What is not a legitimate theological claim, and why?
I am simply finding an explanation that is logically consistent with the axioms that I hold. There is nothing logically wrong with that.
We might have a different understanding of the role of the soul. I have affirmed many times in this forum that I believe that physics is closed. This is a personal belief and not Catholic doctrine. A philosophical-zombie will act the exact same way if it is ensouled. Said in other words: a person without a soul has no detectable difference from a person with one.
First, Humani Generis does not mention DNA, so I know that it does not refer to humanity based on some DNA definition, further, it uses the term âtrue menâ, which to me indicates that there are human who are not âtrue menâ.
I have stated explicitly that I know that there is no de fide pronouncement on evolution.
That is good, and true - but demonstrates that moral certainties cannot and must not be formed by science. After all, the early anthropologists opposed Christian monogenism on the basis of objective measures of the lack of âworthâ of primitive peoples such as cultural attainment, intelligence and even moral qualities like idleness and promiscuity.
The Eugenicists from Galton on put that on an apparently sounder evolutionary footing (read Haeckel or the Cambridge Natural History on the gap between the races.)
In the earlier twentieth century, the Catholic Church was dogged in its opposition to the Eugenics Movement, on the basis of Adamic monogenism, and was castigated as anti-scientific on that basis (to the extent that articles in Margaret Sangerâs Birth Control Review hinted that Catholics themselves would probably be found genetically inferior and unproductive, a situation [which] is anti-social, perhaps gravely so.
After the Holocaust, of course, the moral instincts of the intelligentsia changed, and presumably coincidentally, the evolutionary monogenism of humanity and, more significantly, its ongoing thorough mixing, has given scientific support to that.
But had that not happened, on what basis would one say the Eugenicists were misled in seeing the superstition of Catholics (and, it must be added, many traditional Protestants) as immoral or dangerous to society because they were pitting a mythical concept like âthe equality of Adamâs childrenâ against the clear pattern of nature, to the detriment of human survival?
But by your own observations of the analysis, and by definition, the diversity in the human race cant be from the legacy genes provided by Adam and Eveâs meager contribution. Todayâs current diversity has to emerge in post-Adam generations!
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And for the statement above to be true at all, dont we have to move Adam back half a million years? This seems like a pretty weak solution.
In comparison, if we are looking at geneaological progenitorshipâŚwe all are equal in our lack of Adamâs legacy genetics!
If thatâs so, then youâre telling @T_aquaticus that his valuing of human worth and value is, at best, as uncertain as that of the Eugenicists. They, however, did at least provide scientific evidence.
I think it boils down to the Is/Ought problem. We canât determine what we should do from what is. At least in my view, morality is subjective which doesnât lend itself to objective methods like the scientific method.
Eugenics was just old-time racism pretending to be science. The theory of evolution only says that the less fit tend to have fewer grandchildren. The theory never proscribes killing or sterilizing the less fit. You might as well cite the theory of gravity as a reason for tossing people off of tall buildings.
Yes. Morality doesnât make sense outside of the subjective needs and wants of humans. This blog post sums up most of my views on subjective vs. objective morality, if you are interested:
Iâm presuming that a theological claim must be based on something beyond your personal imagination. Is that wrong?
It seems kind of a pinhead-dancing exercise, doesnât it? It also seems that the more ad hoc assumptions you have to make, the less interesting your scenario becomes. Would you agree?
What is the role of the soul? Is it possible for a person to know whether or not they have one?
In addition, I would say that a theological claim is a claim on a metaphysical realm of the world.
Inasmuch as we have to hold many other beliefs axiomatically, I donât see how this one is more problematic than others. Again, my issue with your claim that this or that axiom is ad hoc or that this or that axiom makes a particular scenario less interesting is because I fail to see how such arguments can be written rigorously. This does not make your argument wrong, but it makes this argument very hard for me to engage.
To me, the only thing that can discount a scenario is if a particular axiom is not logically consistent. Note that to get here, I already have to assume many things, including the particular logical system(s) that I use. I do not have the right, for example, to discount the ultra-skeptic assumption that doubts even the existence of logical systems (and with it the existence of axioms).
Now, onto this question:
In my belief, the soul does not have a âuseâ or a âroleâ in the physical world. For example, it is not a tool by which we use to act our free will upon the world. It is something that is just ontologically there.
This seem to point that there is a mismatch between our ontologies (again, in our axioms). I am not a materialist, so I believe there are ontologically real things that are not part of the physical world. Physics cannot be used to probe truths on metaphysical claims.
I can never see how the Euthyphro âparadoxâ applies at all to the God of classical Christianity, though it makes more sense in pre-Christian Platonism. In Christianity, God is not simply a supreme being, but the source of all being, and his will is his rectitude is his justice is his power, mercy, love and so on. Thatâs the context in which to consider an absolute morality from God, and not the Platonic God derived, perhaps unconsciously, from Zeus, who was born of the cosmos.
And since all those things are not attributes that God acquires accidentally, but things that originate in Godâs very being, there can be no conflict between them, and no true alternatives to them.
Therefore, there are a number of fallacies in @T_aquaticus subjective morality argument. The first is that God is not simply another âvoteâ to add to the opinions of men - he is the final source of the opinions of men as Creator.
The argument that, in theory, God could disagree with all men ignores God as the maker of all men, including their nature and, specifically, their wills. In the end, we have no original opinions, but only what is either in accord with, or in negation of, our God-given nature.
That people are not as united in their moral outlook as, say, the cuckoo or the koala are in theirs is, in Christian theology, an aberration due to rebellion. And that makes the context for St Paul to be able to write, âLet God be true, and every man a liar.â What matters is the account we give of our conduct to our maker, not just how people choose to relate.
In fields other than morality, itâs absolutely the case that all men can be wrong and God right, and itâs the former that have to move. Not long ago it was near-universal to believe that the earth, of all cosmic entities, does not move. The Creator, of course, knew better - and Galileo and Co had to catch up, a few thousand years late. If thatâs not a problem regarding the laws of nature, why should it be one with the laws of conduct?
In fact, there is demonstrably a universal sense of morality underlying the many differences in human behaviour. For example, in world affairs the âamoralâ dictator covers his deeds with hypocrisy - Stalin has his show-trials, Nazis hide their holocaust, and so on. And when those people fall, it is usually because some moral universal of justice prevails against what has been going on.
Presumably you would also discount a set of axioms that were not mutually consistent and would have to abandon at least one.
Now, in mathematics one attempts to minimize the number of axioms. Is that true of theology also? It seems that any notion at all could be rescued by introducing a new axiom or three, and that the problem of inconsistency is easily avoided with a little effort. And it also seems as if this can lead to chaos, with vast proliferation of axioms and no way to choose among axioms and scenarios.
Let me remind you that âroleâ is your word. You have answered neither of my questions. What is the role of the soul, in any world? Is it possible to know whether or not you have one?
Yes, thatâs a common defense. It will make no sense to anyone who isnât already a committed Christian. Itâs just victory by definition. You really canât do that.
Is he not then the source of rebellion? How can anyone act other than in accord with their god-given nature? This idea doesnât hold together.