Michael Egnor tries to solve the dualist problem of interaction

I’m resolved not to respond to any more of Egnor’s comments on this subject. I can’t just keep shooting fish in a barrel. But can someone confirm that, in the passage below, he is just plain wrong in his understanding of the word “cause”?

Modern materialism, from which our denial of consciousness springs, was formulated by Francis Bacon (1561–1626) and his immediate predecessors in the early modern era. They denied the reality of formal and final causes in nature. They argued that science could only deal with material and efficient causes — stuff hitting stuff, basically.

This is a diminished view of nature, as quantum mechanics has made painfully obvious. It is also entirely unnecessary. Scientists who wish to focus their research on material and efficient causes are free to do so. They can do good (if not profound) science with these impoverished tools. But it is another thing entirely to deny that formal and final causes exist. They most certainly do exist — nature is incomprehensible if we do not take into account formal and final causes.

For example, the universe obeys intricate mathematical laws (formal cause) and biological systems obviously have purposes (final cause). Studying the dynamics by which the heart pumps blood, for example, inherently means taking into account formal and final causation. Formal and final causes are everywhere.

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@TedDavis and @rcohlers, is there any sense in which this quote from Egnor (at the Discovery Institute) could be correct?

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Well, as I’ve commented above, I don’t know if Egnor himself understand Aristotelianism properly. Still, what Egnor is saying here is just repeating a common narrative among Thomists. As a physicist I would disagree that final or formal causes exist in physics today. The main concern of modern physics is to provide an equation that accurately characterizes the evolution of any physical system. Physics is agnostic over what “causes” the equations to be true - for that we need to get into the philosophy of science (see: What are Laws of Nature?). As Feynman said, the modern physicist’s main preoccupation is to “shut up and calculate”. So even the fact that these sorts of discussions are held among philosophers, not physicists, is a sign that modern physics is primarily concerned with only material and efficient causes.

Now going specifically into philosophy of science, even if you believe in something like OSR (which @BruceS mentioned), where everything at the very bottom is just mathematics, it would be a stretch to say that these equations would be the same as Aristotelian formal causes.

Regarding final causes: I’m not a biologist, but I very much doubt that true final causes exist in biology. I thought this is why ID is so controversial, though - remember those debates we had with Eric Holloway about teleology? (But it’s important to remember that ID proponents are generally not Aristotelians either.)

Final causation is even less important in physics. Aristotle believed that even a stone falling to the ground exhibited a final cause. This statement is meaningless in modern physics, since it is not something which is experimentally testable. Modern physics adopts a pragmatic philosophy of verificationism, where something is only of scientific interest if it creates a difference in observable quantities.

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For as we divided natural philosophy in general into the inquiry of causes and productions of effects, so that part which concerneth the inquiry of causes we do subdivide according to the received and sound division of causes. The one part, which is physic, inquireth and handleth the material and efficient causes; and the other, which is metaphysic, handleth the formal and final causes.

Bacon, The Advancement of Learning

Apparently, however, I think @Faizal_Ali is right in pointing out that there is much philosophical debate over whether final causes exist in biology specifically.

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@swamidass Messed up the blockquotes in the original comment; I’ve now fixed them.

Egnor mentions Goff. Goff believes in an updated form of Russellian monism which is a form of panpsychism. Goff’s argument in a nutshell:

  1. Science can only tell us about the behavior of entities; it cannot provide information on their intrinsic nature.That is, science tells us about quantities, but cannot speak to qualities.

  2. But our most certain knowledge is qualitative: it is our subjective experience, like redness or pain.

Therefore physicalism is incomplete: the world is intrinsically conscious in panpsychist sense.

But Goff and panpsychism are orthogonal to hylomorphism, as far as I can see.

I linked to the Jaworski Philosophy of Mind upthread. There he argues that hylomorphism is not mere physicalism. He accepts physics being the most general science but denies that everything is determined or explained by physics.

He goes on to explain why hylomorphism is not a form of Non-Reductive Physicalism, but the argument is quite subtle: NRP has many variations, and I have not studied hylomorphism enough to follow Jaworski’s arguments as to why no variation of NRP works.

Just going by the quote, I think Egnor is confused.
Science uses only efficient causation. It alone explains the behavior of material objects.

