The proposed mechanism is the proposed physical process that is causing the observations. To test the proposal you can predict what you should observe in an experiment if that proposal is true. Those predictions are often made using equations.
That’s wrong. We can verify it. This is done through experimentation, such as the Hafele-Keating experiment which measured time moving at different rates at different altitudes over the Earth.
Observations that back up the success of the theory are evidence. That’s the definition of the word “evidence”. When the evidence supports the theory then the theory is considered tentatively verified.
That is a concept used throughout science. We call it consilience, or agreement between independent lines of evidence. In the case of relativity there are multiple experiments that are independent of each other, and they all support the theory of relativity. By independent, I mean observations that involve different processes and events. For example, the Hafele-Keating experiment is independent of the LIGO experiment, yet both confirm the theory of relativity.
Possibly? Some aspect? You will need to do better than that. The theory of relativity makes real testable predictions that have been confirmed. Pointing to some unknown and untestable mechanism that seems to be pulled out of hat is not a better explanation.
Your assertion needs some evidence. Is the shape of the Earth in doubt because Flat Earthers exist?
@Jim… one more time. It is open to you to take the position that general relativity is a correct theory - i.e. that the equations of general relativity accurate predict the behavior of physical entities, within certain domains (*) - while holding that the usual interpretation of general relativity - i.e. that there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity - is mistaken.
In this case, clocks run slower in regions of higher gravitational field because the gravitational field is, or represents, something real that causes all physical processes at the fundamental level to run more slowly, and clocks are built up of things at that fundamental level. That is literally what’s going on in general relativity: the equations can be written in such a way that there’s a parameter that corresponds to the gravitational field, and that parameter appears in all the equations of physics in such a way as to affect the rate of all physical processes.
How exactly does that work? What is the “mechanism” by which the gravitational field slows down physical processes? (@T_aquaticus, this is for you as well.) We don’t know - in exactly the same way that we don’t know the “mechanism” by which charged particles interact with the electromagnetic field. We have equations describing the situation, and it’s reasonable to believe that those equations correspond to some causal process, or maybe just to the fundamental causal powers of the entities in question.
(*) By which I mean, there may be domains where it breaks down and some as-of-yet undiscovered theory (such as quantum gravity) must take over.
I would express it this way: and it’s reasonable to believe that the verifiable effect those equations describe corresponds to some unverifiable causal process, …
I pretty much agree with this. What I’m saying is that in the case of time dilation, for example, the evidence points more to gravitational influences as the cause than anything else. To what degree we can call that knowledge is debatable. And as I’ve said already, I concede that the success of the theory can be construed as evidence for the truth of the concepts the theory employs. But what I’m objecting to is the notion that the theories in any way shape or form verify that the concepts they employ are true to reality, which, whether intentionally or not, is how it often seems to be portrayed.
I think where we probably differ, though, is how to approach questions of unverifiable reality overall. I would argue that the issue of unverifiable reality is a question for metaphysics, not physics. And although physics lays the groundwork for metaphysics by gathering the evidence required for approaching questions of the unverifiable, the task of sifting through the evidence to arrive through inference at the most reasonable conclusions, in my view, belongs to the field of metaphysics.
Trying to arrive at answers about what is unverifiable through mechanical theories of physics which are directed at verifiable reality, in my opinion, is just not the correct approach. I think this distinction between where physics ends and where metaphysics takes over was especially lost during the era of logical positivism. And even though logical positivism has fallen out of favor decades ago, the distinction has yet to be reestablished in general among scientists and philosophers to this day.
Where I differ from you is not about the importance of metaphysics to answer more fundamental questions about being and reality. Rather, it’s on the importance of understanding and knowing the physics (i.e. empirical data and the physical laws and mechanisms inferred from them) to systematically inform reasoning about metaphysics and in articulating a metaphysical framework.
Consequently, I would say that any metaphysical theory that wants to talk about space and time but cannot properly respond to the empirical evidence for SR and GR amassed over the last century will not be credible today.
Yes. I think we’ve established that as a point of dispute. And as I’ve mentioned before, what I view as important to systematically inform reasoning about unverifiable reality is essentially the relevant evidence, which includes the relevant empirical data from physics, and as potential explanations, the concepts that are being employed for frameworks in various mechanical theories of physics. Knowledge of the intricacies of how the equations work is not needed, in my opinion. That, I believe is the main point of contention.
Not exactly sure what you mean by this. Care to elaborate?
