Free Will and Theism

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282

It seems obvious to me.

Definition 2 : Entity P is said to “infallibly know” proposition A only if in every possible world W: P believes A in W if A holds in W, and P believes non-A in W if non-A holds in W.

Let A be “Faizal ate waffles last Tuesday morning.”

In world W, Faizal didn’t eat waffles last Tuesday morning.

Therefore, A is false in world W. Or, one could say “Non-A holds in W.”

According to Definition 2, Entity P believes non-A in W.

But you are saying it is possible in world W for P to “know A”, which would entail that it does not believe non-A, but instead believes A.

How? That would directly contradict Definition 2.

Yes. But it does not follow that what is true about A in one possible world is necessarily true in all possible worlds. That seems to be your error.

283

Where in my discussing of infallibly knowing by Definition 2 do I say this?

What specifically do I say that makes it seem to you like I am making this error? When, in all of my treatment of Def. 2 of infallibly knowing, have I insisted that A must have the same truth-value in all possible worlds?

I have explained why I find that definition unsatisfactory, yes. But I do not understand what error I made when ever I assumed and discussed it, that would have it look like I failed to understand its implications.

284

Here:

On this, I seem to have misread you. My apologies.

285

Here, too, it would appear you are misreading me. “P infallibly knows A and A is false” is not the same as “P knows A and A is false”. This was, in fact, one of my main points in that analysis of Definition 2: The way it is constructed, infallibly knowing would not technically imply knowing. This is precisely why I find Definition 2 to be a… let’s say awkward definition for “infallibly knowing”. In normal usage of a phrase like that I would want to mean a kind of knowing when speaking of infallibly knowing, and I would expect that this is what others mean when they use such phrasing. Definition 2 allows for an infallibly known statement to be non-necessary, but at the cost of losing this very intuitive seeming connotation.

286

Why not?

287

Well, let’s review the definition:

Definition 2 : Entity P is said to “infallibly know” proposition A only if in every possible world W: P believes A in W if A holds in W, and P believes non-A in W if non-A holds in W.

Paul_King suggested “justified true belief” as the definition of knowledge. A lot of philosophical discussion concerning problems and edge cases of this definition has been had, but it wouldn’t serve us here to account for all such nuances. So let’s instead just take it at face value and define:

Entity P is said to “know” proposition A if and only if the following three conditions obtain:

  • A is true.
  • P believes A.
  • P is justified in their belief of A.

Now, let’s for simplicity’s sake grant that P is always justified to believe what they do about A, just so we don’t have to keep saying it explicitly. I omitted this from Definition 2 for the sake of simplicity, and paid for it by making the definition a specification of necessary conditions only, rather than necessary and sufficient ones. Further, let’s assume P infallibly knows A as defined in Definition 2. Note, that both of these assumptions are treated as a given from now on.

By definition, we have assumed then, that P has a correct and justified belief of the truth-value of A in all possible worlds: In a world where A holds, P knows A. In a world where A holds not, P knows not-A. Importantly, there is no reason to say that the latter case is impossible. This was the entire point of constructing this definition: Allowing for infallibly knowing a proposition without that proposition being true in all possible worlds.

Notice also, that in this latter case, P knows that not-A. P believes that not-A, and does not believe that A. Also, A is not true, not-A is. Therefore the statement “P knows A” is not true in that world, but “P infallibly knows A” was and remains a given throughout all of this. That is to say, there exists a possible world, where the statement “P knows A” is false, even given “P infallibly knows A” is true. Therefore, the implication “P infallibly knows A” \to “P knows A” does not always hold.

288

Where is all this going? I believe I now know what you mean by definition 2, and it has the unfortunate effect of obscuring the subject. If by “P knows A” we mean that P knows whether A is true or false, that’s just unclear language that should be avoided. But I ask again, where is all this going?

289

It is common practice to say “P knows A” when one means that P knows A to be true. In the same way one says “P knows not-A” to mean that P knows A to be false, or not-A to be true. I did not go out of my way to avoid shorthands of this sort for clarity, but I think given the context and usage, this was clear enough. I did go out of my way to say things like “P knows the truth-value of A” and “P knows A when A holds and not-A when A holds not”, when I meant to express that P’s beliefs were correct about A irrespective of what they were, specifically.

