What is materialism?

[Faizal_Ali]

@DaleCutler

The question really is, why does it exist?

Because humans invented it. Why are there marshmallows? Is there a material reason?

[DaleCutler]

I think that is called question begging.

Humans did not invent mathematics, to my way of thinking. We merely discover it. The relationships don’t need us for their existence.

So, is mathematics material?

[Faizal_Ali]

@DaleCutler

Humans did not invent mathematics, to my way of thinking. We merely discover it. The relationships don’t need us for their existence.

That still doesn’t work.

We didn’t invent the process for creating marshmallows. We discovered it. That process would still have been capable of producing marshmallows, even if no one had ever actually discovered and used it.

[DaleCutler]

That still begs the question. Marshmallows are material.

Let me retract that. The idea of the process is immaterial and the material process would still work even if a crow had discovered it. (Oh, I’m thinking of roasting marshmallows. )

Yes, it does work, so you are really agreeing with me. (Perish the thought. )

[DaleCutler]

It’s not entirely unlike Michelangelo’s sculptures. They were all in the marble before he started. I believe it was he that said he was just removing the material that didn’t belong there, or words to that effect. Some of us are just more skilled at discovering.

[nwrickert (Neil Rickert)]

@DaleCutler

Does a piece of metal care that it exhibits ductile or malleable behavior?

I am more interested in the behavior of biological organism, the behavior of chemical reactions, the behavior of vibrating strings, etc.

[DaleCutler]

But why is the concept of material behavior not immaterial?

(I prefer the vibration of baroque strings, and oddly enough, bluegrass strings, too. )

[nwrickert (Neil Rickert)]

@DaleCutler

But why is the concept of material behavior not immaterial?

Call it as you see it. I don’t consider myself a materialist. It is immaterial to me whether behavior is taken to be material or immaterial.

[DaleCutler]

@nwrickert

It is immaterial to me…

Ha!

At least you don’t automatically preclude the existence of the immaterial God.

[jongarvey]

@Faizal_Ali

Mathematics is a system of axiomatic premises and logical processes that we find useful. Why we find it useful is an interesting question. I don’t see how invoking the immaterial solves it.

There’s no need to invoke the immaterial. mathematical universals simply are immaterial. The word simply describes the phenomenon, and so “solves” the problem no more or less than “invoking” the material by describing phenomena by that term.

[Guy_Coe]

The material world informs us of the surprizing goodness, beauty and perfection of its Maker!
“This is my Father’s world… He speaks to me everywhere… Jesus Who died shall be satisfied, and heav’n and earth be one!”
“In the stars His handiwork I see’” :o)

[Faizal_Ali]

@DaleCutler

Yes, it does work, so you are really agreeing with me.

Not quite. My question is whether the fact that the process of making marshmallows refutes materialism, in the strict philosophical sense.

That is to say will a materialist insist that abstract concepts such as those involved in math are material? Or will he say that abstract concepts do not refute materialism. which only entails the rejection of material entities that can have active physical effects on the world (ghosts, gods, souls, spirits, etc.)?

@jongarvey

There’s no need to invoke the immaterial. mathematical universals simply are immaterial. The word simply describes the phenomenon, and so “solves” the problem no more or less than “invoking” the material by describing phenomena by that term.

I guess I’m not explaining myself well.

There are those who reject materialism and, for instance, say that the operation of the human mind can only be explained by an immaterial entity like a “soul.”

A materialist will reject this claim, and state that the mind is completely accounted for by physical brain processes.

If this materialist accepts the existence of math as non-material, how does that pertain to his position on the existence of the mind? I don’t see any inconsistency between the two positions.

[BruceS]

@Faizal_Ali

materialist accepts the existence of math as non-material

Most contemporary analytic philosophers would prefer the term ‘physicalism’ to ‘materialism’, I think. Probably because ‘materialism’ has connotations of matter, and even philosophers know about Einstein’s most famous equation. Physicalism says that the only things that are real are things allowed by our best physics, or things that supervene upon them. Of course, many issues hide in “best” and in “supervene”. See link.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

Abstract objects cause an issue for physicalists. Abstract objects are often defined as those with no spacetime location and no causal properties. The existence of such objects contradicts our best physics, it would seem.

