Objective Direct and Indirect Evidence, and Subjective Inferences

Falsification is when a theory makes false predictions. In science, for every hypothesis there is a null hypothesis which are the conditions under which the hypothesis is false.

A modified theory is a new theory.

I would say that most modern scientific theories are not expected to fundamentally change. There may be a few modifications at the fringes of theories, but most are thought to be very likely true. Still, scientists still keep an open mind.

How do you decide when it is time to stop looking for a natural cause?

I don’t make arguments for causes that are not empirically accessible. How would you do that?

1 Like

Where did I say that? I don’t like “truth” as a concept. I find I can use “reality” and “accuracy” to better convey what I am trying to say and tend to avoid using “truth” as a word.

I mean converging on reality! :slight_smile:

Well then, we are using “unobservable” in a different sense. I often qualify with “however indirectly” to clarify that I am including observation enhanced by scientific instruments, detectors etc.

Oh, sorry. As a layperson, when I said that I wasn’t thinking about the actual processes involved in formulating and testing hypothesis. I simply meant to say that, in light of accurate predictions having been made by past theories that are now no longer accepted, it seems predictions may be somewhat, but not very substantial indications of confirmation. Sorry if that wasn’t clear.

The subjective inferences would generally be the theoretical aspects, and the objective evidences, i.e., empirical, mathematical, mechanical, etc., which the inferences are drawn from would generally be the other aspects.

I’m sorry if you got that impression. That was not at all my intention. I’m simply trying to understand what’s going on as best I can. Sometimes I don’t express what I’m trying to say as clearly as I should. Again, I apologize.

This is more or less what I’m getting at. I don’t see how it can be the most important because of the fact that incorrect theories can make accurate predictions.

Again, I don’t see how predictions provide any substantial amount of an advantage, particularly when it comes to inferences, which is the issue I’m concerned with. There may be particular cases in that regard where a prediction might give science an advantage over other fields of study.

But that, I think, would largely depend on how the prediction was formulated, and how much the prediction is directed towards the theoretical aspect of a theory. But even then, if the theory is faulty that doesn’t preclude predictions being made from it that are accurate. So taking those things into consideration, it seems like predictions would not lend much of an advantage generally speaking.

Aren’t judgments, scientific or otherwise, based on subjective reasoning? I agree that questioning the objective scientific aspects require doing science. But aren’t judgments in any field of study for the most part a philosophically centered endeavor?

OK. Although to make that statement a bit more precise I would clarify that it’s the scientists who make the predictions.

Here’s what I found on Wikipedia about hypothesis and predictions. Does it generally sound ok to you?

Though diverse models for the scientific method are available, there is in general a continuous process that includes observations about the natural world. People are naturally inquisitive, so they often come up with questions about things they see or hear, and they often develop ideas or hypotheses about why things are the way they are. The best hypotheses lead to predictions that can be tested in various ways. The most conclusive testing of hypotheses comes from reasoning based on carefully controlled experimental data. Depending on how well additional tests match the predictions, the original hypothesis may require refinement, alteration, expansion or even rejection. If a particular hypothesis becomes very well supported, a general theory may be developed.

Any useful hypothesis will enable predictions, by reasoning including deductive reasoning. It might predict the outcome of an experiment in a laboratory setting or the observation of a phenomenon in nature…
It is essential that the outcome of testing such a prediction be currently unknown. Only in this case does a successful outcome increase the probability that the hypothesis is true. If the outcome is already known, it is called a consequence and should have already been considered while formulating the hypothesis

I would say after several decades of research that not only doesn’t come up with anything, but keeps uncovering more difficulties and making a natural explanation more and more improbable, that’s a pretty good indication that it’s time to at least start considering alternative explanations.

Also when evidence makes a compelling case for it. For example, in the case of a natural cause of the universe, since all the available evidence points to a beginning, that would be a strong indication that the initial cause would not be natural.

Not sure what you are wanting to say when you say you don’t make such arguments. But let me give an example of what I’m talking about. As far as I know, change from one kind of animal into another is not an empirically accessible event, since it happens over millions of years.

Therefore it seems it isn’t a humanly possible observation to make in the sense of seeing it in the present, nor does it seem possible to be reproduced in an experiment. This would also seem to be the case for other past events like the beginning of the universe.

If such is the case, and inferences are made for such events based on relevant, howbeit indirect evidence, then it seems it would be fair game to argue for the supernatural in a similar fashion.

Jim, you’re utterly wrong. An essential aspect of a scientific hypothesis is that it is clear and specific enough that we all agree on the empirical predictions it makes.

