worthiness of worship and obedience are forms of perfection, and I admit can only offer intuition in support of those premises. Nevertheless, I think they are more probable than not.

So you can offer no argument in support of your central premise. The ontological argument is perhaps the worst of all argument advanced for God’s existence; a lot of people think it’s meaningless, and I’m one of them.

@structureoftruth

But we do have more than “what God is like”; we have the moral intuitions that God has given us to guide us in what is good.

Yet your claim is that we can’t use those intuitions when considering God’s actions, so they are in the current case inapplicable.

@structureoftruth

There’s obviously more than one such difficulty of the kind you reference here, and the response may vary depending on which one it is, specifically.

Take Job as a start. How can you defend God persecuting him (by delegation) as a result of a bet with the underling actually doing the persecuting?

[dga471 (Daniel)]

So, my take on the Euthyphro dilemma is nothing original: it simply flows out of my stance as a classical theist. I believe in divine simplicity, the idea that God is a metaphysically simple being. What this means is that God’s attributes are identical to what he is: God literally is his goodness, love, omniscience, omnipotence, immutability, etc. Contrast this with all other beings, which have a combination of essential and accidental attributes. For example, the color of my hair is black. I could dye my hair green and still retain my identity as me, because the color of my hair is an accidental feature. One can also imagine that I suffer a terrible accident that makes me unable to walk. Yet even without my ability to walk, I would retain my identity as me.

Not so with God. None of God’s attributes or powers can be changed (even hypothetically) without denying the very existence of God. Once again, God is his goodness, God is his mercy, God is his omniscience and omnipotence and so on. Thus, the different attributes of God are really referring to the same attribute - his essence, which is a complete unity. This is what distinguishes God from other beings, including hypothetical super-powerful, technological advanced aliens from Planet X. For one can imagine a universe where these aliens did not possess the abilities they had yet still lived in Planet X. This is not the case with God.

1. You might ask, what proof or evidence do I have that God is simple? The short answer is that there is no proof needed, because for me, God as simple is part of my definition of what or who God is. If your idea of God doesn’t include simplicity, then you’re not even talking about what I mean by the word “God”.

2. Now, you could ask me why I think God exists at all. That’s a legitimate question, but that’s not the topic under discussion right now.

Thus, in this view, the force of the Euthyphro dilemma evaporates. Certain actions are good because God approves of them. But God’s approval is not arbitrary: it flows out of his very being, which is immutable and simple. The goodness of moral commands are grounded in the very being of God, which cannot be altered, even hypothetically. There is no hypothetical universe where God is evil or whimsical, for such a being would not be God. You would be asking: is there a hypothetical universe where God is not God? That would be a nonsensical question.

3. Next, to answer a similar objection:

@John_Harshman

How can we say that he’s good if we have no standard of good other than “what God is like”?

That’s the point: the only reason a standard of good makes any sense whatsoever is because the standard is God’s goodness itself. If God were not the standard for good, then once again, divine simplicity takes over: God would not be God, and you’re back to stating a self-contradiction.

4. But how do we reconcile God as the standard of goodness with the actions and commands of God in the Old Testament?
   a. This objection assumes that we’ve interpreted the moral ramifications of God’s actions and commands in the OT properly. Matt has, for example, suggested some people who argue that the descriptions of God’s actions, if properly understood within the cultural context, were not evil.
   b. This objection assumes a completely different conception of God, one in which God has the same moral obligations like humans. This doesn’t make sense. We hold children, mentally ill people, and animals to different moral standards than regular humans. So why should we think God, a perfectly simple being, has the same moral obligations as regular humans? In fact, if we look through the Bible, some things (such as vengeance) are prohibited because it is God’s prerogative to do them, not humans’.
   c. At most, this objection proves that the Old Testament is not an accurate description of God’s actions. This, by itself, is insufficient to defeat theism. For I’ve been defending classical theism in this post, not Christianity. While I of course don’t believe this, it is entirely possible that the Bible is not infallible and yet God still exists.

[structureoftruth (Matthew Dickau)]

@John_Harshman

The ontological argument is perhaps the worst of all argument advanced for God’s existence; a lot of people think it’s meaningless, and I’m one of them.

Too bad for you? The ontological argument that I advance is formally valid. There’s no question of whether it is meaningful or not (unless you are some kind of non-cognitivist about either God or modal logic more generally); the question is whether the premises are true or not.