Laws are not formal causation as I understand the term. Laws are not causes. Laws capture regularities. Some philosophers further argue that laws are not mere regularities, but that laws of nature express regularities by capturing necessities: the way the world must unfold. They may then further argue that (efficient) causation is ontologically grounded in laws.

Teleological (purposeful) behavior is, I would say, the most challenging for explanation by efficient causation. It may be expressed as the problem of downward causation: how can the whole influence the parts without introducing laws of nature or causes that conflict with fundamental physics and efficient causation? One can speak of emergence, but that is just hiding the problem in a word.

One way to capture downward causation as efficient causation is to look to the dynamics of non-linear systems. Very briefly and roughly, the dynamics of the components of a system can undergo a sort of phase change where it enters a phase space region that reflects global constraints on future evolution of the system. Deacon’s teleodynamics takes that idea to an extreme:

ETA: Just came across this link which appears to be making similar arguments, although I have not studied thoroughly yet.

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Yes. The laws of physics as we understand them are descriptive, not prescriptive. We describe that we observe regularities, relationships of quantity and magnitude taking place in time and space. We call them laws, but it’s not like this automatically entails that they are their own thing that somehow exist in some platonic or abstract realm and which have the power to cause certain states of affairs.

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True for science.
As you might expect, philosophers start with the science, but then argue about whether regularity alone is enough to capture the nature of laws. Perhaps regularity is not enough and we need to add nomological necessity to reality? The technical term is “modality” and the argument about whether it is part of reality gets its modern start with Hume, who said no there is no modality in reality.

Lots more in SEP and IEP if you are interested in philosophical stuff.
https://www.iep.utm.edu/lawofnat/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/laws-of-nature/

(O/T my excuse for posting this early EST is insomnia…)

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As a former physics student/teacher turned historian of science, I disagree. IMO, Schrodinger’s equation (for example) and other formal mathematical descriptions of nature are exactly what I just implicitly called them: formal causes. They don’t directly cause anything–here we agree, but they describe real patterns in nature that are part of the created order, what Boyle might have called properties and powers given to the creation by the Creator. Certainly Feynman and some other physicists have said, just calculate, but I think Feynman was philosophically naive here. Did he think that Schrodinger’s equation wasn’t part of the causal nexus? If not, why did he treat the equations he used in his calculations as if they were actually producing true results?

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I assume that Egnor is accurately quoted here, but I haven’t listened to his talk.

If this quote is accurate, I think it reveals a fairly limited/shallow view of Bacon’s understanding of “atheism” and the design argument–similar to some things I’ve seen others from the ID movement say. I would never pretend to be an expert on Bacon, but he did say this in his famous little essay “Of Atheism.” (Of Atheism - Collection at Bartleby.com). I’m not confident this is the most reliable version of that piece, but I haven’t time to check it as carefully as I should. If someone does, please share the findings. With these caveats, here’s the passage, with my note in square brackets:

" And therefore God never wrought miracle to convince atheism, because his ordinary works convince it. It is true, that a little philosophy [“science” as we would say today] inclineth man’s mind to atheism; but depth in philosophy bringeth men’s minds about to religion. For while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them, and go no further; but when it beholdeth the chain of them, confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity. Nay, even that school which is most accused of atheism doth most demonstrate religion; that is, the school of Leucippus and Democritus and Epicurus. For it is a thousand times more credible, that four mutable elements, and one immutable fifth essence, duly and eternally placed, need no God, than that an army of infinite small portions or seeds unplaced, should have produced this order and beauty without a divine marshal. The Scripture saith, The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God; it is not said, The fool hath thought in his heart; so as he rather saith it by rote to himself, as that he would have, than that he can thoroughly believe it, or be persuaded of it. For none deny there is a God, but those for whom it maketh that there were no God. It appeareth in nothing more, that atheism is rather in the lip than in the heart of man, than by this; that atheists will ever be talking of that their opinion, as if they fainted in it within themselves, and would be glad to be strengthened by the consent of others."