That’s why science is so much more powerful than retrospective inferences. That’s why pseudoscientists avoid testing hypotheses and pretend that science is just about interpreting existing data.

Then we are working from radically different definitions of “empirically accessible,” since evolutionary theory makes rigorous empirical predictions. You’re missing the important fact that the predictions aren’t necessarily about what will happen in the future, they are about what we will directly observe in the future, including discovering new evidence from past events.

And by the way, evolution only happens to populations and “kind” is meaningless in the context you’ve used it.

Apologies for quick drive-by. Real life remains very demanding, currently.

No. Scientific judgements are not subjective.

Sorry, I think we are going in circles because you use the word ‘subjective’ incorrectly. I’ve discussed why already, so I will let it go.

That seems to be in reference to the ideal situation. But how does that work when there are several different hypotheses, like QM, where there’s no consensus on any one interpretation? And what about models like the Big Bang, that even today there are scientists who are still proposing alternative models? And apart from that, there is still the problem of accurate predictions from incorrect theories. How is that dealt with?

It seems so. Of course evidence will be empirically accessible, otherwise it wouldn’t be evidence. But whether the object/event in question is empirically accessible can only mean one thing, as far as I can tell, that it can be observed or experienced directly.

I’m using kind to mean an animal type. So from one kind to another would be e.g., an ape evolving into a human, or a water dwelling fish evolving into a land dwelling animal.

So what do you mean by populations?

Would you agree with this definition of judgment?
Judgment : Decision that something - usually an idea or statement - is true or false, or probable or improbable, or good or bad.

The reason to distinguish judgments is that there are - it seems - choices that something is true, probable or good, or any of its opposites, that differ from non-judgements that something is red, or sweet, or painful, that seem to be just given and unavoidable given one’s sensations, and either need no judgement at all, or are judgments only in a weak and attenuated sense.

The reason there are judgments is precisely because what is judged is neither simple nor directly given or accessible in sensation, but requires comparison along several dimensions; weighing evidence; balancing desires, beliefs and knowledge; consulting diverse sources, both in oneself, in others and in books; and needs reference, for a sound decision (one that will probably turn out to have been correct later, and then often in the sense that one has not grievously erred through passion or prejudice), to what one has learned.

And indeed, skillful knowledge is recognized by sound judgment - decisions that such and such is true (or not), or a good option (or not), that later turn out to be mostly correct, and that either cannot be made at all by less skillful men, or are much less often correct when judged by less skillful men.

Also, it is noteworthy that much skilled judgment is required and involved in distinguishing one’s own and each other’s imaginations, fantasies and fictions, from real, possible or probable fact or desirable end.

Is this what you meant by “I’ve discussed why already?”

If so, going with scientific processes, I’m wondering how scientific judgments are not in some sense “dependent on contingent social and ethical values, nor on the individual bias of a scientist?” The fact that it seems there are cases where scientific judgments are disputed is evidence that indicates in those cases they are at least in some degree epistemologically subjective.

Now I would imagine that there are cases where, because the evidence is such that there is only one option, or at least only one probable option, they would fall into a range of being either epistemologically objective or at least intersubjective.

But generally speaking it seems like scientific judgments would be in some sense epistemologically subjective in nature since they’re not epistemologically objective by default, but are only so in cases where it’s provided by sufficient evidence. I would also assume this would apply to all domains of knowledge inside or outside of science.

Not at all. That is how it’s done in real life. That’s why ID is obviously pseudoscience.

Different hypotheses make different predictions.

We’re waiting to test the predictions of the alternative models.

Further tests of predictions.

Would you mind trying a bit harder to respond to what I actually write, Jim? How on earth could my statement, “An essential aspect of a scientific hypothesis is that it is clear and specific enough that we all agree on the empirical predictions it makes,” be falsified by the existence of multiple competing hypotheses?

That’s a standard IDCreationist pseudoscientific trope.

“Kind” and “type” are weasel words. We have far more rigorous classifications. Why do you refuse to use them?

That’s absurd. Humans ARE apes.

What I mean is that your characterization of evolution as:

is false. A single animal doesn’t evolve. Only populations evolve.

This isn’t that hard, man.

depend on the definitions we choose.

how we can falsify evolution? what do you think about human fossil with a dino?

Seems the issues I raised haven’t been addressed directly, or at least not very substantively. So I’ll try again.

For more than 80 years scientists have made no significant progress in coming up with a theory for QM that can be agreed upon, or even to have a consensus on. Also there are still scientists that don’t accept the big bang model after so many years, and there have also been past accepted theories of which the theoretical aspects have been quite significantly overturned by new theories.