So physicalists will deny the reality of abstract objects, usually though some from of nominalism. Here’s a paragraph on nominalism quoted from the linked Loux & Crisp book:

There are, however, different forms of nominalism. The most extreme version endorses an ontology incorporating only concrete particulars and holds that all claims apparently about universals are just disguised ways of making claims about concrete particulars. There are serious difficulties with this extreme form of nominalism; and those difficulties have led some philosophers to endorse a metalinguistic form of nominalism. This view agrees that the only things that exist are concrete particulars, but holds that claims apparently about universals are really disguised ways of talking about linguistic expressions. There is also the form of nominalism that has been called trope theory. On this view, there are such things as properties or qualities, but they are one and all particular – each can be found in just one object; and the claim is that talk apparently about universals is really just talk about these particular qualities or properties (called tropes; hence the name ‘trope theory’). Finally, there is the form of nominalism called fi ctionalism. On this view, talk about universals is like fictional discourse. It is just an element in a fictional story we tell.

More at this link or in SEP.
https://www.iep.utm.edu/universa/#H3

[BruceS]

@nwrickert

But nobody ever explains what would be the difference between a world where materialism is true and a world where materialism is false. I’m inclined to doubt that there is any such difference.

OK, I’ll bite.
I read you as saying that you don’t recognize that a world where the Judeo-Christian God exists is different from a world where such a God does not exist?

Maybe you are saying there is no way to know about such a difference. And if there is no way to know about a difference, then there is no real difference. (If that latter distinction is what you mean, you are either an anti-realist or an internal realist, at least according to philosophers, for what that is worth.)

[BruceS]

@jongarvey

But it also creates issues about the apparent universals of patterns within nature, which looks to follow regular immaterial mathematical laws apart from human cognition.

I’m not clear on what issues you are referring to.
If you are referring to the mind’s ability to recognize patterns, psychology addresses that. Deep learning in AI shows its physical possibility, although its mechanisms are likely not the ones people use.

If you are referring to the status of laws in philosophy of science, then Humeans will say that the regularities encapsulated in laws are not metaphysical realities, but only are best systems analysis of those regularities that we recognize and formalize via human cognition. And non-Humeans can satisfy themselves of that some form of necessity or dispositions/causation exist because they are countenanced by our best science, while at the same time still accepting the truth of physicalism.

[nwrickert (Neil Rickert)]

@BruceS

I read you as saying that you don’t recognize that a world where the Judeo-Christian God exists is different from a world where such a God does not exist?

I have avoided saying that, and I don’t think it is quite the same thing.

My main point, really, is to say that it would be better to see materialism as a stance that some people take, rather than seeing it as a true or false assertion about the world. Similarly, it would be better to see theism as a stance.

@BruceS

Maybe you are saying there is no way to know about such a difference.

The verb “to know” is fraught with difficulties.

If materialism is a stance, then somebody can know whether they have adopted that stance. And if the particular stance (materialism, or its converse) changes how you understand the world, then you would believe that you know about the difference that this makes. Nevertheless, nobody has ever pointed out something that I can actually test that would allow me to conclude whether materialism is true.

[BruceS]

@nwrickert

If materialism is a stance

That is a position on physicalism that also makes sense to me. It is one supported by a minority of philosophers. Given that philosophical support, if you still are comfortable with your position, then that falsifies the conjecture I made at TSZ claiming that the intersection of your ideas and those advanced by any philosopher is in fact the empty set.

From SEP
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#PhyAtt

In view of the difficulties posed by Hempel’s dilemma and related problems, some philosophers have explored the interesting idea that to be a physicalist is not to hold some thesis or belief – that is, to hold something that may be true or false – but is rather to adopt a kind of attitude or stance.

[BruceS]

@DaleCutler

In the real world, if you get 10,000 heads, you recognize that something else is going on

Here is an introduction to some ideas that formalize that intuition. The paper tries to answer the question

The [all-heads] sequence doesn’t seem likely to have resulted from tossing a fair coin. But why not? What does [a human observer] expect a fair-coin sequence to look like?

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/225562683_The_miraculous_universal_distribution

(You do not have to join researchgate to download; just click “Download pdf” in upper right and wait a bit for download to start).

[Faizal_Ali]

@DaleCutler

In the real world, if you get 10,000 heads, you recognize that something else is going on. Think about that, yourself.

If I had memorized any particular sequence of 10,000 flips, and then one day that exact sequence came up, yeah I’d find it really weird.

I doubt that has ever happened to anyone, though. Unless you can give an example?

[DaleCutler]

@Faizal_Ali

Unless you can give an example?

Sets of providential co-instants infused with meaning, even life-changing meaning? You have already seen several over our mutual tenure here of the I don’t know how many hundreds that I’ve documented. I’m sure it exceeds a thousand. I’ve also cited other Christians’. So I’m not going to bother reposting any because they won’t be any more compelling to you then before – your worldview disallows the concept, let alone the reality.