So, Bacon’s view is quite a bit more nuanced and complicated that Egnor apparently realizes. Ironically, here Bacon expresses precisely the view that ID holds–namely, that the chain of causes is just too complicated to be accidental, that a God must lie behind it. At the same time, elsewhere he cautions against appealing to final causes without also pursing the secondary/efficient causes–that is, don’t use design as a science stopper. That’s the part that seems most to bother ID folks, as far as I can tell. But, Bacon absolutely did not deny the general validity of design arguments, nor did he advance “materialism” as Egnor apparently thinks.

It’s worth adding that Bacon’s view of “atheism” and design was standard stuff among 16th & 17th Century Protestant authors. Genuine “atheism,” truly denying God’s existence, was seen as a literally incredible position that was almost never actually found in a given person. Rather, Protestant apologists typically held that the real problem was “practical atheism,” living as if there’s no divine judge for one’s actions. A serious problem still today, IMO, while genuine atheism of course is quite prevalent.

When Bacon invoked the complexity of the chain of causes, he wasn’t being original there either. A classic example is DuPlessis Mornay’s work on “The Trewnesse of the Christian Religion,” where he used the clock metaphor to refute “atheism,” a century before Boyle did the same thing. Mornay, Bacon, Boyle, Richard Bentley, and Samuel Clarke all basically held the same overall view of “atheism” and its refutation by design arguments.

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Lewis’s Best System Analysis is the current philosophical argument for the regularity view of laws; that is, for denying the reality of modality, eg necessity.

Of course, many philosophers reject Lewis’s modernized version of Humeanism. But the viability of Lewis’s arguments means scientists are philosophically justified in ignoring formal causation, even assuming one interprets it the way you do.

I recommend these papers by Jenna Ismael and the material she cites if you want to explore the philosophy of laws and modality beyond the SEP and IEP introductions I linked above.

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More papers I feel I must read! Enough already! Stop!

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Sure. Of course, I too have a many papers and books that I have on my list to someday get around to studying in detail.

I should say that Ismael has a strong point of view that is not consensus. I find a lot of her work to be in synch with my intuitions, but YMMV. She does cite or footnote alternative points of view, in particular in the introduction sections of the On Chance paper

Lastly, my approach to posting is to post in a style I hope others will use. I like to see cites of places to follow up if I am interested. I’m sorry if others have found them to be distracting.

(Ismael does have a great book on Free Will which I will not link…)

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Just joking. Do not hesitate to share as many resources as you wish. :slight_smile:

I figured you were, but I am not sure what your likes indicate…

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How do Thomists interact with modern chemistry? For example, for Thomists, what percentage of a kilogram of steel, is made of air, fire, water, and earth respectively?

@dga471 and I had some discussion on a Thomist view of chemistry (water molecules was our example, I think) a while ago. While I don’t think I ultimately agree with the Thomist view, it is an interesting way to shake things up a bit, thinking in a less reductionist way. I doubt many modern-day Thomists take every position of Aristotle and Aquinus. I imagine the 4 elements would be type of (incidental) stuff they’d drop or reframe.

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Interesting. Do you think they would consider Thomas was flat out wrong on this, and that modern chemistry is accurate, or would they consider that the traditional elemental system can be preserved if we rename it, but still argue that modern chemistry is inadequate because it doesn’t take into account these four elements as the basis for compounds of matter?

How about the philosopher’s stone and the transmutation of mater, are Thomists much into that these days, or have they decided to let it go? I would have thought that using the philosopher’s stone to transmute matter would be an excellent demonstration that the Thomistic view of elements is sound.

If these questions seem random, they’ve been prompted by my recent studies into medieval alchemy, and the extent to which its views on matter became completely interwoven with medieval Christianity.

Honestly, I haven’t met that many Thomists, but the ones I have seen around here seem to be extracting out and using the metaphysics of Aquinus, rather than looking to everything he said as revelatory. I had the same concern when I first had the discussion with @dga471, but the actual conversation centered more on understanding how we think about the nature of relationship between individual hydrogen and oxygen atoms, and water. Is water the sum of the parts (bottom up) or can we look at the organization of the atoms (form?) coming more top-down. It interesting. I think like any philosophy that is grounded in pre-modern thought, some stuff (alchemy, etc.) just doesn’t make sense anymore and needs to be reworked. That’s what the people @dga471 has been engaging with are doing, as I understanding it, with evolution.

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