That seems to be in reference to the ideal situation. But how does that work when there are several different hypotheses, like QM, where there’s no consensus on any one interpretation? And what about models like the Big Bang, that even today there are scientists who are still proposing alternative models? And apart from that, there is still the problem of accurate predictions from incorrect theories. How is that dealt with?
It seems so. Of course evidence will be empirically accessible, otherwise it wouldn’t be evidence. But whether the object/event in question is empirically accessible can only mean one thing, as far as I can tell, that it can be observed or experienced directly.
I’m using kind to mean an animal type. So from one kind to another would be e.g., an ape evolving into a human, or a water dwelling fish evolving into a land dwelling animal.
So what do you mean by populations?
Would you agree with this definition of judgment?
Judgment : Decision that something - usually an idea or statement - is true or false, or probable or improbable, or good or bad.
The reason to distinguish judgments is that there are - it seems - choices that something is true, probable or good, or any of its opposites, that differ from non-judgements that something is red, or sweet, or painful, that seem to be just given and unavoidable given one’s sensations, and either need no judgement at all, or are judgments only in a weak and attenuated sense.
The reason there are judgments is precisely because what is judged is neither simple nor directly given or accessible in sensation, but requires comparison along several dimensions; weighing evidence; balancing desires, beliefs and knowledge; consulting diverse sources, both in oneself, in others and in books; and needs reference, for a sound decision (one that will probably turn out to have been correct later, and then often in the sense that one has not grievously erred through passion or prejudice), to what one has learned.
And indeed, skillful knowledge is recognized by sound judgment - decisions that such and such is true (or not), or a good option (or not), that later turn out to be mostly correct, and that either cannot be made at all by less skillful men, or are much less often correct when judged by less skillful men.
Also, it is noteworthy that much skilled judgment is required and involved in distinguishing one’s own and each other’s imaginations, fantasies and fictions, from real, possible or probable fact or desirable end.
Is this what you meant by “I’ve discussed why already?”
If so, going with scientific processes, I’m wondering how scientific judgments are not in some sense “dependent on contingent social and ethical values, nor on the individual bias of a scientist?” The fact that it seems there are cases where scientific judgments are disputed is evidence that indicates in those cases they are at least in some degree epistemologically subjective.
Now I would imagine that there are cases where, because the evidence is such that there is only one option, or at least only one probable option, they would fall into a range of being either epistemologically objective or at least intersubjective.
But generally speaking it seems like scientific judgments would be in some sense epistemologically subjective in nature since they’re not epistemologically objective by default, but are only so in cases where it’s provided by sufficient evidence. I would also assume this would apply to all domains of knowledge inside or outside of science.