@John_Harshman

So you can offer no argument in support of your central premise.

Eventually the inferential regress must come to a halt. Heard of properly basic beliefs? Our intuitions, though fallible, supply some of these. Example: the necessary truth of the rules of deductive inference themselves is not something we can come to know either empirically (since that could never tell us their necessity) or by inference from other knowledge (since inference presupposes their validity). So I see no problem with arguing from premises supported by intuition.
Of course, you may not share those intuitions. But a substantial number of philosophers and theologians throughout history have considered what a perfect being would have to be like, so it’s not like these are merely my own private intuitions either.

@John_Harshman

Yet your claim is that we can’t use those intuitions when considering God’s actions, so they are in the current case inapplicable.

No, that is not what I claim. What I claim is that we do not have enough knowledge to definitively say that God lacks morally sufficient reasons to allow the evils we observe. I do not claim that we are unable to judge whether a particular event in itself is something good or something evil, nor do I claim that we would be unable to evaluate God’s reasons with our moral intuitions if we did have enough knowledge to do so.
In other words, we can differentiate between the kinds of things where something is good (so God is justified in bringing it about for its own sake) and when something is an evil (when that would not hold). That is perfectly sufficient for meeting the objection you raised on this point.

@John_Harshman

Take Job as a start. How can you defend God persecuting him (by delegation) as a result of a bet with the underling actually doing the persecuting?

I can make a couple of guesses on God’s reasons for bringing that about (strengthening Job’s character so that he is able to enter into deeper relationship with God and therefore better enjoy the greatest possible good for eternity; providing an example for others who go through suffering they can’t understand). And I can note again that he does no wrong to Job in bringing such things about, given that he has such reasons and that he is not subject to moral obligations towards us the way we are to each other.
But my point is that I don’t need to know God’s reasons to have sufficient cause to trust that he in fact does have such reasons. So I don’t actually feel the need to have a complete answer for why God put Job through what he did.

[John_Harshman]

@dga471

God as simple is part of my definition of what or who God is.

Proof by definition? Not a good argument. Nor does simplicity imply goodness.

@dga471

That would be a nonsensical question.

I think everything you’ve said in that post is nonsensical, unfortunately. God has some kind of essence? OK, let’s suppose that. His essence is good? But how can you say that unless you have a standard of goodness against which to measure him?

@dga471

There is no hypothetical universe where God is evil or whimsical, for such a being would not be God.

How do you know that our universe is one in which the being you would call God exists rather than the being you wouldn’t?

@dga471

That’s the point: the only reason a standard of good makes any sense whatsoever is because the standard is God’s goodness itself.

Sorry, that makes no sense itself. That’s just down to “goodness is whatever God is”, and we’re back to Euthyphro.

@dga471

But how do we reconcile God as the standard of goodness with the actions and commands of God in the Old Testament?

And described motivations, don’t forget.

@dga471

Matt has, for example, suggested some people who argue that the descriptions of God’s actions, if properly understood within the cultural context, were not evil.

Would you agree with “some people”? Genocide is fine, within the proper cultural context?

@dga471

So why should we think God, a perfectly simple being, has the same moral obligations as regular humans?

Ah, as I suggested, it’s “do as I say, not what I do.” I don’t consider that moral.

@dga471

At most, this objection proves that the Old Testament is not an accurate description of God’s actions.

Now I would agree with that. It’s not an accurate description of anything real, for the most part.

[John_Harshman]

@structureoftruth

the question is whether the premises are true or not

The question is whether the premises are not even wrong.

@structureoftruth

So I see no problem with arguing from premises supported by intuition.

I do. It’s a copout. So is appeal to authority or some number of authorities.

@structureoftruth

That is perfectly sufficient for meeting the objection you raised on this point.

I don’t believe it is. We can’t judge whether something is evil, only that it appears, at the moment, evil. Or such is the claim necessary to justify evil. We must assume that all evil is just unrecognized good.

@structureoftruth

I can make a couple of guesses on God’s reasons for bringing that about

The reasons are specified in the text. Haven’t you read it? It’s a bet.

@structureoftruth

strengthening Job’s character so that he is able to enter into deeper relationship with God

That must be a great comfort to his dead family and servants.

[dga471 (Daniel)]

@John_Harshman

I think everything you’ve said in that post is nonsensical, unfortunately.

