Tim and Matt on Free Will

[Tim]

@dga471

I will admit that I’ve been finding it increasingly more frustrating than interesting, particularly its conclusion – when @structureoftruth ended up stating that “natures”, which is what the majority of this thread has been arguing about, does not in fact underlie his defense of the coherence of LFW – making this whole thread more than a little off-its-stated-topic.

I would also question the benefit of splitting out the ‘Comments on’ section.

This post from @John_Harshman is in many ways a more concise articulation of my issues with LFW than anything I’ve said here:

Comments on Tim and Matt on Free Will

A claim is only coherent if you can say what it means. So far free will is defined as “like, you know, free will” or words to that effect. I don’t think you can do better, which is why I claim it’s incoherent. I gather that in your view, free will resides in the soul, not the brain, though the soul has access to the information and processes of the brain and injects its decisions into the brain. Correct? But what happens in the soul when it chooses? Apparently nothing causes the soul to choose a certain way, nor is it random. But what is it, actually? And how does that relate to the brain processes that seem to happen during choice?

It was also replied to by this lengthy post that remains part of the ‘main’ ‘currated’ thread (meaning you have to jump back and forwards between thread to follow the conversation):

Tim and Matt on Free Will

What I’ve said is more like “free will is the (indeterministic) causal power of a being to act in accordance with reasons”. Causal powers, their activity, and reasons aren’t defined in terms of free will themselves. Make of that what you will. Something like that, I suppose. I don’t claim to have this fully worked out. Though I would say that in my view the brain doesn’t have information in the absence of the soul. It activates its causal power initiating the decided course of action (e.g. if I choose to raise my hand, I activate by causal power of trying to raise my hand; though it was possible for me to decide not to do so). You are correct to say that in my view nothing else causes this to happen (or perhaps more strictly speaking, it is not wholly the product of prior efficient causes). But it isn’t random, because the agent acts for reasons (i.e. with reference to the intrinsic teleology / final causality that motivated the decision). That would be an instance of the more g…

I would also suggest that this post from @nwrickert raises more questions about my worldview than anything in the ‘main’ ‘currated’ thread did:

Comments on Tim and Matt on Free Will - #4 by nwrickert