By theory here I assume you mean in the sense of a position, not in the scientific sense of the term of being subject to repeated testing and verification. Correct?
The empirical evidence for SR and GR? Not sure what you mean by that? Do you mean the empirical verification of the equations? If so we’re still going around in circles as far as I can tell. All that tells us is that the equations match the verifiable effects. But what does it tell us about the unverifiable causes besides that they somehow exist?
And again, it may be that the standard concepts employed as frameworks by SR and GR are true accounts of reality, or approximations thereof, but the only evidence to support that is the success of their equations, at least that’s the only evidence that I’m aware of.
Yeah, that’s our point of contention. I would like to point out that it’s odd for someone to argue that a certain type of knowledge is not needed to evaluate a question when they themselves have had only a very limited experience with that knowledge. It reminds me of New Atheists’ Courtier’s reply that actual knowledge of theology is not needed to refute theism.
A competent metaphysician about space and time should be able to articulate how her metaphysics intersects with scientific concepts which are empirically supported. This is why, for example, Edward Feser, who believes in an A-theory of time, spends many pages in Aristotle’s Revenge on the problem of what to do with the issue of SR and GR.
The problem is that you have assumed that your view of the evidential situation is the only possible one.
First, your view of physics is very instrumentalist and anti-realist in only believing that we can only say physical theories only “track the movement of matter” without saying anything about their causal powers. In that sense, your view is almost Humean: if I see a moving billiard ball A touch another billiard ball B, after which B starts moving, I do not know at all whether A was the cause of B moving.
You claim that your position isn’t anti-realist because you say that we can know something about actual reality as opposed to merely apparent events (i.e. noumena as opposed to phenomena, to use the Kantian terminology), but when you try to explain what that knowledge is, it is pretty vague: clocks are slowing down affected by gravity somehow (but not time itself, and you refuse to explore how this actually happens, given what we know about clocks), and we know this from intuition somehow.
Since your position is anti-realist, it is vulnerable to all the same objections that anti-realism is regularly subject to, such as the “miraculous success of science” problem (why are the equations so successful if they correspond to nothing real?), and that it seems to defy common sense.
Second, your manner of using the terms “cause and effect” is non-standard. You say that physical theories only talk about “effects” and ask what “causes” reality to follow the equations. But that’s completely disconnected from what we’re talking about, and that assumes that your anti-realist view is correct, and that your view of what is “verifiable” and “unverifiable” is correct. In contrast, realists like me believe that there are features of physics equations which capture some aspect of causes and effects that are regularly observed in nature (such as billiard ball A hitting billiard ball B). One possible such feature is the temporal order of the events.
Even Feser’s lengthy analysis would have benefited from a greater familiarity with the physics. For example, I thought his case could have been stronger if he had discussed exactly what physicists mean when they talk about curved space-time, and how that mathematical, abstracted sense coheres with his overall epistemic structural realist view of science.
Yes, while he acknowledged that it was an important issue, he mostly only gave a brief presentation of four or so alternative metaphysical interpretations of SR and relied on explaining work done by other philosophers. It’s similar to other parts of the book effectively being more of a compendium of all sorts of philosophical views that can cohere with Aristotelianism, rather than building Feser’s own holistic view from the ground up. Feser is really good in explaining Thomism but he isn’t really a specialist philosopher of science who can really get deep into the technical details.
I think I’ve provided more than ample reasons for why I hold the position I do. In light of those reasons I don’t see how any of the above provides any compelling reasons for me to change my position. And my position is not that no knowledge of mechanical theory is required, but only sufficient knowledge of the relevant aspects of it with regards to the metaphysical subject matter, which I believe I have demonstrated.
Still not sure what you mean by metaphysical framework? And now I’m not sure what you mean by empirical support for the particular concepts we’re concerned with as true to reality? At least you haven’t offered any such support so far that I’m aware of. The only evidence that I’m aware of in support of those concepts as true is the fact that the theories where they are employed are successful.
And I’m also not sure what is meant by how metaphysics intersects with physics? The only connection I’m aware of is that metaphysics is somewhat dependent on physics in general to do the investigative groundwork of uncovering the relevant empirical evidence. Is that what is meant by intersecting?
OK. I’m open to the fact that there may be other options. So what is/are the other option(s)? And though it might not be necessary, it might possibly be helpful to answer the above questions I posed just for the sake of clarity.
