What is Evidence?

[dga471 (Daniel)]

@Rumraket

Then we make tests on the box without opening it.

How would you know if the box can be subjected to controlled tests? That assumes that the box will respond in the same way every time we act upon in some way. That is true for most boxes we encounter, but maybe not all.

@Rumraket

In fact all our experiences tell us that the other methods do worse than science. They’re usually no better than random guessing.

As you yourself admitted, the only justification you have for this statement is that you are assessing other methods by the standards of science, which could be completely irrelevant if the matter being studied is not amenable to science. In other words, your statement is not a rational conclusion, but an axiom of your epistemological system. It would be begging the question to use this as an argument for why other methods are less reliable than science.

@Rumraket

No, they don’t inherently rule it out. My preference for empirical evidence is itself based on experience. Science has a proven track record of being the best tool we have for investigating the world. That includes the contents of boxes, how boxes come to exist, and why they were made.

Firstly, your assumptions do inherently rule out certain types of objects, behaviors of objects, or scenarios which are not amenable to controlled scientific testing.

Secondly, that “proven track record” is only such based on your starting assumptions.

Thirdly, there could be boxes or other objects which are very different in nature from what science has been successful at studying. Thus science’s track record means little.

@Rumraket

The other methods have consistently failed the tests for usefulness…If they were as useful as empirical evidence is, we’d use them in science too. They’d be part of the scientific method and carry as much weight.

Usefulness here is again defined with respect to what science is interested in. So again, your definitions of reliability, usefulness - are all conveniently chosen to satisfy your starting assumption of science as the standard by which all methods of knowing must be judged.

@Rumraket

I then evaluate and compare the performance of these other ways of knowing, to knowing things empirically using science. I discover that the other methods generally don’t work. In general they perform no better than random guessing.

I agree with you that there are certain scenarios where you can directly compare the results of knowing via scientific method with other methods. But there are other scenarios where it doesn’t make sense to compare them (such as knowing whether it is morally right or wrong to do X),

[Rumraket (Mikkel R.)]

@dga471

How would you know if the box can be subjected to controlled tests?

By doing them.

That assumes that the box will respond in the same way every time we act upon in some way. That is true for most boxes we encounter, but maybe not all.

Maybe not, but then I’m going to do it to find out.

@dga471

As you yourself admitted, the only justification you have for this statement is that you are assessing other methods by the standards of science

Yes, and I have no reason not to. After all, we have no reason to think science is making the other methods fail. Just what is the alternative you are suggesting here? How are we supposed to determine if some other method is good at answering questions about the world, than to test them and record the number of sucesses and failures? Is the very concept of testing the other methods somehow magically forcing them to fail? That’s absurd. I’m not persuaded you are even aware what you are saying.

which could be completely irrelevant if the matter being studied is not amenable to science.

If. There’s only one way to find out. And if it’s not amenable to science, what is it amenable to and how would you know?

In other words, your statement is not a rational conclusion, but an axiom of your epistemological system. It would be begging the question to use this as an argument for why other methods are less reliable than science.

For the third time, this is false. I have not axiomatically assumed the other methods must always fail to yield useful or true answers. I have concluded that by comparing their performance to science. By noting how often they succeed and how often they fail.

@dga471

Firstly, your assumptions do inherently rule out certain types of objects, behaviors of objects, or scenarios which are not amenable to controlled scientific testing.

No, they don’t. How would they do that? Give an example.

Secondly, that “proven track record” is only such based on your starting assumptions.

Mmm… no.

Thirdly, there could be boxes or other objects which are very different in nature from what science has been successful at studying. Thus science’s track record means little.

There could be all sorts of things. We’ll have to cross that bridge when we get there. Tell you what, when I find a magical box that refuses empirical investigation, I’ll call the ghost busters and then you guys can go nuts quoting scriptures at it, dowse it with sanctified fluids, and pray intensely in it’s general direction. If that manages to open it, or make it talk and tell us where it came from, I’ll recommend you for a job.

@dga471

Usefulness here is again defined with respect to what science is interested in. So again, your definitions of reliability, usefulness - are all conveniently chosen to satisfy your starting assumption of science as the standard by which all methods of knowing must be judged.

No, they’re not conveniently chosen to satisfy any starting assumption. They’re concluded on the basis of experience. I can only repeat myself, if those other methods had been successful, I’d be fine saying they produce knowledge too.

@dga471

I agree with you that there are certain scenarios where you can directly compare the results of knowing via scientific method with other methods.

Thanks.

But there are other scenarios where it doesn’t make sense to compare them (such as knowing whether it is morally right or wrong to do X),

I don’t see why not. After all, if you define what are the conditions for being morally right, or wrong, then you can determine empirically whether doing X satisfies the definition?

[DaleCutler]

@dga471

How would you know if the box can be subjected to controlled tests?

