I’m not familiar with microorganisms, but with subatomic particles, as far as I know, they are not empirically verifiable. At least there seems to be an impasse in coming up with a technology to actually observe them. They have to be inferred.
There are empirically verified effects from which one could reasonably assume their existence. But ontologically speaking, at this point in time what they are in actuality would have to be inferred.
The way I see it, an inductive inference in mechanical theory is what’s been confirmed as empirically verified without exception of what’s been observed/detected to date. From what I’ve read, that appears to be how Newton used the term.
It seems there may be other types of inductive inference in other fields of science, but I’m not really concerned with those. I believe abductive inference can generally refer to any non-deductive type of inference including induction. In that case induction would be a specific type of an abductive inference.
How do you determine if a concept is verifiable or unverifiable? Can you give us an example of a verifiable concept?
From an ontological point of view, even observations are inferences. When you are looking at something you are interpreting chemical reactions in your retina. It’s concepts all the way down.
That perfectly describes relativity and time dilation.
If we’re talking observations of concepts employed by mechanical theories in physics, I don’t know of any off hand. Do you?
I’m not sure I agree with how that’s worded, but even if such is the case it would be an objective inference. Without empirical verification it would be a subjective inference. It’s much more difficult to deny objectively experienced observations, like that the sun exists, than it is to deny subjectively reasoned to concepts, like time slowing down.
Concepts are usually just ideas that are subjectively reasoned to. Observations are mostly objective experiences.
Just give me a general example of something you consider to be verifiable.
Then why aren’t the measurements from atomic clocks also objective inferences, and why can’t they be used to empirically verify the different rates of time in different frames of reference?
The experiments I have shown you are objective, not subjective.
If we’re talking empirical verification then predictions of effects described by relativity and quantum mechanics would be examples.
They are. They can. What’s at issue is what is causing the clock rates to change. The cause is not empirically verifiable. It has to be reasoned to through subjective inference.
So what do those experiments have to do with the concepts? As far as I’m aware they are about empirical verification of descriptions of effects predicted by the equations. But concepts are about the actual causes, not the effects of the causes, are they not?
Just a comment on this discussion: the idea that clocks at speed read time ‘incorrectly’ raises the question of which clocks then do read time correctly? If the answer is’ clocks at rest’, the next question is, at rest with respect to what? Do you posit an absolute reference frame, and if so, what and where is it?
Objective in the sense we’re using it has to do with what can be verified empirically, i.e. observed or detected. The idea of an “objective inference” as has been defined in this discussion, e.g., the existence of the sun would be an objective inference, in this case would be an observation. Since the cause in question can’t be observed, therefor it would have to be reasoned to by subjective inferences.
Not sure what you mean when you say oscillation of an atom is a theory? Oscillations from atoms are detectable and therefor, as I understand it, are empirically verified effects of atoms. And I’m not sure what you mean by saying atomic clocks are concepts? From my perspective, they are instruments that evidently use the regularity of oscillation rates as a way to track time.
As I understand it, the role of the concepts in the theory is primarily to facilitate the formulation of the equations. As far as I can tell the experiments are demonstrating the accuracy of those equations’ description of the effects. They’re not about demonstrating the truth of the concepts themselves.
This is the part that puzzles me every time that you say it.
I know what it means to say that a proposition is true. I know what it means to say that a statement is true. I cannot make sense of talk about whether concepts are true.
That’s what I’m asking you. Is there any theory in science you would consider verified?
Differences in atomic clocks are detectable and therefore are empirically verified effects of relativity.
Those are the predictions. In my world, if those equations are empirically verified then that demonstrates the truth of the concepts. Why don’t you agree with this?
My understanding is that a concept is an idea. When I talk about the truth of the concept I’m basically talking about whether the idea is a true representation of reality or simply a fictional thought with no real correspondence to reality. Like the difference between a fictional novel and a biography.
I’m just not sure what you mean by a verified theory? By theory do you mean something that is reasoned to by subjective inference based on evidence? By a verified theory do you mean there is sufficient evidence that it would arguably be unreasonable to object to the theory?
Empirically verified effects of which the equations of relativity successfully describe.
How so? In my mind the equations are where the predictions come from, not the concepts. The equations tell if this particular measurement is taking it will show this particular result. That’s what is empirically verified as far as I can tell. The concepts are just ideas used as frameworks for formulating the equations. How do you empirically verify an idea about something like time slowing down that cannot be observed?
It’s evidence, but it doesn’t entail that they’re true. And I think empirical equivalence demonstrates that there are indeed cases where the concepts of different theories making the same successful predictions cannot all be true.
I would define theory as generally a claim that cannot be empirically verified but is reasoned to by subjective inference based on scientific evidence. A verified theory in general I would define as having sufficient evidence that it would arguably be unreasonable to object to the truth of the theory. Are we on the same page about that?
Depends on what you mean when you say relativity. If you mean the concept, no. It’s not possible to empirically verify a concept that can’t be observed. If you mean the relativistic equations are empirically verified as successful descriptions, then yes.
To my knowledge there are no observational instruments that can observe, or photograph what time looks like. And it certainly can’t be observed by the human eye. In fact it’s not even known whether it actually exists as a physical entity or rather that it’s just an artificial human construct. But we’re just going around in circles on this again.
In the case of subjective inferences in my estimation there will never be the same level of certainty as objective inferences. I think most people agree that there is a high degree of certainty with objective inferences. But in my opinion with subjective inferences when there is sufficient evidence there can be a reasonable degree of certainty. That’s generally what seems to be accepted for a subjective inference to be considered as true.