If by physical theories you mean mechanical theories of physics then I don’t see how descriptions of effects informs us about causes, especially unverifiable causes, other than to inform us that they exists. And the way I understand it, the realism vs antirealism debate is centered around the unverifiable concepts of mechanical theories of physics, not physics as a whole which, as I understand it, is meant to deal with verifiable causes and effects. And I believe the question is whether or not the concepts have any truth value in regards to actual unverifiable causes, or only serve an instrumental purpose without pertaining to anything real.
What I’m arguing is that some of both is going on. In the context of physics they play an instrumental role, and in the context of metaphysics they provide a clue as to what may, but not necessarily, be true about the unverifiable cause of the physical effects described by the successful mechanical theory in physics.
I think maybe a possible alternative portrayal of what I’m arguing would be to say that my position is that of a metaphysical realist in that I hold to the existence of a reality that is fundamentally unverifiable, and not a strict but a weaker scientific instrumentalist/constructive empiricist of sorts in that concepts employed by mechanical theories only serve as instruments in the context of physics in providing frameworks for those theories, and may, but not necessarily, provide clues as to what is true about unverifiable reality in a metaphysical context. And I don’t see any contradiction in holding to both of those positions.
But I could also be said to be a weaker scientific realist of sorts as well. I just don’t fit well into either of those two categories of scientific realism or instrumentalism/constructive empiricism. So I would say that it would be best to classify me as a metaphysical realist who doesn’t strictly hold to either the scientific realism or antirealism position.
And as I see it, the question of whether or not the concepts in question correspond to an actual fundamentally unverifiable reality is not something that can be addressed in the context of physics. It’s a question that in essence has to be addressed in the context of metaphysics, the field of study that is centered around such type of questions.
And as for the miracle argument, I’ve never been able to understand the force of that argument if one holds to theism. Why would it be a miracle for science to be able to describe physical effects in the world in mathematical terms if that is how God structured it? And a concept that seems to capture only successful equations might seem miraculous if it were the only concept to do so and that were the case in every occurrence of such. But I would argue that empirical equivalence seems to suggest otherwise.
And even if granted, as far as I’m concerned, it doesn’t give the concepts a free pass. It only counts as evidence which has to be considered with all the other evidence. And I’m also not sure that would be as much of a problem for the position I hold as it is for the scientific antirealist who rejects metaphysical realism as well, especially since I grant the success of the theory as evidence. But that might takes us to deep into the weeds to further explore that.
Not exactly sure what you mean here. Let me restate what my position is for clarity sake.
I’m saying that mechanical theories of physics are essentially directed at effects, in that what the equations describe are effects, not causes. At least that’s how I understand it. If that’s not the case, maybe you could elucidate me.
But fundamentally unverifiable causes are questions that don’t fit into what physics is set up to address, and should be examined metaphysically which is the field of study in place specifically to deal with such type of questions.
What the heck is “gravitational influences”? It sounds like it was made up out of thin air. How does gravity cause atomic clocks to tick at the wrong rates?
I agree. Observations verify theories, and it is those observations I keep pointing to. If observations can’t verify theories, then what would?
How do we know that time itself is a physical substance that can slow down? And how does time slowing down have a physical affect on clock rates at different elevations?
We can inductively infer from repeatable scientific observation that gravitational pull increases the closer objects get to the center of the earth. So it’s reasonable to infer that changes in gravitational pull from moving clocks closer or further away from earth’s center would at least be a plausible explanation of why clock rates change at different elevations.
What repeatable scientific observations are there from which we can inductively infer that time itself is a physical substance that can slow down and have physical effects on clock rates at different elevations? I’m not aware of any.
As far as I can tell, the only thing the repeated observations regarding time dilation tells us is that there is a lag of time in our measurements of those particular type of events that needs to be accounted for. And we know that our measurements are affected by our lack of ability to keep clocks in sync that are positioned at different elevations.
So how does it follow from those facts that time itself is a physical substance that can slow down and affect clock rates at different elevations? That seems like a mighty big logical leap to me. But that seems to be what you are suggesting.
What do the observations verify? They verify the equations of the theories, not the concepts. There aren’t any observations to verify the concepts. So explain to me why the concepts should get a free ride just because they happen to be useful as frameworks in formulating the equations in question? And explain to me how with empirical equivalence that opposing concepts can be equally true if concepts from successful theories are considered as true to reality?
We know this from the experiments that have been described to you on multiple occasions.
There is no physical effect on clocks. It is time itself that is changing. You are the one claiming that elevation somehow affects the physical operation of clocks, not I.
It’s not plausible at all since nothing in the physical operation of these clocks is affected by gravity. Can you show us how different amounts of gravity physically alter how these clocks operate?
