My interest in such arguments is, at best, tenuous and tepid (though I will admit to an ongoing morbid curiosity about the Quirinius Census – it seems such an absurd oddity, and defenses of it create amusement in their creativity, if not their plausibility).
A more interesting question, to me at least, is whether there is such a thing as good apologetics, including in that term the “confessional scholarship”[1] that Peter J. Williams indulges in. Are we wrong to, in @nathanlong’s words, “paint all ‘apologists’ with the same brush”?
Regardless of its label, apologetics, by definition, consists of taking a fixed conclusion and tailoring the evidence and the analysis to fit it. This generally results in the evidence being cherry-picked and/or selectively emphasised and de-emphasised, bare possibilities (and even stacked bare possibilities) presented as plausible, and steps in the argument skipped or assumed.
This creates two problems for the skeptical observer.
Is the putative ‘better’ apologetics more valid, or simply more sophisticated in how it obfuscates its flaws?
Even if, by happenstance, an apologist makes a valid argument for a true conclusion, how would a skeptical observer know this? It will be presented with the exact same level of confidence and certitude as an invalid argument for a false conclusion.
This does not render apologists’ arguments inherently wrong, but it does render them inherently untrustworthy. For this reason I think it is legitimate to “paint all ‘apologists’ with the same brush.”