I didn’t express the concern that science cannot discuss design because design belongs to the world of values, purpose and meaning, though I remember someone else expressing it earlier on this thread.
The concern I have expressed is this: When design is inferred, if it is required that the designer itself be explainable within MN, then philosophical naturalism is governing the whole enterprise of scientific reasoning.
This takes us back to the OP and the problem that @dga471 had with the article on BioLogos specifically (and TE/EC more broadly) that the OP referred to. And the problem is this: TE/EC is an attempt to integrate Christianity, which by definition recognizes a supernatural God who sometimes does intervene in the natural world in discernible ways, with a paradigm of science that rules out a priori any recognition of supernatural reality. Biblical Christianity and philosophical naturalism cannot be integrated. They make mutually exclusive claims about the nature of reality.
Thank you for the acknowledgement that I understand the activity of science. I’m happy to have a good faith discussion about ID, but to keep on point with respect to the OP, I’d point you to comment #122 above. I’ve raised an issue that is relevant to TE/EC, which is more-or-less an in-house debate among professing Christians.
Certainly, anyone is free to chime in on it, but for anyone who doesn’t believe in the Judeo-Christian concept of God, it might seem irrelevant or nonsensical. I don’t know where you come down on the question of God, but I thought it might help to mention that here so as to clarify and stay on point.
I don’t think this is necessarily true. Scientists still can’t fully explain how gravity works (gravitons?), but gravity is still a part of MN.
You may have already read it, but I really enjoyed the article on Atheistic Meteorology and Divine Rain. My guess is that you already use the same theology as TE/EC in other realms of science.
Fair enough. MN doesn’t require philosophical naturalism and is compatible with christianity, as demonstrated by the millions of christian scientists worldwide who don’t see any conflict between their scientific work and their religious beliefs.
I want to push back a little on this. Methodological naturalism is not the same thing as philosophical naturalism. I don’t see how philosophical naturalism can be governing the whole enterprise when it is a metaphysical position outside of science (i.e., it goes beyond science itself). Methodological naturalism is a pragmatic, “rules of the game”, statement that comes from the practice of science. It is limited to methodology and doesn’t put much of a limit on philosophy. That’s why you have theists, deists, atheists, and everything in-between comfortably using methodological naturalism to describe the bounds of science.
Well, it sounds like you and I are in agreement on this: Philosophical naturalism and biblical Christianity cannot be integrated.
And since, as you stated above, it is not necessarily true that when design is inferred the designer must itself be explainable within MN, then I think we’re pretty much in agreement there too.
I understand that there’s a difference. And I agree with you. MN is like a rule of the game. It sets boundaries. I was raising a question about the situation where the boundaries are extended such that any inferred design(er) must itself be explainable within the same boundaries.
I think the point is that it’s not extending the boundary but only saying that everything that’s “in” is subject to the same rules. If the inferred designer isn’t “accessible” to science, because it is outside the MN boundary, then it isn’t a scientific subject/hypothesis/project. That doesn’t mean it isn’t valid, true, etc. because that would be a metaphysical statement (philosophical naturalism), it just means science can’t address it.
I think the discussion since your request and before this reply has maybe expanded on it quite a bit already. I appreciated the BioLogos article you linked to. As I said to @Dan_Eastwood in a PM,
I guess we have different views on “discernable”. Believing that the moon was designed for us is different than discerning the design of the moon, at least in my book. If it can be discerned then the conclusion would follow the premises. Instead, we have a belief without supporting premises.
The quoted section also creates a false dichotomy. There is a third option: we don’t know if it is designed or not.
I don’t think it’s a false dichotomy. Either (1) it was intentionally designed to be the way it is or (2) it wasn’t. Now, a person may legitimately say, “I don’t know if it was designed,” and that’s fine. But that doesn’t negate the logic of there being an either-or nature to the question of design.
That may seem to be a trivial quibble, but I don’t think it is. We all have the freedom to choose how we respond to the natural world as it presents itself to us.
I think they go hand in hand. Doesn’t it have to do with our differing worldviews and conformation biases? Since I do not believe there is any such thing as coincidence, everything is designed, and after the fact discernment comes ‘naturally’ (double entendre not really intended, but I’m not too sorry ).
This actually gets to the heart of this discussion. MN can not rule out God acting in ways we can’t discern or measure, and MN does not make any axiomic or metaphysical statements about what absolutely does or does not exist. MN only tentatively rules in processes when we have evidence for them. If we don’t know what is causing a natural phenomenon, then science simply answers “we don’t know”.
And I can delight in the couple dozen sandhill cranes that I now see out the living room window in the cornfield stubble north of our house, and thank my personal Creator for them. (…and for having put me here and when.)
I could be wrong, but I would think you view beliefs and evidence as two different things. If you were in a jury for a murder trial, I doubt you would consider the prosecutor’s deeply held belief in the guilt of the defendant as evidence for guilt. I also doubt you would accept the deeply held beliefs of other people in other gods as evidence for their existence.
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