The Hafele-Keating experiment:
The clock rates within the frame of reference don’t change.
This is the crux of where we disagree. You want to claim that because the concepts are used as frameworks for equations that are empirically verified, that the concepts are somehow verified because they happen to be part of the theory, and therefore share in the verification.
I just disagree as I see no justification for that claim. So I guess maybe we’ll just have to agree to disagree since we seem to be just going around in circles.
The concepts make predictions in the form of equations. We use observations to see if reality matches those predictions. When observations match the predictions made by the concepts then the concepts are tentatively verified. That’s how verification works.
You seem to be saying that no amount of evidence can be used to verify any claim.
I don’t agree. The equations make the predictions, not the concepts. The concepts only provide a framework from which to formulate the equations for describing certain effects. The concepts are simply ideas. Evidence is what provides justification to claim that the idea is representative of actual unverifiable reality that is the cause of the effects, unless you hold to the view that ideas are primary and experience is secondary.
And I’ve already granted that the success of the theory is evidence for the truth of the concept. But that is the only evidence there is. Verification of the equations is evidence for the success of the theory, not for the truth of the concepts. So the only relevant evidence for the truth of the concept is the success of the theory.
But we keep going around and around on these same points, so maybe we should discuss the issue of empirical equivalence in regards to whether or not concepts of successful theories are true, which hasn’t really been dealt with. Otherwise I really don’t know if there’s any point in continuing to discuss the other issues as we seem to have reached an impasse on those.
Jim, do you think I am justified to infer from the posts made by “Jim” on this thread that Jim is a real human person typing these replies? Or is that just an “unverifiable concept”, and that the only verified statement from my observations is that “there is an entity using a user account named “Jim” that is replying to my posts in a human-like way, which may or may not be a human”?
I can repeat similar forms of this argument:
We can inductively infer from repeatable scientific observation that gravitational pull increases the closer objects get to the center of the earth. So it’s reasonable to infer that changes in gravitational pull from people closer or further away from the earth’s center would at least be a plausible explanation of why people living in the mountains are able to better handle hypoxia.
We can inductively infer from repeatable scientific observation that gravitational pull increases the closer objects get to the center of the earth. So it’s reasonable to infer that changes in gravitational pull from people closer or further away from the earth’s center would at least be a plausible explanation of why people living in the mountains suffer from more malnutrition compared to people living nearer to the ground.
The concepts make the equations. I already referenced for you how the concept of a constant speed of light in all reference frames can be used to derive the equations found in relativity:
Again, it is the concepts that give rise to the equations. The equations are the predictions made by the concepts. You compare observations of reality to those predictions, and if they match then the concepts are tentatively verified, at least in the school of reason I belong to.
Are you claiming that reality is unverifiable? If so, it seems that you are pushing denial instead of inquiry.
That’s not in principle unverifiable. Whereas the discussion is about what is in principle unverifiable.
As far as I can tell, all you’ve done here is contrast a plausible inference with two examples of implausible inferences. Other than that I don’t see any relevance to what we’re discussing.
Not really. Scientists formulate the equations, and they use the concept as a framework in doing so.
Umm, I believe that’s an assumption, not a concept.
Again, it’s intelligent beings coming up with imaginative ways to formulate equations that describe in general terms how matter moves through space.
No, the predictions are made from the equations, which are formulated by using the concepts as frameworks.
That’s what my op is arguing against. Still going around in circles here.
No. I’m arguing that there is an unverifiable reality that underlies verifiable reality, which is what the concepts, if true, are supposedly representing. And since it’s unverifiable, to claim that it is is a logical contradiction.
We’re still going around in circles here. How about moving on to the issue of empirical equivalence?
The “in-principle”-ness doesn’t matter, since right now I haven’t “verified” that. I’m asking you again: do you think I am justified to believe right now that you are a real person named Jim as opposed to some imposter or an artificial intelligence?
In my view, they’re no more or less plausible than your application of the same argument to explain how all clocks all seem to dilate in the same way. What makes your example more plausible than others?
What I’m saying is that in the case of time dilation, for example, the evidence points more to gravitational influences as the cause than anything else. To what degree we can call that knowledge is debatable. And as I’ve said already, I concede that the success of the theory can be construed as evidence for the truth of the concepts the theory employs. But what I’m objecting to is the notion that the theories in any way shape or form verify that the concepts they employ are true to reality, which, whether intentionally or not, is how it often seems to be portrayed.