As to where this is going: I made the assertion that if the future is a matter of fact, then it cannot be a matter of choice, i.e. that libertarian free will (a still fairly common notion of free will) is not compatible with infallible knowledge of all events (a fairly common attribute assigned to gods). I was challenged on that point, tried at first to make the case in defense of that position with natural language, and got increasingly more formal as ambiguities and imprecisions were pointed out. This is not so much building up to an argument yet to be fully expressed, as it is a defense of a position already voiced.

290

Thanks for the clarification. But regardless of (or perhaps because of) the formalism, I don’t understand how knowledge of the future is incompatible with libertarian free will.

291

But why are you going off on weird and idiosyncratic definitions of “infallibly knows”? Doesn’t that just sabotage any argument you might make? The use of modal logic seems both unnecessary and contrary to the usual meaning.

Why not just say that infallible knowledge of the future requires a form of fatalism (in the broad sense) ?

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292

Libertarian free will is in one sense or another the freedom to choose between alternatives. If there are no alternatives, there is no libertarian free will. There are no alternative facts. If statements about future occurrences are matters of fact, then there cannot be a choosing of alternative truth-values for them.

I did, with that word directly, and without, both before and after the linked instance. I was challenged to explain, so I tried in different ways, becoming more formal lately, in an effort to remedy imprecisions and ambiguities of earlier attempts.

293

I think that no matter the degree of formality, a case can be made that knowing a future decision does not necessitate that the future decision is contingent on that foreknowledge. You can readily conceptualize that a decision can be freely made in the future, and a notification sent to the present. Star Trek is constantly messing up the timelines with this sort of thing. Of course, as four dimensional entropy bound creatures, we are not able to send any such information, so such foreknowledge is the exclusive prerogative of the supernatural which would not be constrain to our understanding in any case.

294

I don’t think that creating a lot of arguments over definitions is really helping, especially as I don’t see any point in invoking modal logic at all. The point of “infallible knowledge” is just to emphasise that it really can’t be wrong. But the only valid statement in modal logic seems to be that there is no possible world where P infallibly knows A and A is false.

295

But if the future is known, does that mean there are no alternatives or merely that one alternative or other must be chosen? If there is a possible world in which A was chosen and another possible world in which not-A was chosen, how does knowing what choice was made invalidate the choice?

296

OK, with that digression out of the way we are back here. And I still do not see how you justify THIS position. But I also have no more to say on the subject. If you do not accept my position after the clarification offered by @misterme987 here, I am at a loss as to what else I can say.

297

Surely if someone says “event E will occur or it will not occur”, we would not really say they have in any meaningful sense knowledge of the future, would we? If they know, however, that event E will occur, then surely it cannot be the case that E does not occur, or can it? After all, if somoene has knowledge of a statement, then it cannot be the case that the statement is false.

So if someone has knowledge that the statement “E will occur” is true, then the alternative wherein E fails to occur does not exist. Therefore there is no freedom anybody has to choose any course of action that would prevent E – a fated event – from occurring. Nobody can choose a fact to be false.

Now we iterate upon the argument: If all of the future can be known, then all of the future is fact. Libertarian free will is thereby precluded.

298

Thank you nevertheless for an interesting and challenging discussion. :slight_smile:

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299

@gisteron,

How many times shall we use the phrase: “Libertarian freewill is the freedom to choose between alternatives”? It seems like a clause just begging to cause confusion.

Maybe if we invert this clause, things become more obvious more quickly:

“There is no libertarian freewill if a divine being, or a telepath, or a machine, can reliably forecast a moral agent’s future selection of a choice between 2 or more alternatives. The explanation is if a person’s choice is reliably known then no factor or causal affect can change the agent’s choice, right up to the moment the choice is made.”

What else should we add to make the explanation of libertarian freewill more self explanatory?

300

If some challenge me to explain why I adopt a particular position, I’m happy to oblige. If you feel that my repeated and increasingly technical explanations were unnecessary because the thing I tried to explain was obvious or intuitive to you all along, that’s fine. I shall take no offense for your choosing to just scroll by it all for that reason.

301

That argument is replete with tensed language (“will”, “will not”) and talk about the “future”. But on the Boethian view of divine time, God views all events as an eternal present. There is no “will” and “was” and “future” and “past” for him. His knowledge about what people choose is different from the claim that he knows what people will choose.

Earlier, you said that your use of tensed language was just uncautious, but I think it’s fundamental to your argument. Otherwise, you have to rely on a strange view of infallibility where infallible knowledge of a proposition entails that the proposition is necessarily true.

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