And that is what I disagree with, because all the evidence is of relative locations, not absolute locations. I don’t see how measuring a relative location also constitutes evidence for an absolute location. How do you extract the absoluteness of a position from a relative measurement?
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My points were not about physics, they were about basic geometry and mathmatics. If your “metaphysics” cannot reconcile the underlying mathmatics of space-time, they are groundless.
It feels like Jim is more or less treating “verified”, “objective”, and “absolute” as synonyms. He is basically saying, if there are verified facts about space, then there are objective facts about space, thus that proves (or gives “reasonable evidence”) the existence of absolute space. Thus, it is more like a word game. Nobody is arguing against the existence of objective facts about the locations of objects in space. If that is all that Jim is arguing, then I think virtually everyone would agree.
However, this is not what the term “substantivalism” is commonly taken to mean. Here is an excerpt from section 5.2, “Space Substantivalism” of a relevant SEP article about space and time. (Bold emphases are all mine):
Put another way, we can define the complete predicate x accelerates as trajectory ( x ) has-non-zero-rate-of-change-from-straightness, where trajectory maps bodies onto their trajectories in Galilean spacetime. And this predicate, defined this way, applies to the water in the bucket if and only if it is rotating, according to Newtonian mechanics formulated in terms of the geometry of Galilean spacetime; it is the mechanically relevant sense of the word in this theory. But this theoretical formulation and definition have been given in terms of the geometry of spacetime, not in terms of the relations between bodies; acceleration is ‘absolute’ in the sense that there is a preferred (true) sense of acceleration in mechanics and which is not defined in terms of the motions of bodies relative to one another. (Note that this sense of ‘absolute’ is broader than that of motion relative to absolute space, which we defined earlier. In the remainder of this article we will use it in the broader sense. The reader should be aware that the term is used in many ways in the literature, and such equivocation often leads to significant misunderstandings.) Thus if any of this analysis of motion is taken literally then one arrives at a position regarding the ontology of spacetime rather like that of Newton’s regarding space: it is some kind of ‘substantial’ (or maybe pseudo-substantial) thing with the geometry of Galilean spacetime, just as absolute space possessed Euclidean geometry. This view regarding the ontology of spacetime is usually called ‘substantivalism’ (Sklar, 1974).
In other words, space substantivalism refers more to the idea of whether quantities related to space and time (position, velocity, acceleration) can be defined in terms of an overarching geometry of space and time rather than only in terms of the motions of bodies relative to one another.
Even in the case of the latter, locations are still objective. The statement
“X is M meters in front of Y”
is a statement which is either absolutely true or false, even if it defines X’s location relative to Y.
The same goes with the statement
“Y is moving at V meters per second relative to X”.
Again this defines motions in terms of relative motion, but it is also an objectively, absolutely true or false statement that can be verified via empirical investigation.
(I’m not even going into special relativity here, which complicates matters and makes the above statements potentially problematic - we’re here just assuming Newtonian physics, and as the article above makes clear, there are issues with space substantivalism even in that setting!)
Overall, the objectivity of the two above statements does not resolve the debate about space substantivalism at all, because it is a deeper metaphysical debate about whether (in this case) the positions, velocities, accelerations of X and Y can be specified without using relative qualifiers. I’m not sure if Jim is interested in this debate, but it is certainly the one which seems more metaphysically interesting.
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If it is metaphysical, then it is irrelevant to physical space.
It’s not real clear to me what “relative locations” actually means. Does it concern metaphysically how locations exist, or does it concern the physics of how they are measured? If it’s the former then it is simply seems like you’re saying that relational locations are evidence for relational locations.
If it’s the latter it seems like you’re saying because the only method of measurement available for locating objects is dependent on locating them in relation to objects in the surrounding environment, that therefor the dependence is evidence that infers that locations are relational in nature.
The latter seems to be what’s going on as far as I can tell. If so it seems you’re arguing that relative locations are evidence locations are relational in nature, not absolute. What I’m arguing is that objective locations are evidence that locations are absolute in nature, not relational.
If that’s correct, it’s not been demonstrated that there’s something wrong with the argument I’m making. The only thing that has happened is that some counter evidence has been presented to support the position that locations are relational and not absolute in nature.
Are you saying that mathematics is the fundamental ground of reality? That’s what it seems like. If so, how can reality be fundamentally grounded in abstract objects that are causally effete? Regardless, as far as I can tell you are approaching this from the standpoint of physics.
But as I have repeatedly mentioned, the question I’m asking is not a question that physics in general has anything to say about. It is at its core a metaphysical question that has to be approached as such. It cannot be resolved using mathematical methods that are made use of in physics.
It looks to me like you are agreeing with most of what I’m saying. What you seem to suggest is that objective facts cannot be used as evidence to infer absolute existence. It doesn’t seem to me that you have given adequate reasons for why that’s the case.
I realize that commonly this definition is used as it relates to Galilean spacetime in physics. As I tried to clarify earlier which I will include below, I’m using it in the metaphysical sense of absolute existence, i.e., existence that isn’t dependent on relationships. Maybe using the term “absolutism” instead would have made it easier to recognize the meaning I had in mind.
Metaphysics: the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space.
Unless I’m not understanding what exactly you meant by your comment above, it seems like physical space would be a topic that is relevant to metaphysics.
You are correct. I was wrong.