Then why are you bothering to respond to nonsense? That’s even more nonsensical. Should I take any of your objections seriously if you are actually responding to what you think is nonsense?

@John_Harshman

But how can you say that unless you have a standard of goodness against which to measure him?

Because God by definition is good. That’s why we’re talking about God at all. Your objections are all wrongheaded because you seem to assume I want to point to a specific creature (for example, the God of the Bible, read through Harshman’s lens of interpretation), and then argue that that creature fulfills Harshman’s intuition of goodness. That’s not what I’m talking at all.

Rather, I’m pointing to Harshman’s intuition of goodness and arguing that if it is objectively actually good, that must only be because there is a higher standard of goodness that exists somewhere. I argue that it exists in God.

@John_Harshman

Ah, as I suggested, it’s “do as I say, not what I do.” I don’t consider that moral.

Do you think everyone has the same moral obligations?

@John_Harshman

That’s just down to “goodness is whatever God is”, and we’re back to Euthyphro.

On the contrary, I think you need to reread Euthyphro and articulate the dilemma properly. I don’t understand your objection to me. Perhaps make a little bit more of an effort to flesh out your posts since I’ve done so on my part. That’s just courtesy.

[John_Harshman]

@dga471

Then why are you bothering to respond to nonsense?

To determine whether you can defend it, of course.

@dga471

Because God by definition is good.

That’s circular. God by definition is good and good by definition is what God is.

@dga471

I’m pointing to Harshman’s intuition of goodness and arguing that if it is objectively actually good, that must only be because there is a higher standard of goodness that exists somewhere. I argue that it exists in God.

Well, I don’t claim that there is objective good. And you don’t argue that it exists in God; you claim that by definition it exists in God. That doesn’t work.

@dga471

Do you think everyone has the same moral obligations?

They would if there were an objective standard.

@dga471

I think you need to reread Euthyphro and articulate the dilemma properly.

There are only two ways out of the circularity. Either “good” means something more than “what God is”, and there’s an external, objective standard by which we can realize that God is good, or there is no objective good, just something human society makes for itself. In either case, God is not the objective standard of good.

[dga471 (Daniel)]

@John_Harshman

They would if there were an objective standard.

Really? Does a parent have the same moral obligations as a child?

@John_Harshman

To determine whether you can defend it, of course.

Do you know what “nonsense” means?

@John_Harshman

That’s circular. God by definition is good and good by definition is what God is.

Yep, it’s circular because that’s the definition of God. I’m not interested in defending the idea of a God that isn’t good by definition.

@John_Harshman

There are only two ways out of the circularity. Either “good” means something more than “what God is”, and there’s an external, objective standard by which we can realize that God is good, or there is no objective good, just something human society makes for itself. In either case, God is not the objective standard of good.

Sorry, that’s not quite accurate. Socrates asks Euthyphro: are pious men loved by the gods because they are pious or are they pious because they are loved by the gods?

Horn 1: Pious men are loved by the gods because they are pious.
Implication: piousness is grounded in an external standard of piousness, not the gods.

Horn 2: Pious men are pious because they are loved by the gods.
Implication: piousness is arbitrary, subject to the whims of the gods (who often don’t even agree with each other).

The classical theist option: Instead of many gods, there is only one, unchanging God, who is identical with piousness and love itself. Pious men are pious insofar as they participate in the piousness of God.
Implication: piousness is grounded in God’s piousness (horn 1) but piousness itself is not arbitrary (horn 2), for God is piousness, and God is immutable. Thus piousness is also immutable.

[Rumraket (Mikkel R.)]

@dga471

Because God by definition is good.

Who decided that?

@dga471

Yep, it’s circular because that’s the definition of God.

I can just say it isn’t. God is evil, by definition. And that is the definition. Now what?

[dga471 (Daniel)]

@Rumraket

Who decided that?

You decided the moment you decided to talk to me about God.

Note I’m saying more than God is necessarily good, I’m saying that God is literally goodness itself.

@Rumraket

I can just say it isn’t. God is evil, by definition. And that is the definition. Now what?

We would be talking about different ideas of God. I’m not interested in believing in nor discussing a God that is necessarily evil.

[Rumraket (Mikkel R.)]

@dga471

You decided the moment you decided to talk to me about God.

