I tend to regard “belief” as an emotional commitment to some proposition. Such commitments may be hard to shift even in the face of evidence that undermines that commitment.
You have to distinguish between falsifiable in principle, in isolation from any data, and falsifiable in light of prior observations. Is a hypothesis that has survived a great many attempts at falsification still falsifiable? Consider, for example, the hypothesis that there are things called atoms. Is that falsifiable? Is there anything we could do now to convince us that atoms do not exist?
As for God, he seems unnecessary to explain anything we see, and much of what we see seems inconsistent with his proposed nature of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence. Thus I conclude that such a being probably doesn’t exist. What would falsify that conclusion would have been a rather different world, but it’s a bit late for that.
Now, some different sort of God could provide evidence of his existence by manifesting in some way, perhaps as a burning bush or pillar of fire. But given the data of the world, that still wouldn’t be the person you’re thinking of.
You kindly answered my questions, I decided to rewrite them in a simpler way as bullets underneath the questions. I fail to see how misunderstood anything then. Perhaps someone else can explain since I don’t see it.
There is not a single proposition “unbelief”, it is a compound of lack of belief in a number of propositions: God, Allah, Odin, Angels, Ghosts, etc, etc. Each proposition would need to be evaluated separately.
Each of these individual lack-of-belief-in-X propositions can be falsified, by incontrovertible proof that X (be that X God, or Allah, or Odin, or Angels, or Ghosts, etc, etc) exists.
Why is it more plausible than belief?
Not a meaningful question, as for the reasons I’ve already stated, neither “belief” nor “unbelief” is a single proposition. The only way you can evaluate that question is to evaluate it individually for all values of X.
May I suggest you put more thought into your questions. I am getting rather tired of dealing with woolly and/or incoherent ones. Life is really too short to try and formulate meaningful answers to badly formulated questions.
Ok, so your unbelief is unfalsifiable unless there is incontrovertible proof of a religion or the supernatural. What counts as incontrovertible proof? (Just making sure your unbelief is not completely unfalsifiable)
Ok, your unbelief is more plausible because you have evaluated X?
That is not what I said. And I am getting really really tired of correcting your logical foul-ups.
I don’t think you understood what I was trying to say, and I’m really not interested in trying to explain it further, given the failure of all my previous attempts.
I’m restating what you wrote in terms of the questions I asked to show you that unbelief is not a neutral proposition. In the terms you are defining it as, it starts from the premise that unbelief is unfalsifiable.
Im sure there are other atheists who are open-minded but I don’t think you are.