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Can you explain what you mean by “relationships”? Relationships between what and what?
No, I have never said that
Mathematics are one of the fundamental tools that we use to explore and explain reality., and the “laws” of physics are a set of rules we use to describe reality.
If you cannot differentiate math from physics, you are really lost.
You seem to think the “metaphysics” is a version of Calvinball, where you can make up your own rules, definiitons and logic as you go.
Relationships between objects that inhabit space. Just to be clear, we’re talking about how things exist. So my understanding is that there are two positions on how space exists. One is the position that space exists in an absolute sense, or that its existence isn’t dependent on the objects that inhabit it. In other words, the objects wouldn’t have to exist necessarily in order for space to exist.
The other position is that space exists in a relational sense, or that its existence is dependent on the objects that inhabit it. In other words, the objects would have to exist necessarily in order for space to exist. The relationship between the objects is, in a sense, what the existence of space is grounded in. Does that answer your question?
My point was simply that the mathematical methods used in physics, specifically in regards to classical or relativistic mechanics, have no direct relevance to the question under discussion. I thought the meaning would have been obvious, but I guess not. 
After all this time, you have finally explained what the thread is about.
I’m still not sure of the point. It seems to me you can think about space in either of those two ways. That would be your personal way of conceptualizing space. What’s to discuss?
Your adversion to physics has been noted.
Please explain to us how you can discuss the nature of spacetime, including objects, distances, directions, intervals and locations without using such tools as plane geometry, differential geometry, topology and tensor analysis.
Does the fact is that these methods are fundamental to classical, special and general relativity (and in other fields) in some way exclude them from your metaphysics?
Can you discuss “metasurveying” without trigonometry or “metanavigation” with spherical geometry?
If there is more than one reality, or no reality beyond what is humanly accessible then that might make sense. However, if there is only one reality and it extends beyond what is humanly accessible then the only way to make sense of it is that only one of the two can be true. So it depends on which view is being assumed.
Describing how matter behaves in mathematical terms is not what’s being discussed. But I’ve mentioned that several times now and for some reason it doesn’t seem like the message is getting through.
I am not talking about matter behaves in mathematical terms either.
My point is how can anyone discuss the geometry and locations of any events in any spacetime without a mathematical framework.
I don’t recall having ever said anything to that effect. But that’s not what this discussion is about.
The way I understand it, the success of relativity as a concept is used to support the idea that relativity represents how things truly exist. That somehow translate into the idea that truth is relative which is an idea that pervades modern western thought. I’m just making the argument that when looking at the full scope of the evidence it actually supports absolute existence over relative existence which supports the idea that truth is absolute. Does that answer your question?
I don’t agree with that.
We can talk about the way that we see or experience reality. And relativity changed that. But I don’t believe that there is a way “how things truly exist”.
From my perspective, truth is a human artifact. It exists because it is an important part of language, of expressing agreement and disagreement. But if you are looking for human independent absolute truth, then I doubt that you will ever find it – because I doubt that there could be such a thing.
Is that not what troubled the office of the inquisition concerning the concept of inertia?
It is absolutely true that today is Monday, October 26, 2020.
Is that absolute truth the same truth tommorow?
OK. I don’t have any problem with you not agreeing with me. But unless you can show me why it’s not, I think the argument I’ve presented shows that viewing reality as absolute in nature is a reasonable position to take.
I agree that there are several ways to approach the question and different assumption can be made and that there’s no cut and dry way to come to a definitive conclusion. The reason for my post is to show that the often assumed position among scientists in general, and western academia at large is that relativity in physics is a slam dunk for the metaphysical position that reality is relativistic in nature.
It’s obviously not something that can be resolved empirically in an objective manner. It has to be investigated by looking at evidence and making subjective inferences based on the evidence. And that subjectivity means that there is plenty of room for disagreement and differing opinions as to what conclusion should be drawn.
I personally think that the evidence falls decidedly on the side of the nature of reality being absolute. But I don’t deny that there are other plausible views that support the opposite position as well.
Not real familiar with that, and not sure how it would engage with the argument I presented? Maybe you can illuminate me?
In the Ptolemaic system, the earth is a stationary sphere under your feet, with the cosmos revolving around it. Thus, the cosmos had a fixed x, y, z, coordinate tethered to the middle of the Earth and oriented to this plane of revolving. That there was no sensation of movement was held to be an obvious evidence in favor of the model. Galileo countered with the idea of inertia, that we do not feel the movement because we are fellow travelers. This did not sit well with the inquisition, as the church took a cosmos physically centered on the Earth as consistent with a theology with God’s attention centered on the Earth ( it should be noted the church had a reasonable backing from the science of the day - this is often forgotten ). As developed by Newton, we already have in inertia a relativity of motion in a fixed coordinate system of space.
In the next step, Einstein’s relativity does away with the fixed coordinate system. The connection with the present discussion is that you have indicated a link between relativity and the idea of the relativity of truth. I have heard that argument before, both from defenders and attackers of absolute truth. Others also see the Copernican principle as leading to relativity of truth, and preparing the groundwork for existentialism and situational ethics and so forth down to the current “ways of knowing”.
For my part, I do not see the connection. I do not see a distinction between absolute truth and derived truths. God has priority over space, not the other way around, and the idea of God embodies truth - surely He is not dependent on some coordinate system. Why should we be more distraught over the relativity of space than the relativity of motion?