Note I’m saying more than God is necessarily good, I’m saying that God is literally goodness itself .

We would be talking about different ideas of God. I’m not interested in believing in nor discussing a God that is necessarily evil.

I’m not trying to persuade you that God is necessarily evil, or to believe that an evil God exists. I’m trying to get you to see the folly of just insisting that God is good by definition.

In a roundabout way, you seem to be essentially conceding to a form of moral relativism. What is morally good is just what anyone personally defines to be goodness, and nobody can show anyone else to be objectively wrong because it’s just a matter of personal whim and upbringing how people define what is morally good or morally evil.

[structureoftruth (Matthew Dickau)]

@John_Harshman

The question is whether the premises are not even wrong.

Fair enough. But since I know what I mean when I state the premises of the ontological argument, I find the claim the they are meaningless a pretty hard sell.

@John_Harshman

It’s a copout. So is appeal to authority or some number of authorities.

I’m fairly confident that you rely on precisely that kind of “copout” when you object that God’s actions or motivations as described in the Bible are not moral. Normative principles aren’t obtained (wholly) empirically.

@John_Harshman

We can’t judge whether something is evil, only that it appears, at the moment, evil. Or such is the claim necessary to justify evil. We must assume that all evil is just unrecognized good.

It seems you are conceiving of the evaluation of good and evil in different terms than I am, if you leave no room for the distinction between what is good and evil intrinsically and what is morally justified for God to bring about all things considered. So if you want to phrase it that way, then sure, my position is essentially that all evil is just unrecognized good (with the big caveat that I would make the above distinction). But it is not actually something I’m assuming. It’s something I’m inferring from other things I believe to be reasonably justified.

@John_Harshman

The reasons are specified in the text. Haven’t you read it? It’s a bet.

Right, I forgot to add the obvious “demonstrate Job’s faithfulness to the accuser (and the other members of the divine council, presumably)” item to the list of God’s reasons.
That’s… probably more significant than we realize, actually. Given the worldview of the ancient Israelites, I doubt it would be in accord with the intent of the author of Job to read this as God playing frivolous games with someone’s life. Rather, it may be more accurate to say it was to answer a question about the nature of human (and perhaps by extension, angelic) loyalty to God, a question with serious spiritual import. I ought not to have forgotten that!

@John_Harshman

That must be a great comfort to his dead family and servants.

You asked about the justice of what happened to Job. What God allowed the accuser to do to Job’s family and servants is another question, with a different answer. Like I said, though, I don’t feel the need to have a complete answer. I don’t know any of the specifics for why God allows people to die in tsunamis, either, but that does not mean I am unjustified in trusting that he does have reason.

[dga471 (Daniel)]

@Rumraket

In a roundabout way, you seem to be essentially conceding to a form of moral relativism. What is morally good is just what anyone personally defines to be goodness, and nobody can show anyone else to be objectively wrong because it’s just a matter of personal whim and upbringing how people define what is morally good or morally evil.

Rumraket, your lack of a philosophical background here shows. You are confusing moral epistemology with moral ontology. The former deals with how we can know what is morally good. The latter deals with whether objective moral values exist at all. Do you understand the difference?

In this discussion, I am primarily talking about moral ontology, not epistemology. What that means is that even if you think A is good while I think not-A is good (because we disagree on how to do moral epistemology), my point is that in both cases, A (or not-A) is good only as far as they participate in God’s goodness.

[John_Harshman]

@structureoftruth

But since I know what I mean when I state the premises of the ontological argument, I find the claim the they are meaningless a pretty hard sell.

Perhaps you could state them and tell me what you mean by them.

@structureoftruth

I’m fairly confident that you rely on precisely that kind of “copout” when you object that God’s actions or motivations as described in the Bible are not moral.

I’m unsure of the source of your confidence.

@structureoftruth

But it is not actually something I’m assuming . It’s something I’m inferring from other things I believe to be reasonably justified.

What are those other things?

@structureoftruth

That’s… probably more significant than we realize, actually.

Why is that demonstration so important as to be worth dozens of deaths and other suffering?

@structureoftruth

What God allowed the accuser to do to Job’s family and servants is another question, with a different answer.

It’s the same question in the book of Job, as all those deaths are just part of Job’s persecution, and otherwise not important.

So, your solution to the problem of evil is to say “What evil? I don’t see any evil.”

