I don’t have the patience to read the sort of literature that is being talked about here. I’ve studied philosophy for nearly 50 years now, and I’m usually able to write about philosophical matters without using any words ending in “-ism”. When I read a passage thick with “isms” I strongly suspect that what I am reading is more an exercise in labelling or categorizing than in talking about a subject of any human importance.
If I want to talk about “dualism” for example, I will talk about whether the soul (or mind) is separable from the body. I don’t need the word “dualism” to raise that question and consider various answers. And I can’t think of when I have ever needed to use the term “idealism” or “realism” to get any important idea across to a reader or student.
To be sure, some “ism” words are handy where they are generally understood by non-specialists. “Materialism” has a generally understood meaning both as a metaphysical position and as a moral/social term, and “empiricism” has a generally understood everyday meaning (reliance on data rather than on sheer speculative reasoning). But in nine cases out of ten, it’s possible to avoid the “ism” word altogether and use everyday English to convey one’s meaning.
One reason why so many academics – philosophers (especially philosophers of science), psychologists, sociologists, education theorists, etc. – are such bad writers is that they have become incapable of writing English without jargon. Every doctoral candidate in Humanities and Social Sciences should have to sign a promise always to follow the principles of writing set forth in Strunk and White, before being given a Ph.D. And every journal should insist that every article is written in the style recommended by Strunk and White. But of course, that is not going to happen, because over half of modern academia is B.S., and clear writing would expose just how much of academic thought is B.S. Academics protect themselves from having their B.S. detected by writing in the way they do. Whole careers depend on it.
Meerkat gives me a passage from Scientific American (hardly a place where I’d expect to find a good discussion of philosophy of science, as opposed to popular science), which passage itself quotes a definition of Platonism from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. And neither the passage from Scientific American nor the passage from SEP is very clear. The SA passage reads:
This is unclear. “Objects within the models of theoretical physics” – I can’t tell how the word “object” is being used here. What’s an example of an “object” within a “model”? For example, is an “electron” an “object” within the “atomic model” of matter? I suspect that “object” – which in normal English suggests a clunky physical thing, e.g., “there’s an object on the radar screen” or “I feel some object in my eye”, is a poor word here, and that “element” or “component” would be a better word.
And again, “these models are not based on pure thought” – what does that mean? What’s the difference between “pure thought” and just plain “thought”? Does the writer mean that “models are not based on thought alone, but also on our experience of the world”? If so, then that’s what the writer should have written.
Regarding the SEP passage, consider: “there exist such things as abstract objects” – what does the SEP author include in “abstract objects”? Why doesn’t the author help the reader out with an example? In Plato’s “theory of Ideas” (leaving aside the question whether Plato himself asserted that theory), there are “ideas” or “forms” of things which are “abstract” (though Plato doesn’t use that term): the form of “threeness” or of “odd” or “even” or of “justice”, and these forms exist always, even if no physical embodiment of them is presently at hand. So Plato helps us by giving examples of his “abstract objects”; the SEP author fails to do so.
Much of what passes for “philosophy of science” is written like this. It’s not very clear, and not very helpful. Science is great, and traditional philosophy (Plato, Hobbes, Rousseau, Mill, etc.) is great, but modern philosophy of science is of questionable usefulness, and it’s certainly less clearly written than either of the other two enterprises.
Because I have so little sympathy with the entire subject of discussion, I can’t get interested in sorting out the dispute between Tim and Meerkat. I love the writings of Plato and have studied them for nearly 50 years, but discussions about whether some physicist or psychologist is “platonist” in some recent, contrived sense of the term, simply don’t interest me. So I will leave other people to wrangle over this stuff.