Okay, so discoverability by design is the hypothesis, and the discoveries is the evidenceâor rather, the nature of the discoveries. Did I get that right?
To me, this reads as âdiscoverability is the evidence for the [discoverability by design] hypothesis. Would you agree or disagree? If you disagree, would you mind sharing how you view it differently?
First, itâs quite evident from the context (a debate with Bill Cole, who is a Christian who believes in God, and thinks God is the designer), that Faizal Aliâs âomnipotent beingâ is meant to refer to God.
Second, even though our minds more easily handle the routine things Faizal mentions, it does not follow that they donât have the capacity to go beyond such routine reasoning, and come to a deeper understanding of nature; and indeed, the very existence of modern physics and chemistry (or for that matter, evolutionary theory) proves that the human mind can be pushed to higher levels of understanding. And how does Faizal know that God would not have designed human beings exactly in this way, so that they would attain understanding of difficult things such as quantum physics etc. only later in their history? How can he say that God would not be expected to design human beings in that way? He could not say that without some prior notion of what God is like, what his motives are and what means he might use to achieve them. Faizal was implicitly theologizing. I challenged him to make his implicit theology explicit. He has declined the challenge.
He also declined the challenge to show where ID is âbad theologyâ according to even a single religious tradition.
Itâs clear he wants to be able throw out comments about God and theology in these discussions, without taking responsibility for those comments by defending them when they are challenged. This is not discussion in good faith.
If he doesnât provide defenses of his statements, I wonât respond further, to him or to anyone here who is running interference for him. If he is not bluffing, if he really has good reasons for his statements, he should be able to state those reasons without help from others.
The claim was implicit, but it was there in your words. Do you know what âimplicitâ means? Iâll give you an example.
Suppose I were to ask you, âWhen did you stop beating your wife?â In that case, I would be making no explicit claim that you ever beat your wife, but I would be making an implicit claim. And you would be right to say that I was accusing you of beating your wife.
You made a claim that a certain human understanding of nature would be expected to be the way it is if man arose through random mutation and selection, but that it would not be expected to be that way if man came from an omnipotent designer (which in your discussions always means God) who desired human beings to understand nature. You could not possibly claim the last part without some view of your own about how that omnipotent designer would think or what he would intend, etc. You canât say what would be âexpectedâ if such a being existed without some conception of the nature or operation of that being. If you canât grasp this implication of your own claim, then logic is definitely not your strong suit.
So you were indirectly making a theological claim. You can choose to flesh it out, i.e., to specify what are the characteristics of the omnipotent designer such that he would not create human beings who found quantum theory difficult to arrive at. Or you can admit that you donât really have any evidence that an omnipotent designer would not do that.
Similarly, you can choose to specify one significant theological doctrine in one significant religious tradition, in comparison with which ID is âbad theologyâ, or you can admit that you have no such examples, due to lack of knowledge of religious traditions and/or lack of any examples of ID theology.
Iâm assuming you will do neither, but will continue to seek nit-picking, hair-splitting, legalistic, purely technical verbal dodges to avoid defending what you clearly stated or implied. I will ignore all such evasions. If you donât answer directly, Iâll assume itâs because you cannot defend your claims. And if you donât care what I think, thatâs fine, we can just end this ridiculous discussion quickly.
Discoverability (vs no Discoverability)
2.Design (vs no Design)
Discoveries apply to hypothesis 1. The nature of the discoveries apply to hypothesis 2.
In this case an example of a piece of evidence is a microscope. Where matter (metal glass etc) was able to make an instrument capable (with the addition of human design) of additional discovery.
This supports hypothesis 2 as the ability to use the raw materials of the universe to better understand
the universe looks intentional IMO.
Close. As you say, I discussed what we human beings would expect of an omnipotent being under those circumstances. But such a being is not obliged to satisfy our expectations. That has been the main thrust of my argument here with @cole: That it is pointless for us human beings to have firm expectations regarding whether and how an omnipotent god would create a universe so that we could understand it. A position that, interestingly enough, you have endorsed yourself.
No, I did not explicitly state this position. It was, rather - wait for it - implied.
âif an omnipotent god did such-and-such, we would see thisâ
You could try saying that heâs making an implicit claim about how an omnipotent god might do such-and-such, but the âomnipotenceâ aspect makes that problematic.
That is correct. But, to be more complete, I am saying âWe, as human beings, would expect an omnipotent god to do x if it wanted to achieve y .â
There is no requirement, however, that such a being act in accordance with our expectations, which are primarily based on our experience with how we observe our fellow human beings behaving.
This points to a more basic problem with @colewd /@vjtorley 's argument, in that it begs the question by assuming we human beings are endowed with ability to use our senses and reasoning ability to determine what such a being would and would not do. @Eddie has already expressed his agreement with my position that such an assumption is unwarranted.
Of course, someone as well-versed in philosophy as âEddieâ claims to be would be aware that it is common in philosophical discussion to assume one or more of the premises of an opponentâs argument, even if one does not actually accept these premises, in order to demonstrate that the argument fails even if these premises are assumed to be true.