[John_Harshman]

@dga471

I’m saying that God is literally goodness itself .

Either you mean something different by “goodness” or something different by “literally”. Goodness is the condition or property of being good, and yet God is not a condition or property. “Literally”, on the other hand, means the opposite of figuratively, so you are saying that God truly is the condition or property of being good. I’ve heard that claim before, but I find it hard to believe that it’s intended literally.

@dga471

I’m not interested in believing in nor discussing a God that is necessarily evil.

Does what you’re interested in have any necessary relation to truth? You think God is good, and your current justification for that belief is, apparently, that you want to think so and you refuse to consider anything else. That’s not a justification.

[dga471 (Daniel)]

@John_Harshman

I’ve heard that claim before, but I find it hard to believe that it’s intended literally.

Well, I do intend it literally. Think of God more as an abstract principle that unifies the universe, rather than a bearded man in the sky which happens to be really powerful and good.

@John_Harshman

Does what you’re interested in have any necessary relation to truth? You think God is good, and your current justification for that belief is, apparently, that you want to think so and you refuse to consider anything else. That’s not a justification.

I’m not trying to justify my belief in God in this thread. Instead, I’m explaining how the Euthyphro dilemma works within the context of my belief system.

[John_Harshman]

@dga471

Think of God more as an abstract principle that unifies the universe

Sorry, but goodness isn’t an abstract principle that unifies the universe. Goodness is not a principle capable of creating a universe. Principles don’t do anything.

@dga471

I’m explaining how the Euthyphro dilemma works within the context of my belief system.

I think you are failing in that. And it isn’t as if I haven’t heard this claim before. I don’t think it’s coherent.

[dga471 (Daniel)]

@John_Harshman

Sorry, but goodness isn’t an abstract principle that unifies the universe.

What is goodness then?

@John_Harshman

I think you are failing in that. And it isn’t as if I haven’t heard this claim before. I don’t think it’s coherent.

Given your short, impulsive responses in this thread, I doubt that you’ve attempted to seriously consider what I actually wrote. All of your criticisms miss the point, as you keep trying to fit my beliefs into a predetermined box in your mind of what God is and what Christians must believe.

Unlike you, here I’ve actually tried my best to articulate my own beliefs cogently, anticipating objections and explaining what I mean. It would be more interesting if you could at least do the same in return (even if you disagree with me) but you’re not.

[Rumraket (Mikkel R.)]

@dga471

Rumraket, your lack of a philosophical background here shows. You are confusing moral epistemology with moral ontology .

No, I’m not, and you’re not showing that merely by pointing out what the difference is.

The former deals with how we can know what is morally good. The latter deals with whether objective moral values exist at all. Do you understand the difference?

Yes, but the two are intricately linked. To say that something exists (such as objective moral values) is a claim I’m going to need to be persuaded of in some way. That means I want to know how you know that. You are making some sort of fact-claim by saying objective moral standards exist. I want to see how you intend to support that fact-claim.

All I see is you just making the claim. And by making claiming the contrary, I am hoping to persuade you to see that we do not establish what is objectively true, we do not come to know what is factual, merely by assertion.

In this discussion, I am primarily talking about moral ontology, not epistemology.

Yes, and I’m trying to get you to understand that you do not show that objective moral values exist simply by asserting that they do.

You do not establish that objective moral values exist just by parroting the statement “God IS goodness itself”. That’s not how we show that something exists, nor how we show a proposition to be objectively true.

If you want to argue that there is an objective moral standard, you’re going to have to do some act of persuasion here. That means you need to make some arguments that aren’t just examples of question-begging assertions.

What that means is that even if you think A is good while I think not-A is good (because we disagree on how to do moral epistemology), my point is that in both cases, A (or not-A) is good only as far as they participate in God’s goodness.

Yeah that’s your point, but your point is just your opinion as far as I can see. What is missing is something that makes your opinion a statement about what is objectively true. I want to know how you intend to make the case for your opinion that “A is good only as far as they participate in God’s goodness” being an objective fact.

I suspect you know, already now, that you can not actually do this. That all you have here is the assertion, and that it weighs no more than mine. That there really doesn’t actually exist an objective moral standard. Even if God exists, nothing makes it an objective fact that God is the moral standard for anything. That will always just be an assertion you can’t show to be true. An opinion for you to state.