What is Classical Theism?

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You’re not reading what I wrote closely enough.

If you want to argue what the nature of X is, we have to first agree that we’re talking about the same thing. Otherwise we would be talking past each other. There are certain essential requirements that everyone agrees a being has to satisfy in order to be God:

  • God is the creator and sustainer of the universe
  • God is omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, perfectly loving and perfectly good, etc. (this is not meant to be an exhaustive list)

Now, if you disagree that those requirements are necessary for God to be God, then there’s no point of dialogue, because I’m not interested in arguing whether lesser deities like Zeus or Thor exist or what is the nature of such entities. You might as well ask me if I’m interested in arguing about the nature of Superman or Batman. You can label Superman to be “God”, but then this would just become a debate about semantics and terminology, not really philosophy or theology.

Based on this agreed list of things that are required for something to be God, we then philosophically examine their implications and argue that God is metaphysically simple, otherwise those requirements wouldn’t be fulfilled.

Note also that this is not an argument for the existence of God. The assumption here is that we accept (at least for the sake of argument) that God exists. Then what would he be like?

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On the topic of comics and God, I’m not super familiar with them, but I am aware that there is a parallel of the Abrahamic God in many universes:

What appears common to these ideas of God is that he is in a different class of being compared to the other super-powered or magical beings in these fictional worlds. He is the creator of all lesser deities and superheroes and they all, directly or indirectly, derive their power from him. Superheroes are able to transcend, break, or manipulate the laws of nature. In contrast, the One God created and sustains those laws in the first place.

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I’ll stop you right there. Not everyone agrees. Perhaps all classical theists agree? (I will note in passing that some of those attributes are mutually exclusive.)

I think it already is.

But that’s all circular. We accept that God exists and also define God as having particular attributes (because that’s what we mean by “God”), and then argue that God has particular attributes on that basis.

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That’s the problem with conversing with you, John: you always stop someone in mid-sentence without bothering to hear them out fully. This is why we also talk past each other all the time.

Then I’m not interested in that debate, sorry. Divine simplicity is a concept to be debated among theists who already accept those requirements of what God is, otherwise it just doesn’t make sense.

Your question was whether divine simplicity is true. I did not define God as simple in my argument. Instead, I assumed that everyone arguing about God would agree that he has certain attributes (and that list does not include being simple). These are the premises that everyone in the debate accepts. Then I argue that divine simplicity follows from those premises. If you don’t accept the premises then that means you are not interested in the same question as I am. Period.

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That doesn’t seem a problem to me. When you make unwarranted assumptions, should those not be pointed out? What followed depended on that assumption. Now, if by “everyone” you just meant those who argue for divine simplicity, then that’s what you should have said. Necessary assumptions should be clearly stated up front.

Not exactly. I asked how you know it’s true. You should make your argument based on clearly stated assumptions, which as far as I can tell you have not. The property you use to argue for simplicity is not stated as being one of the ones you mention. Apparently the property you intend is that God’s existence can’t be differentiated from his essence, but that’s not one of the ones you had previously stated, and it seems more or less identical to defined simplicity. That truly does look circular to me. If you have a clearer argument that isn’t circular, go ahead and make it.

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No, you’re misreading my argument once again. My argument is an example of proof by contradiction:

  1. I assume that there are a list of necessary attributes that God has to satisfy. [1]
  2. I explain what it means for God to be simple: it is equivalent to having his existence the same as his essence.
  3. I assume for the sake of argument that divine simplicity is false: God’s existence is distinct from his essence.
  4. I argue that this implies that the negation of some of the necessary attributes in 1).
  5. Therefore, divine simplicity must be true.

Do you understand the flow? It is quite straightforward, and certainly not circular, even if you disagree with the argumentation in point 4) (which is most common in these debates).

[1] This is the only point that I did not spell out explicitly in my initial post, but this is taken as given in most theological discussions, because whether one endorses divine simplicity or not, one usually agrees that God is the creator of all and that he is omnipotent, immutable, etc. Most people are not interested in arguing whether Superman or Thor exists.

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Yes, but you cannot know whether those assumptions are warranted or not until you hear me out. In this case, if you don’t accept those assumptions, then I concede that God would not be simple, and the argument would not apply at all.

This would be like if two biologists were arguing whether whales first evolved 50 million or 100 million years ago, and a young earth creationist jumps in and says, “How do you know that the Earth is even 50 million years old in the first place? That’s an unwarranted assumption!”

The assumptions I made about God are shared by most Abrahamic theists, not only classical theists who accept divine simplicity. Vincent Torley, William Lane Craig, Aquinas, Maimonides, Avicenna would all agree that God is the Creator and Sustainer of everything, infinitely powerful, perfectly good, etc., regardless of their views on divine simplicity.

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This is still the hole in your argument. You need to explain which necessary attributes you’re talking about and why divine non-simplicity implies their negation.

This may be true inside the circle of classical theists, but it is most certainly not true among all theologians, much less the general population. You need to be clear on just how circumscribed the theological discussions you refer to are. Parts of the bible clearly state that God is not immutable. For example, he regrets creating humans and thus sends a flood. There are many other cases in which his actions are dictated by events and are thus contingent.

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I reject that comparison.

The word “most” in that sentence would seem to concede my point.