That is correct as far as it goes, but youâre failing to complete the argument to reach the implicit conclusion. Here is the completion that you are (deliberately?) suppressing:
â⌠and we donât see this; therefore, no omnipotent God did such-and-such.â
This conclusion is implied by the setup of the argument, which amounts to: âWe do see what would be expected if man arose out of unplanned evolutionary processes; we donât see what would be expected if man came into being as the result of a deliberate decision of an omnipotent God; therefore, man arose out of unplanned evolutionary processes.â
So heâs making a claim about what would be expected of man if an omnipotent God existed, and that amounts to a claim about what kind of human being an omnipotent God would choose to create. If you say â or even only imply â that an omnipotent God would never created human beings with an intellect that would make the discovery of quantum physics hard (though not impossible), you are claiming to know something about what an omnipotent God might or might not do. Thatâs theologizing, plain and simple. Atheist writing these days is full of such theologizing.
Your âweâ is impertinent. You were not speaking for âwe human beingsâ, but for yourself, or for a certain segment of your fellow atheists. Many human beings would be careful not lay down any âexpectationsâ about what an omnipotent God might choose. Among those many are a good number of theologians.
If that was your argument, then paragraph that I was objecting to was written poorly. It did not convey that idea. It conveyed the idea:
âWe do see what would be expected if man arose out of unplanned evolutionary processes; we donât see what would be expected if man came into being as the result of a deliberate decision of an omnipotent God; therefore, man arose out of unplanned evolutionary processes.â
If youâre now saying that we shouldnât have any expectations about what an omnipotent God might do, thatâs fine, but then your line of argument leading to âtherefore unguided evolutionâ collapses. It collapses because it rests on a premise that has not been established, a premise about the kind of world an omnipotent God would create.
So if youâre not guilty of faulty reasoning, youâre guilty of very unclear writing. In either case, you left the strong impression of implying a theological claim about what kind of human beings (specifically with regard to their powers of reasoning about nature) God would create. I have exposed both the theological character of such a claim, and its dubiousness. So Iâve done my job in improving this discussion. Whether you will back down even slightly, e.g., even to the point of admitting that you didnât write as clearly as might have, and might well have left a wrong impression, remains to be seen, but as there is little historical precedent for such an admission, I do not expect one.
Even with the qualifier âif it wanted to achieve yâ the expectation is unwarranted. If God wanted human beings to be able to understand quantum physics, he might still have chosen to create human beings who would find the thinking involved in quantum physics difficult, such that it would take centuries of intellectual development before quantum physics would be grasped. He might have wanted such a long historical development to take place. There is no âexpectationâ that an omnipotent God would not do this. Itâs your expectation you are recording, and by representing it as a universal or appropriate expectation, you are merely indicating how you suppose an omnipotent God would think, intend, or act regarding the human capacity (to understand quantum physics, etc.) in question. You are working from your conception of an omnipotent God. And thatâs fine, as long as you indicate this, and donât use pronouns such as âweâ to suggest that people in general conceive of God in that way. Itâs your generalization from your own conception of what an omnipotent God is like that I was objecting to.
Yes, but in that case, it is normal to state explicitly that one is doing that. It is not good practice to leave it unclear whether one is endorsing a statement or only accepting it temporarily for the sake of argument. In your paragraph that I quoted, you failed to state you were doing this, and thus, you have only your own writing to blame if anyone thought you were giving your own view. I respond to what people actually write, not to what they might be thinking but have failed to say.
Let us presume that you are correct in microscopes not being possible in a universe not designed to be discoverable. That would require that the laws of refraction to not apply to the microscope, and therefore that the reduced speed of light due to scattering as it travels through dense medium not apply. But why should just microscopes be excepted? So if the universe pervasively behaved such that microscopes do not work, then the fundamental physics and constants of the universe would be unrecognizable and nothing would be as it is. So this presumption hangs on an absurdity, that the universe could exist - designed or otherwise - and microscopes not be possible.
Now let us presume that the familiar universe is not designed for discovery. All this requires is that the optics of microscopes work the same way nature works, and that discovery is an just an extension of the resolving capacity of the optics of our naked eyes. The purpose of light scattering is not to discover cells, classify minerals, or fab microchips; the familiar universe would not be here otherwise, let alone our eyeballs. It would seem that reality does not require anything additional or intentional to unlock discovery.
Sorry, do you agree or disagree with my previous question (we can do âlean yes, lean noâ if you prefer):
It sounds like you may be disagreeing, but I donât want to make any assumptions hereâitâs landed me in hot water before. If you are disagreeing, itâs not entirely clear to me how you see that they differ⌠would the microscope in your example fit into the discovery category, the discoverability category, or a third category, and if the latter, how would you distinguish that category from the previous two?
Hi Ron
My claim is that microscopes are evidence for a discoverable by design universe. PCR machines, CT scan machines and thermometers are also evidence for a DBD universe.
Thatâs ridiculous. As a psychiatrist, he has a far deeper understanding of the frailties of human thought than you do.
Itâs just fascinating that you relentlessly discount the expertise of others and expect everyone to respect yours, which we shouldnât because you are pseudonymous.
Faizal didnât write that. Why did you enclose it with quotation marks?