@Rumraket

By doing them.

If ‘the box’ or what is ‘in the box’ is God, don’t we already know that you cannot?

[Rumraket (Mikkel R.)]

@DaleCutler

If ‘the box’ or what is ‘in the box’ is God, don’t we already know that you cannot?

How do we know that? You’ve merely defined God that way.

[DaleCutler]

Your definition of God means that he has material attributes that you can test?

[DaleCutler]

…or that you won’t allow him to be God unless you can subject him to material testing.

[T_aquaticus]

@Rumraket

I will say though, that what makes me somewhat more receptive towards your claim that we can have a rational intuition uniquely on logic, is that unlike many other forms of intuitions, on the topic of the metaphysics of logic it seems to be different.

It is also worth asking how much of that rational intuition is instinctual and how much is learned. There are logical fallacies that seem intuitively logical at first, which is why people commonly commit these fallacies. I think it would be fair to say that we humans have discovered logic in spite of our instinctual biases.

[T_aquaticus]

The creationism v. evolution debate offers an interesting insight into this discussion, IMHO. I think it shows that both sides of the debate have concluded that scientific reasoning carries more weight than religious reasoning.

Why is that? Creationists have tried and tried again to gain scientific legitimacy. At the same time, creationists have tried to cast the theory of evolution as a religion based on faith in an attempt to delegitimize the theory. The actions of creationists tell us that even they think science is valid while religious belief is less valid. Not once do you see someone trying to delegitimize creationism by calling it just another science backed by empirical evidence.

It would seem to me that most of this discussion comes down to pragmatic judgments instead of epistemological ones. We use science because it is the best pragmatic method we have for understanding how the universe works, not because of the axioms that underpin it. We also judge claims by how well they convince us at a personal level. For us atheist skeptics, we tend to be convinced by demonstrable and verifiable evidence, and we are more focused on the method of gaining knowledge. Could skeptical atheists be wrong in some absolute sense? Yes. However, this is the place we start from when approaching claims.

[DaleCutler]

I still think that recognizing that testimony is a legitimate source of evidence is key (and we’ve already established that we all do accept it).

@T_aquaticus

Could skeptical atheists be wrong in some absolute sense? Yes.

Dismissing testimony out of hand because it does not comport with our worldview qualifies for that.

@DaleCutler

And then there’s the experience part.

[Mercer (John Mercer)]

@dga471

I could take it even further: how do you know your mind is able to properly understand and utilize the rules of logic, given that it evolved purely for the purpose of improving evolutionary fitness?

I’d point out that knowing that the selective forces in our evolutionary history frequently mentally blind us to logic helps us to circumvent those tendencies.

This is a great book, keeping in mind that it is almost certainly a gross oversimplification (as most books are):

Amazon.com: Thinking, Fast and Slow (Audible Audio Edition): Daniel Kahneman,...

[T_aquaticus]

@DaleCutler

I still think that recognizing that testimony is a legitimate source of evidence is key (and we’ve already established that we all do accept it).

I don’t accept all testimony. If someone testifies that homeopathy is a valid medical treatment, I will doubt their testimony.

@DaleCutler

Dismissing testimony out of hand because it does not comport with our worldview qualifies for that.

Requiring more evidence before accepting testimony is the prudent thing to do. As the old saying goes, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.

[DaleCutler]

@T_aquaticus

I don’t accept all testimony.

I didn’t mean that you should. There are such things as false evidence and error bars.

@DaleCutler

We are talking about faith and trust – we are each a jury of one and need to be careful that we do not have flawed biases influencing our faith in the validity of our own analyses.

[DaleCutler]

@T_aquaticus

As the old saying goes, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.

And this by an agnostic:

The claim that ocean water [or pick your favorite flavor of prebiotic soup] will in time produce Manhattan [not to mention the Manhatten Symphony] seems to me sufficiently extraordinary to require extraordinary evidence.

That evidence has not been forthcoming.

[T_aquaticus]

@DaleCutler

That evidence has not been forthcoming.

I have said many times that I don’t know how life came about, and for that very reason. I have yet to see evidence.

[DaleCutler]

No, you have yet to recognize that you have seen evidence.

[T_aquaticus]

@DaleCutler

No, you have yet to recognize that you have seen evidence

You are going to have to be more specific.

[DaleCutler]

Another highly recommended book:

The Reason for God: Belief in an Age of Skepticism

[DaleCutler]

I wasn’t referring only to the origin of life.

[T_aquaticus]

You left quite the cliffhanger. You claimed that I had seen evidence, but failed to recognize it. I think we are all curious as to what that evidence is.

[DaleCutler]

If I restate it, you will just deny that it is legitimate evidence for the existence of God because of your predisposition to affirm your worldview (aka confirmation bias). Shall we start with big bang cosmology.