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I think my assumptions are fairly generally held among theologians. If you open any systematic theology textbook, it will teach that God is immutable. I haven’t encountered one that doesn’t. To take an example, Grudem’s popular Systematic Theology (1994) argues this on pp. 163-165. In Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (2003), Craig, who rejects simplicity and argues against it on pp. 524-526, immediately affirms God’s immutability in pp. 526-527. Even GotQuestions.org, a popular Christian Q&A website which favors young earth creationism and does not paint a favorable view of divine simplicity, affirms divine immutability.

But that’s your personal interpretation of the Bible, which has little bearing on the wider conversation I’m referring to. Traditionally, biblical scholars and theologians have tended to read God’s expressions of regret as metaphorical, not literal.

Sure, there are some open theists and process theologians who argue that God can change, and I would readily concede that my argument doesn’t apply to them. I wouldn’t be talking about divine simplicity to people like that. They have different concerns and questions. (I also think that few Christians would describe themselves as open theists.)

Like I said, there’s no point to arguing about when whales evolved to creationists who don’t even accept that the Earth is old. There is no point arguing details about the orbit period of the Earth to people who believe that the Earth is flat. All conversations begin with certain shared assumptions.

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No problem. I merely objected to your assertion that “everyone agrees”. I don’t want to quibble about proportions.

I suppose it’s easy to interpret the bible as authoritative if you assume that all the parts you don’t like are metaphorical. We could explore that further, since I’m interested in whether the assumptions behind your argument can themselves be justified, but it’s a digression.

In the meantime, I’m happy to accept your assumptions as long as you state them clearly. Is divine immutability the assumption on which the argument for simplicity relies, or is it just one of them? Again, you need to make a clear argument in which the premises and the process by which the premises imply the conclusion are actually stated.

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Hi @dga471,

I’d just like to comment on your argument for divine simplicity. (Naturally, I accept divine immutability.) Let me reiterate that the Catholic Church has defined only that God’s essence is absolutely simple.

Now, if God is not metaphysically simple, then he would be metaphysically composite, having his existence differentiated from his essence. Thus, it is possible to imagine multiple instances of God existing at the same time with slightly different accidental properties.

  1. The argument assumes that any difference in accidental properties is enough to individuate two entities sharing the same essence. I would question that. Consider the scenario of two individuals, A and B, occupying the same point in space and time, but having different beliefs and desires, or performing different actions. Does that make sense to you? It doesn’t make any sense to me: I’d be more inclined to ascribe the two sets of beliefs/desires/actions to the same individual, even if they were mutually inconsistent. To differentiate Zeus from Poseidon, one must first assume that they are in different locations. However, the argument fails to show why a non-spatiotemporal being could not have accidental properties.

  2. According to Aquinas, the essence of an angel is distinct from its existence. However, Aquinas does not believe that there could be multiple instances of angels belonging to the same species: on the contrary, he famously maintains that each angel belongs to its own separate species. The reason is that for two things to belong to the same species means that they have the same kind of form, but different (signate) matter; however, according to Aquinas, angels have no matter: they are pure forms.

In any case, your argument works only if God has accidental properties. It does not refute the possibility of a God who has no such properties, but whose essence is nonetheless distinct from His existence. (I might add that many Scholastic philosophers don’t believe in a real distinction between essence and existence anyway, even for creatures: instead, they maintain that it is purely logical.)

In contrast, the classical God doesn’t have any accidental properties. He just is God, and if you change anything about him then he wouldn’t be the same being. Divine simplicity also entails divine unity: there is no accidental property you can change about God to differentiate him from another instance of him, so God is necessarily one.

  1. God would still be the same God, even if He hadn’t (timelessly) performed the action of creating the universe, since His decision to create was a free decision, which He need not have made. Or again, God would still be the same God, even if He hadn’t (timelessly) performed the action of redeeming the human race by becoming incarnate - another decision which He freely made. Now, actions, according to Aristotle and Aquinas, fall into the ontological category of accidents: they are not things, or substances. Consequently, it would seem to follow that God has certain non-essential accidents - namely, His free actions.

Thomists can evade the force of this argument only by maintaining (most absurdly) that God can create the world, or become incarnate, without performing any actions at all - not even timeless ones. (This is the ultimate version of “Look, Ma! No hands!”) But God is said to be the efficient cause of the universe’s existence - after all, in the Nicene Creed, we call Him “maker of heaven and earth” - and efficient causation, by definition, involves performing an action - namely, making something happen. It does not matter if the action occurs inside or outside time: it is still an action. What’s more, it’s a contingent action, that God does not need to make. Consequently, it cannot be identified with the Necessary Being of God. It must therefore be distinct from God’s essence.

To sum up: all we can conclude from reason alone is that God is not composed of (logically or temporally) pre-existing parts. The possibility of God generating accidental properties (actions) of His own free volition has not been ruled out.

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The God of the Bible is very much like Zeus, Odin and Thor. Let’s recap the God of the Old Testament first appears on Earth in the Garden walking around looking for his naked and ashamed couple he made from dust, clay or rib. He then appears in a burning bush. Afterwards He is a destroyer from above, killing crops and livestock and destroying cities by Earthquakes, floods and pestilence. The God of the Old Testament is far more of a wrathful, jealous God than Thor, Odin or Zeus ever were.

Then there is the God of the New Testament who is not God-like at all. No super powers, just a meek innocent man who supposedly is the God of the Old Testament. He talks and prays to his Father God who is really him.