To me, that seems to indicate that there is really no difference in resolving theoretical aspects of science than in any other philosophical conundrums in other field of study. This, I think, should give scientists pause to be a bit more humble when it comes to promoting the success of theoretical aspects of science. I know you disagree, but why?

Another of the issues I raised is how predictions can be shown to be mediocre means of confirming the theoretical aspects of a theory. This, I think, should also give scientists pause as to how much confidence they put in predictions when it comes to confirming theoreticals. How do you reconcile this issue in respect to how you seem to highly rate the power of predictions in a confirmatory role?

And to repeat what I said about empirical accessibility:

But whether the object/event in question is empirically accessible can only mean one thing, as far as I can tell, that it can be observed or experienced directly. Since you seem to disagree I would be interested to know why.

It seems that you’re not trying at all.

I don’t agree. Your use of the phrase “a theory for QM” is grossly inaccurate. You don’t seem to grasp the difference between hypotheses and theories.

And consensus isn’t the goal. It’s about empirical testing of hypotheses.

Jim, this is nonsense. Theories are overturned by data, not new theories.

Your definition of “theoretical aspects” has no basis in my reality as a working scientist.

I also noticed that you went from a single case (QM) to all of science. What exactly was your justification for doing so? I seem to have missed that. :grinning:

Yes, you wrote:

And I replied:

At no point have you even tried to show that predictions are “mediocre means of confirming the theoretical aspects of a theory.” So why are you claiming that it “can be shown” now? It seems very arrogant from where I sit.

As I wrote:

Why are you pretending that I did not reply?

Only the predictions need to be “empirically accessible.” Evolutionary theory has an enormous track record of correct empirical predictions. You don’t seem to have addressed a single one yet.

Why are you constantly coining neologisms?

Something tells me we’re talking past each other. Is it possible that you hold the position that of all the disciplines only science can give us knowledge of reality?

No. We’re talking past each other because I’m talking about the reality of science, while you aren’t.

Hmm. I’m only raising issues that I believe are raised by both various scientists and philosophers of science. So maybe your idea of reality is different than theirs (?), and that would explain why you don’t seem to be engaging with these particular issues.

If that’s the case, it’s fine if you want to take the position that they are non-issues. But I’m not sure that would change the fact that there is warrant for arguing that they are real issues that need to be dealt with.

Why wouldn’t you cite them, then?

Let’s see what’s different. Since you used the plural, how about if you do the reality check and cite two of these people who have written anything resembling your phrase,

or even the smaller phrase “theoretical aspects of theories,” which makes absolutely no sense.

I’m not the one failing to engage, Jim.

Again, as a reality check, how about if you quote two more of these “various scientists and philosophers of science” who pretend that testing hypotheses empirically is not an iterative process? I’ve pointed that out to you twice to no effect.

I’m saying that they aren’t issues because they make no sense. I’m challenging you to show “various scientists and philosophers of science” who frame things the way you do.

I think this would this be in line with issues I’ve mentioned.

The Realist/Anti-Realist Debate
“In response some realists have defended ‘selective realism’ which concedes that while the majority of theories from the history of science have proven false, some of them have components that were retained in subsequent theories—these tend to be the components that were responsible for novel successes. Putative examples of this phenomenon are the caloric theory of heat and nineteenth century optical theories (Psillos 1999: Ch. 6), both of which were ultimately rejected as false but which had components that were retained in subsequent theories; these were the portions that were responsible for their novel confirmations.[19] So in line with the ultimate argument the claim is made that novel successes constitute a serious argument for the truth of the theory component which generates them. However, antirealists have responded by citing cases of theoretical claims that were subsequently determined to be entirely false but which managed nonetheless to generate impressive records of novel predictions. These include certain key claims made by Johannes Kepler in his Mysterium Cosmographicum (1596), assumptions used by Adams and Leverrier in the prediction of the planet Neptune’s existence and location (Lyons 2006), and Ptolemaic astronomy (Carman & Díez 2015).”

Not sure why you brought it up? I’m not aware that I ever raised that as an issue?

Jim,

There’s nothing whatsoever in that quote about “theoretical aspects of theories,” or " how predictions can be shown to be mediocre means of confirming the theoretical aspects of a theory," or “past accepted theories of which the theoretical aspects have been quite significantly overturned by new theories,” (theories are overturned by data, not new theories) so I’m left to conclude that you just fabricated those bizarre ideas.

Are you kidding? QM is used everywhere in everyday life. Flat screen monitors are 100% QM.

1 Like