“Basic” refers to what I said it refers to. “Properly basic” also refers to what I said it refers to. I’m not just throwing that extra word in there to be verbose.
Yes and no. Beliefs formed through sense perception are properly basic and so are accepted rationally. They can also be accepted on a pragmatic basis at the same time. But in my previous comment I was intending to talk about beliefs that are accepted only on a pragmatic basis. So mostly no.
By definition. Or because that’s how an epistemological theory including properly basic beliefs works. (The regress problem in epistemology supports such an epistemological theory… somewhat in the same way that the moral argument supports the theistic metaethical theory.)
You can’t get a normative conclusion out of an argument containing wholly non-normative premises. (See: naturalistic fallacy. This claim is contested, but the only successful contender that I can see is of the Aristotelian-Scholastic variety, and doesn’t think much of Euthyphro either.) If we have some item of moral knowledge, it is a normative conclusion, because morality is normative. Hence we arrived at it via an argument that included a normative premise among our knowledge. But no human has time to think through an infinite chain of arguments, so there has to have been a normative premise among our knowledge that wasn’t arrived at through argument, hence properly basic.
And yes, still true if you reject premise 0.
… its great that our moral intuitions would be useful and all, but notice that useful is not the same as true. My point stands.
You said (emphasis added):
And what I said in 7b was (again, emphasis added):
Now, just in case anyone missed that… “Either A or B” means: “only A” or “only B” or both. So I wonder if you actually did go back and read 7b.
I even answered your follow-up questions on why both necessity and moral perfection are required, so it should have been quite obvious that I did consider a being lacking only one.
How does it set an external standard? Referring to analogy in my other post - does the man-on-the-street’s vague idea of a meter set an external standard on the prototype meter? Does his vague idea prevent him from recognizing the concept of a meter as defined by the prototype meter?
How? Do tell.
A dinosaur dies and leaves some fossils fragments. From those fossil fragments, we infer things about it, like that it had a certain height when it was alive. The fossil fragments are our reasons for believing those facts. But the thing that grounds those facts in reality is the dinosaur.
The idea here is that reality isn’t constituted by our knowledge of it. It’s why your objection “how can we say that what God would do is good, unless we have some standard of goodness by which to judge his character?” is off the mark.
More like, because I know it is wrong to casually murder strangers, I infer that naturalism is false. I find your view inconsistent, but I’m very glad you maintain that inconsistency in favour of your moral intuitions rather than your poorly-justified metaphysical view.