Is believing that atheism is a choice related to prejudice against atheists? The present research draws on attributional models of prejudice to examine the relationship between perceptions that atheism is a choice and anti-atheist prejudice among Christians, Jews, and nonbelievers. We hypothesized that Christians would be more likely than Jews (Sample 1 and 3) and nonbelievers (Samples 1, 2, and 3) to believe atheism is a choice. Further, we hypothesized that the relationship between perceptions of choice and anti-atheist prejudice would be stronger among Christians than Jews and nonbelievers. In three samples of college students and U.S. adults (N = 859), Christians were more likely than others to believe atheism is a choice and perceptions of choice uniquely predicted Christians’ prejudice toward atheists. By examining perceptions of choice, our research reveals a novel source of anti-atheist prejudice, but a source with deep roots in the psychology of prejudice.
Recent discussion on another topic led me to see if there was any research on perceptions of whether people “choose whether to believe in [God]”. This turned up, and seemed relevant.
I couldn’t see any obvious problems with the methodology – but then I’m more familiar with analysis of economic data rather than sociological data.
I think the biggest problem here is the definition of “choice”. This appears to be left up to each participant to apply their own definition. Maybe there is other literature about how people define that.
The sample size across samples is pretty good, and the smallest sample is N=235, which is OK. The methodology appears to be linear regression separately for each sample; this is fairly common in Psychology, but it’s a bit “old school”. I would do a single analysis, either stratified or with sample-group interactions to preserve power. This approach would allow direct comparison of results between groups, which I do not see here (but I didn’t look too hard).
This methodology is OK, but suffers from the same problems in a lot of Psychology research: It’s hard to make qualitative questions into quantitative measures
My take-away is not everyone sees atheism as a choice, and Christians are more likely to see it as a choice based on the social distance construct (“How icky are atheists?”).
I think one of the contributing factors is the commonly attributed motive, “without fear of God’s judgment you are free to do as much evil as you like”.
I’m not at all sure that a sufficiently clear and uncontentious definition is even possible in this context. Any attempt would seem likely to lead into the intractable question of whether Free Will exists, excursions into how beliefs are produced, etc, etc.
This seems more likely to simply replace the respondents’ preconceptions about choice with the surveyors’ own, as well as further muddying the issue.
It would seem better to do as the surveyors appear to have done, and leave “choice” without further definition, with the implicit question being “do you perceive it as being a choice?”
But I could be wrong, and a clarifying definition could be out there. But the only way to demonstrate its possibility is to present one.
Y’know, I’ve never thought of it as a choice, because to me faith in Christianity is literal belief in some core set of supernatural propositions. And there are things a person can’t choose. One can’t choose what to want. One can’t choose what one finds convincing. Even when people engage in “motivated reasoning,” they probably don’t do it with the explicit mental object of trying to believe something. As a lawyer one does something a bit like that, but it’s a little different: trying to figure out what the best strategy is to get someone ELSE to believe something.
But I have heard it said by some that to them faith is something more like “trust,” and I suppose one can choose whether to give someone or some thing the benefit of the doubt. Myself, I am not sure what “trust” in a deity even means, when I don’t have good reason to believe that the darned thing exists. It seems to me that you’ve got to accept that someone exists before you trust him, and that leads me back to the original problem. I trust my wife, but all evidence suggests she has a corporeal existence, a good sense of humor, and the potential to be kind or unkind to me. I can’t say the same for He Who Walks Behind The Rows, so what would trusting it even look like?
I suspect @John_Harshman may be right: the formulation that says one “chooses” atheism may correlate very well with the belief that atheism is motivated by the desire to be free from the moral rules which gods supposedly impose. I’ve always found that interpretation of the motive weird. I have a quite strong desire to be free from traffic tickets, but I still believe in police.
Theists ask me, “If there’s no god, what would stop me from raping and killing everyone I want to.” My answer is always: “I, myself, have raped and killed everyone I want to … and the number for both is zero.”[1]
He continues:
Behaving morally because of a hope of reward or a fear of punishment is not morality. Morality is not bribery or threats. Religion is bribery and threats. Humans have morality. We don’t need religion.
Does belief in police reduce your probability of speeding (and other traffic infractions)? If so, then it would appear to be disanalogous to belief in God – as there is no evidence that this improves any objective measure of moral behaviour.
You nailed it. This is an issue with a lot of Psychology research. To their credit, they have whole bodies of work on validity and reliability trying to address this problem. I’m passingly familiar with parts of that, not nearly all. Psychology has their own statistical terminology which can require some effort to decipher (so do Economists).
I agree. A lot of biostatisticians won’t touch the Psychology stat methods (ie: Factor rotations) because it makes interpretation even more arbitrary. But I’m certain there are psychologists who would argue that with me.
Funny, that. I think that we know from common experience that people are really, really bad at controlling their behavior on the basis of far-off consequences. It makes it hard, for example, to save money for retirement. And the more abstract and unreal the consequence, the harder it is for it to have any impact upon us. This has always made me think it was implausible that “afterlife” consequences had much impact upon most people’s behavior.
And, of course: here-and-now experience of the pain of punishment is a great memory-provoker. I had a run of traffic tickets a few years ago and it actually had a pretty strong impact upon certain aspects of my driving. Before you’ve had a traffic ticket, it’s a more abstract proposition than it is when you’re writing the check.
And, of course, the guy who does NOT believe in police, and drives recklessly because he feels free of consequence in so doing, will be brought up short at some point. A god who periodically administered “sinners” a swift kick in the ass would have far more impact upon moral behavior than one who relies upon distant consequences of a barely-imaginable sort. Any god who understood humans, and wished to encourage moral behavior, would probably do that.